Reduced autobiographical memory specificity and affect regulation

Abstract

The effect of specificity of autobiographical memory (AM) retrieval on the affective impact of an emotional event was examined. In Study 1 (N = 90) the impact of a negative and positive experience was compared between student participants who habitually retrieve autobiographical memories (AMs) in a specific way and participants who generally retrieve less specific memories. In Study 2 (N = 48) the effect of an experimentally induced (specific vs. overgeneral) retrieval style on the impact of a negative experience was studied in student participants who habitually retrieve less specific memories. Study 1 replicated the finding of Raes, Hermans, de Decker, Eelen, & Williams (2003) that a negative event leads to less subjective distress in low‐specific participants as compared with high‐specific participants. However, both groups did not differ in their affective reaction to a positive event. Important, reduced memory specificity was associated with “repressive coping”, providing further evidence for the idea that reduced memory specificity is used as an avoidant or repressive‐defensive mechanism to regulate negative affect (Williams, 1996). In Study 2, participants who were induced to retrieve memories in an overgeneral way experienced more distress following a negative event as compared with participants who were induced to retrieve memories in a specific way. Results are discussed in the context of recent findings concerning AM specificity and emotion regulation (Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003). Directions for further research are suggested.

Notes

Thanks are due to Tom Beckers, Wim de Neys, and Ilse Van Diest for their assistance in data collection (Study 1) and to Linda Geypen and Annemie Defranc for rating the SCT responses (Study 2). We also thank anonymous reviewers for their many helpful comments and suggestions.

Note that in the Raes et al. (2003) study no differences were found for high‐ and low‐specific individuals on a measure of conscientiousness (i.e., the Conscientiousness subscale of the NEO‐Five Factory Inventory; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Hoekstra et al., 1996), nor on a measure of the motive to success and the motive to avoid failure (i.e., the Achievement Motives Scale; Lens & Baeyens, 1991; Nygård & Gjesme, 1973).

Degrees of freedom vary because of missing values.

The same was true when negative and positive affect scores (PANAS) at baseline (i.e., before the puzzle task) were covaried out. In fact, high‐ and low‐specific participants did not differ at baseline for state negative and positive affect.

1 = no memory, mere association (e.g., “Last year… I would never have predicted to be where I am now”); 2 = an overgeneral categoric or summary‐type memory (e.g., “Last year… I felt sad on many occasions”); 3 = an overgeneral memory that extends over the entire past year (“Last year… I was still at St. Michael's high school”); 4 = a particular event that does not extend over the entire past year, but lasted longer than a day, and that did not happen repeatedly (e.g., “Last year… I spent a week with a colleague in North Wales); 5 = a specific event, that did not last longer than a day (e.g., “Last year… I had a wonderful time at the surprise party for my 18th birthday”).

Another, not necessarily competing possibility, is that through the avoidance of specific retrieval, the specific or contextual features of memories are not consolidated. As a consequence, over time, memories will be recalled in a categoric or summarised form.