Problem-Feeding as a Model for Interdisciplinary Research

ABSTRACT

Philosophers of science have in recent years become increasingly interested in the notion of interdisciplinarity. One important form interdisciplinarity can take is that of a dynamic exchange of problems and solutions between disciplines—what has recently been called problem-feeding. On this model problems arising within specific disciplines are sometimes solved more effectively by, or in collaboration with, other disciplines. In this paper we explore this model as a framework for thinking about, and actively structuring, interdisciplinary research. We point to the applicability of the problem-feeding model, and to some of the prerequisites of problem-feeding interdisciplinarity, highlighting in particular the harmonisation of goals and the establishment of mutual trust between disciplines.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 What it means for a problem to ‘belong’ to a discipline is itself not straightforward: see, e.g. Popper (1963, 88) and Thorén (2015a) for discussions.

2 As a reviewer of this paper pointed out, the fourth step also will involve some transformation and translation if the solution is to be expressed in terms that make sense in discipline A. If this is not possible, bilateral problem-feeding cannot be achieved.

3 Occasionally, and perhaps often, the solutions are more or less present in the source discipline, and the entire challenge lies in the problem transformations. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

4 See Thorén (2015b, Chapter 3) for a longer discussion of these kinds of relationship. See also Wahlberg and Persson (2017) and Persson, Johansson, and Olsson (2018).

5 Some, such as Bechtel (1986), have drawn a distinction between fields and disciplines. Here, however, we have followed Darden and Maull and not applied this distinction.

6 Another idea that comes to mind here: a boundary object (Star and Griesemer 1989) is such that it is flexible enough to be adaptable to different contexts, yet rigid enough to ‘maintain identity across sites’ (393). Its function is to mediate communication between otherwise disparate ‘social worlds’. Boundary objects can be both concrete things like maps and abstract things like concepts. The main challenge with this idea is that it seems entirely descriptive. In other words, it is merely part of the definition of a boundary object that it aids the exchange of information in this particular way, and thus we fail to obtain an idea of how that happens beyond the stipulation regarding flexible and rigid parts.

7 Issues of these kinds have become increasingly central not only in the philosophy of science but elsewhere. Of note here is the science of team science. This has developed since the turn of the century and is devoted to empirical and theoretical study of collaborative and integrative scientific approaches from a wide range of perspectives (see e.g. Hall et al. 2018, 2019).

8 There is no particular reason to think that all problem-feeding interactions are, or indeed should be, symmetrical in this respect.

9 It is common to differentiate interdisciplinarity from conventional disciplinary research in that the former is problem-solving or problem-oriented or problem-driven while the latter is (supposedly) not (Schmidt 2022). On its face, this way of drawing the distinction has some drawbacks. As Schmidt (2011) points out, many philosophers including Karl Popper and Larry Laudan have considered science in general to be primarily a problem-solving activity. Nevertheless, PF clearly is about problem-solving and should therefore be of relevance to the idea that interdisciplinarity is problem-solving. For example, a case can be made for the view that what is meant by ‘problem orientation’ and similar constructions is that science as such, as well as its individual disciplines, should be more sensitive to what is considered to be problematic outside the disciplinary or scientific context. Specialisation, which in the interdisciplinarity literature is frequently portrayed as a main challenge (Brewer 1999), is then the process of generating one’s own problems. The PF model may help here by offering some guidance on the constraints and challenges with transferring and sharing problems between contexts where different values and practices dominate.

10 As a reviewer of this paper pointed out, trust and shared epistemic standards are rather different things, at least in certain ways. One way to think about this is that the trust situation actually implies a kind of shared framework, albeit a pluralist one acknowledging the contextual nature of epistemic standards. Another reaction, as the reviewer suggested, is that trust engenders the kinds of social process that are needed to develop a shared framework.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Formas [grant number 2020-00202].