What Is an Immature Science?

ABSTRACT

Cognitive and social sciences such as psychology and sociology are often described as immature sciences. But what is immaturity? According to the received view, immaturity is disunity, where disunity can usefully be cashed out in terms of having a plurality of disunified frameworks in play, where these frameworks consist of concepts, theories, goals, practices, methods, criteria for what counts as a good explanation, etc. However, there are some reasons to think that the cognitive and social sciences should be disunified in this sense. If that is right, either these sciences should remain immature, or we need a new account of immaturity. The former option is unappealing. I therefore provide an alternative account of immaturity, based on Dudley Shapere’s work on the internal/external distinction. I then go on to use this account to argue against the imposition of unification on the cognitive and social sciences. Acceptance of disunity may be the route to maturity, rather than a sign of immaturity.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank David Corfield, Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, and audience members at the British Society for the Philosophy of Science 2013 annual conference for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also go to three anonymous referees for this journal for comments and criticism that have greatly improved the final version.

Notes

1. Kuhn’s position may not be this simple (see Von Eckardt 1993, 353–354) but this is how his view is usually construed in discussions of immaturity.

2. Note that this is not ‘framework’ in the sense meant by those distinguishing framework from content (in the tradition of Carnap 1950). In my sense of the term, frameworks include some aspects of theoretical content as well as more structural aspects.

3. This notion of reasons is a little restrictive. Shapere (1985, 648) does say that ideas, methods, etc., which have not yet been fully accepted as background information, but were constructed based on such background, and function in the same ways, can be called ‘reasons’ in a derivative sense.

4. While I would describe this position as a species of realism, if its claims are too minimal to constitute realism in the eyes of some readers, they may refer to the position as anti-realist or relativist. It is certainly not compatible with certain forms of realism. The important thing is to be clear about the position itself, not whether it is tagged with a label that has currently fallen out of favour.

5. I take it that this notion of success can also rule out pseudosciences because they do not respond properly to failures to establish a track record of success. It is not the case that anything can be allowed to be a criterion for success, only that multiple different things can count as such. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.

6. It might be significant that some very modern physical science shows increasing specialisation and disunity. This could suggest that the run of success had by unification in physics and chemistry is coming to an end. If this is right, and the change is rational, it is compatible with Shapere’s view that even the most entrenched parts of a science can be overturned. If those who advocate pluralism across the board are correct, it may be that unification should become an external consideration in the modern physical sciences too. I take no view on this here, as doing so would involve detailed examination of cases in the physical sciences. Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for pressing this point.