Scientific Imperialism: Difficulties in Definition, Identification, and Assessment

Abstract

This article identifies and analyses issues related to defining and evaluating the so-called scientific imperialism. It discusses John Dupré's account, suggesting that it is overly conservative and does not offer a definition of scientific imperialism in not presenting it as a phenomenon of interdisciplinarity. It then discusses the recent account by Steve Clarke and Adrian Walsh, taking issue with ideas such as illegitimate occupation, counterfactual progress, and culturally significant values. A more comprehensive and refined framework of my own is then summarized. It suggests types and aspects of scientific imperialism as a dynamic interdisciplinary relationship, distinguishing between imperialism of scope, style and standing, for example. It also suggests normative (ontological, epistemological, axiological and institutional) constraints on scientific imperialism. This enables us to distinguish, in principle, recommendable from non-recommendable kinds of it, while recognizing the difficulties involved in trying to do this in practice.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version was presented at the University of Vienna. I thank the participants of the seminar for many inspiring comments. Work on this paper has been sponsored by the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences.