The Exception Makes the Rule: Reply to Howson

Abstract

Colin Howson argues that (1) my sociologistic reliabilism sheds no light on the objectivity of epistemic content, and that (2) sorites does not threaten the reliability of modus ponens. I reply that argument (1) misrepresents my position, and that argument (2) is beside the point.

Acknowledgements

For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay, I thank David Bloor, Martin Kusch, Alex Rueger, and Martin Tweedale.

Notes

[1] Kochan (2009) argues that the account of objectivity advanced by Howson’s former teacher, Karl Popper, can be interpreted in sociologistic terms.

[2] Kochan (forthcoming) discusses the topic–resource distinction in more detail.

[3] See Bloor (1997, ch. 5) and Kusch (2004). Howson also confuses my concept of ‘existential agreement’ with a Peircean notion of truth as convergence of opinion (i.e., ‘epistemic agreement’) even though I clearly rejected this latter position (Kochan 2008, 33).

[4] Since McGee (1985, 468) contrasts his compound conditionals with ‘simple’ conditionals, Howson’s claim that McGee is dealing in ‘fairly simple cases’ is questionable.