Experience and belief: Haack on the problem of empirical basis

Abstract

In her recent discussion of the problem of the empirical basis, Susan Haack sets out to show that the solutions offered by the Popperian school are all inadequate. Her objectives, however, go well beyond the mere refutation of such‐claims. She also tries to explicate the contribution of experience to the justification of one's belief, thus adjudicating between founda‐tionalism and coherentism. She puts forward what she calls a ‘foundherentist’ account of the structure of justification which, she claims, retains the virtues of both foundationalism and coherentism while avoiding their vices. In this article I shall try to show that, in addition to failing to explicate the justificatory role of experience, her proposal is actually a version of coherentism and that a coherentist need not find her account of the contribution of experience to justification particularly objectionable.