The Relationship of Emotion to Cognition: A Functional Approach to a Semantic Controversy

Abstract

We first review the main points in the dispute about whether emotion is primary and independent of cognition (Zajonc), or secondary and always dependent upon cognition (Lazarus), and suggest that the dispute is largely one of definition. Because definitional disputes seldom clarify substantive, theoretical points, we suggest a variety of questions regarding cognition-emotion interaction. To stimulate discussion of these issues, we propose a componential model in which emotions are seen to develop from simpler, reflex-like forms (“wired-in” sensory-motor processes) to complex cognitive-emotional patterns that result from the participation of at least two distinct levels of memory and information processing, a schematic and a conceptual level. These systems are typically activated by a continuous stimulus check process which evaluates five environment-organism attributes: novelty; pleasantness; goal conductiveness; coping potential; and consistency with social norms and self-relevant values. Questions about the relationship of cognition to emotion, and how two initially independent systems become inseparably interrelated, are transformed when viewed within the context of the dynamic, multilevel emotion processing system.