On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson

Abstract

Howson's critique of my essay on Hume's problem of induction levels two main charges. First, Howson claims that I have attributed to him an error that he never made, and in fact which he warned against in the very text that I cite. Secondly, Howson argues that my proposed solution to Hume's problem is flawed on technical and philosophical grounds. In response to the first charge, I explain how Howson's text justifies attributing to him the claim that the principle of induction is shown to be inconsistent by Goodman's riddle. In regards to the second, I show that Howson's objections rest on misunderstandings of formal learning theory and on conflating the problem of induction with the problem of unconceived alternatives.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Oliver Schulte for helpful discussion regarding this essay.

Notes

In fact, given how logical reliability was defined in my essay, the method that follows PI but does not generate new hypotheses is logically reliable in Howson's inductive problem. That is, the definition states that, for any h in the hypothesis set, the method eventually stabilizes on h in every data sequence in which h is true.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Daniel Steel

Daniel Steel is at the Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University