How Inclusive Is European Philosophy of Science?

Abstract

The main question of this article is given by its title: how inclusive is European philosophy of science? Phrased in this way, the question presupposes that, as a mature discipline, philosophy of science should provide an inclusive account of its subject area. I first provide an explanation of the notion of an inclusive (in contrast to a restricted) philosophy of science. This notion of an inclusive philosophy of science is specified by discussing three general topics that seem to be missing from, or are quite marginal in, restricted philosophy of science. These topics are the philosophy of historical inquiry, the role of technology in science, and the socio-political and moral dimensions of science. On this basis, I address the question whether European philosophy of science qualifies as more inclusive as compared with Anglo-American philosophy of science.

Acknowledgements

For helpful comments on an earlier version of this article I would like to thank Katherina Kinzel, James McAllister, and Sally Wyatt. Most of the work on this article was done during an extended research stay in Bielefeld. It is a pleasure to thank Martin Carrier for having offered me this opportunity.

Notes

1 Of course, this constitutes a specific way of addressing the question of the possible distinctiveness of European philosophy of science. An interesting alternative would be to focus on conceptually relevant differences in language. Consider the fact that many European languages differentiate between weten en kennen (or wissen and kennen, or savoir and connaître) as compared to the single English verb ‘to know’. An intriguing question is whether this fact has significant epistemological implications. For more on the role of language in relation to the topic of this symposium, see Wolters (2015).

2 For an overview and some examples, including historiographical projects, see Wyatt, Scharnhorst, et al. (2013).

3 For extensive analyses of the philosophical issues in general historiography, see Lorenz (1990), Iggers (1997), Raphael (2003), and Day (2008). Kragh (1987) not only provides a detailed discussion of the historiography of science, but also includes illuminating substantive analyses of general historiography.

4 For an illuminating reflexive analysis of the role of normative presuppositions in general historiography, see Lorenz (1994, 320–326), who illustrates his analysis with an account of the role of values in the Historikerstreit (which concerned the place of National Socialism in German history) in the 1980s and 1990s.

5 Two other articles relevant in this context are Mladenović (2007) and Kuukkanen (2013).

6 Sometimes, if the relationship between science and technology is discussed, the proposed account is outdated and inadequate. An illustration can be found in Mahner (2007, 539–540), whose account is exclusively based on the questionable views of Bunge (for a criticism of these views, see e.g. Radder 2009b, 66–74).

7 See also Kroes's apt characterization of the relation between science and technology as two sides of the same coin (Kroes 2014).

8 For an important alternative view on the relation between science and democracy, see Brown (2009).

9 In addressing the empirical/historical questions, inclusive philosophy of science can certainly gain from work in science and technology studies. This is far less the case with regard to the theoretical-philosophical and normative questions, however (Radder 1996, chapters 5 and 8; 1998; 2009c, sections 4.1 and 4.3).

10 The theory and practice of patenting constitutes an intricate subject. Therefore, philosophers of science addressing this subject should take care to avoid misunderstanding. For example, Kitcher (2011, 242) states that patenting implies the private ownership of knowledge. This questionable statement perpetuates an unfortunate though common mistake about the nature of patents. What may be patented is the commercial use of scientific knowledge, not the knowledge itself. In fact, it is one of the main aims (and requirements) of the patent system to publicly disclose the knowledge on which a patentable invention is based.

11 Of course, further issues would come up if we were to include Latin America, Asia or Africa.

12 But note again that the topic is the philosophy of historical inquiry in its own right and not the relationship between history of science and philosophy of science.

13 Therefore, as Janich (1998, 94–97) rightly points out, the philosophy of scientific experimentation did not start in 1983 with Hacking's work.

14 For instance, work by Joseph Pitt, Peter Galison, Joseph Rouse, and Don Ihde (but note that the latter two have been significantly influenced by European philosophers).

15 In contrast, in the UK such work is almost totally absent (just take a quick look at the contents of the volumes of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science).

16 See, for example, Leuschner (2012), Yoshida (2012), and Cartieri and Potochnik (201 4). Reading their socio-political analyses and critiques of science might suggest the more extreme view that there is hardly any critical philosophy of science outside North America. Typically, these analyses and critiques are phrased in terms of values, often underwritten by ideals of individual freedom and equality (Longino 1990; Douglas 2009; Kourany 2010; Kitcher 2011). This contrasts, for instance, with more structural or practice-based Foucaultian critiques of science in the European tradition, which emphasise the role of interests and power (see e.g. Radder 1996, chapter 6; Derksen 2001; Dehue 2008).

17 One reason for this was the strong rise of the (allegedly non-normative) science and technology studies since the 1980s, in the Netherlands and elsewhere (cf. Radder 1996, chapter 5; 1998).

18 As I have stressed, my discussion thus far has been preliminary. However, the question of the possible distinctiveness of European philosophy of science is worth a much more detailed scrutiny. It could, for instance, be carried out by members of the HOPOS community, scholars of history of philosophy of science. In view of the complexity of the question, one would need historians of the stature of a Paul Forman to accomplish such an in-depth investigation (see, for instance, his impressive historical account of the cultural views of the science–technology relationship in Forman 2007).