Re-inflating the Conception of Scientific Representation

Abstract

This article argues for an anti-deflationist view of scientific representation. Our discussion begins with an analysis of the recent Callender–Cohen deflationary view on scientific representation. We then argue that there are at least two radically different ways in which a thing can be represented: one is purely symbolic, and therefore conventional, and the other is epistemic. The failure to recognize that scientific models are epistemic vehicles rather than symbolic ones has led to the mistaken (deflationary) view that whatever distinguishes scientific models from other representational vehicles must merely be a matter of pragmatics. It is then argued that even though epistemic vehicles also contain conventional elements, they do their job of demonstration (or showing) in spite of such elements.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Craig Callender for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this paper. He also thanks the audience at the session of EPSA11, Athens, October 2011, where a short version of this paper was read. Special thanks are given to the two referees of this journal for their constructive criticisms.

Notes

1. After a fairly thorough discussion of the different positions in the literature, Callender and Cohen conclude, ‘[I]n our view, running these issues together is conducive to confusion’ (Callener and Cohen 2006, 9; emphasis added).

2. I was alerted to such a possibility by a referee, who gave an example of someone appearing in a play to play herself as an act of self-representation. I am however not convinced by this example. If Bill Clinton, let us say, appeared in a play in the role of Bill Clinton, is he as himself representing himself or as somebody else, an actor, representing Bill Clinton? If he is himself, he cannot ‘act’ in the role, and there is no representation; he must be ‘somebody else’ to play Clinton, or Clinton is playing the role of Clinton, which is not Clinton, the man. Anyway, there seems to be some deeper issue here that I cannot further explore, but the bottom line seems to be this: for anyone, if she is being herself, she cannot be representing herself and if she is representing ‘herself’, the self she is representing cannot be her.

3. Fundamental representational vehicles, such as belief states, are generally assumed to be non-conventional or natural. This may be questioned in philosophy of mind, but I shall here hold to this assumption.

4. I shall henceforth use ‘external vehicles’ and ‘internal vehicles’ in place of fundamental vehicles and derivative vehicles, respectively.

5. Other pairs of terms that are used to refer to similar distinctions exist. One of these is that of ‘linguistic’ versus ‘pictorial’ means. These mark the difference between descriptive versus pictorial representations. It is not the distinction we want to make here. Another is the distinction between purely ‘conventional’ and ‘natural’ means. Broadly construed, the conventional means represent in virtue of a convention that establishes the representation relation between a vehicle and its target, while a natural vehicle is supposed to represent in virtue of some natural connection between the vehicle and its target. This pair is also different from what we have here.

6. Daitz (1956) in arguing against Wittgenstein's ‘picture theory’ of meaning in Tractatus makes a distinction between ‘conventional representation’ and ‘iconic representation’. Linguistic/symbolic vehicles of representation, according to Daitz, belong to the former while pictorial representations, such as paintings and photographs, belong to the latter. The conventional/epistemic distinction I use here has its origin in Daitz's distinction, and yet I have modified it and especially extended the scope of the pictorial vehicles to the notion of epistemic vehicles.

7. To adopt this ontological view, one does not have to say that the word ‘model’ refers only to the abstract entity—it may refer also to the realizations in our daily usage (Keller 2002; Rowbottom 2009); but the daily usage is ambiguous and when the ambiguity is revealed, most people, according to this view, will agree that the model refers to the abstract entity rather than its realizations (as people would agree that it does not matter of what material a model is made or with what language it is described).

8. There is a small but important detail regarding models in the form of differential equations, including the Maxwell equations as a typical example (Liu 1997). The equations express the dispositions of systems (i.e. spatiotemporal objects) that are distinguished by initial and boundary conditions, namely the models are actually what make the solutions of those equations true.

9. The belief states do not have to be ‘iconic’ or ‘pictorial’, but they must have representational content. Despite the suggestive examples used in this article, there is no suggestion that all belief states that serve as the fundamental representations must be iconic. For different theories of how we represent the world through perception, see Freeman (1991), Siegel (2011); Harman (1973) argues for a widely discussed representationist theory of our thoughts.

10. Or more precisely, suppose a model represents a target by analogy and it has ABC but the target has ABD, where A and B are the known aspects of both. If C is causally connected to A and B in the model, we have reason to expect that D is causally connected with A and B in the target if the model is a good representation.