Modelling Beyond Application: Epistemic and Non-epistemic Values in Modern Science

Abstract

In recent years, philosophers of science have begun to realize that the clear separation of the creation of models in academia and the application of models outside science is not possible. When these philosophers address hybrid contexts in which science is entwined with policy, business, and other realms of society, these often practically oriented realms no longer represent ‘the surroundings’ of science but rather are considered an essential part of it. I argue—and demonstrate empirically—that the judgement of a theory or model conducted by scientists in such hybrid contexts may contain two parts: one is truth supportive and the other is utility oriented. In relation to the debate on science and values, the article seeks to reinforce the argument in modern philosophy of science that the boundaries between epistemic and non-epistemic values are blurred. The article stresses that non-epistemic values may be also understood as values that contribute to the instrumental success of a theory or model and—in this way—influence scientific practice in the hybrid contexts.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to the interviewees who committed their time and expertise to the project. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the conference, ‘Values and Norms in Modeling’, Eindhoven University of Technology, 2012, where valuable comments were received. I thank also the members of the Shared Research Group on Limits and Objectivity of Scientific Foreknowledge: The Case of Energy Outlooks (LOBSTER) at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology for insightful comments, support, and encouragement. Finally, I would also like to thank the anonymous ISPS reviewers for their focused and constructive comments, which helped to improve this paper greatly. Special thanks go to the ISPS editor James W. McAllister for his encouraging and most useful feedback.