Experiment, Downward Causation, and Interventionist Levels of Explanation

ABSTRACT

This article considers interventionist arguments for downward causation and non-fundamental level causal explanation from the point of view of inferring causation from experiments. Several authors have utilised the interventionist theory of causal explanation to argue that the causal exclusion argument is moot and that higher-level as well as downward causation is real. I show that this argument can be made when levels are understood as levels of grain, leaving us with a choice between causal explanations pitched at different levels. Causal proportionality has been suggested as a principle for choosing the correct level of description for causal explanations, but this suggestion has serious problems. I offer an alternative principle, based on the idea that explanations should track actual difference-makers. I then consider claims about systems causally influencing their own parts. Such claims risk conceptual confusion for the same reason as the exclusion argument, by conflating causal and constitutive dependencies. The distinction between causation and constitution is used to give criteria for the correct use of the idea of downward causation.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Gry Oftedal, Anders Strand, Claus Emmeche, Jon Williamson, and two anonymous referees of this journal for their very helpful comments on the manuscript.

Notes

1 Note that studying the molecular details of the whole developmental process is of course highly relevant and none of the arguments against causal exclusion would imply the denial of this.

Additional information

Funding

Part of the research toward this article was conducted within the project ‘Grading Evidence of Mechanisms in Physics and Biology’, supported by The Leverhulme Trust (grant number RPG-2014-181).