Natural Selection and Multiple Realisation: A Closer Look

Abstract

The target of this article is the claim that natural selection accounts for the multiple realisation of biological and psychological kinds. I argue that the explanation actually offered does not provide any insight about the phenomenon since it presupposes multiple realisation as an unexplained premise, and this is what does all the work. The purported explanation mistakenly invokes the ‘indifference’ of selection to structure as an additional explanatorily relevant factor. While such indifference can be explanatory in intentional contexts, it is not a causal factor at all in non-intentional nature. The upshot is that, once the necessary initial assumption about heterogeneity is accepted, there is no further explanation to do.

Acknowledgements

I thank Sören Häggqvist, Paul Needham, and two anonymous referees for this journal for constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Notes

Now, it seems that reduction is not all that smooth in chemistry and physics either (Yi 2003; Schaffner 2006; Hendry and Needham 2007). Given this, biological kinds must be taken to bring additional trouble.

E.g., ‘Albinism is a group of genetic disorders characterized by deficient synthesis of melanin pigment’ (Spritz 1994, 1469).