The aimless rationality of science¹

This paper was prepared for presentation at the conference, in Krakow from 4–10 June 1989, on ‘The Aim and Rationality of Science’. I am grateful to the organizers and sponsors of this conference for the opportunity to participate. May I thank my friends and colleagues Jerry Gaus, Stephanie Lawson, and Jeff Malpas for many years of patient conversation about these topics from which I have benefited, I don't doubt, a great deal more than they have? Thanks too to Peter Forrest and to John Watkins for comments, much needed and much appreciated, on an earlier version of this paper.

Abstract

It is usually attempted teleologically to demonstrate the rationality of the so‐called scientific method. Goals or aims are posited (and their specification defended) and it is then argued that conformity with some body of methodological rules is conducive to the realization of these goals or aims. A ‘ deontological’ alternative to this approach is offered, adapting insights of contemporary political philosophers, especially John Rawls and Bruce Ackerman. The ‘circumstances of method’ are defined as those circumstances in which it alone makes sense to seek some method for the resolution of disputed issues. It is then shown that individuals who find themselves in these circumstances have reason to conduct themselves in conformity with certain simple rules of argumentation—have reason, indeed, in the very fact that they do so find themselves and altogether without reference to any goals or aims which it might be hoped to achieve. These rules require non‐interference, responsiveness, relevance, and publicity, and are, arguably, the rules which define the concept (and which therefore provide a framework for various conceptions,) of scientific method.

Notes

This paper was prepared for presentation at the conference, in Krakow from 4–10 June 1989, on ‘The Aim and Rationality of Science’. I am grateful to the organizers and sponsors of this conference for the opportunity to participate. May I thank my friends and colleagues Jerry Gaus, Stephanie Lawson, and Jeff Malpas for many years of patient conversation about these topics from which I have benefited, I don't doubt, a great deal more than they have? Thanks too to Peter Forrest and to John Watkins for comments, much needed and much appreciated, on an earlier version of this paper.