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Original Articles

The A Priori and the Empirical in Theories of Emotion: Smedslund's “Conceptual Analysis” of Emotion

Pages 457-466 | Received 08 Jan 1992, Published online: 07 Jan 2008
 

Abstract

This paper examines the suggestion made by Smedslund that the empirical laws of emotion proposed by Frijda are a priori necessities, derivable from a definition of emotion Smedslund proposes. First, a distinction is drawn between a causal and non-causal reading of Smedslund's own definition of emotion. The suggestion is made that although on the causal reading the definition might provide sufficient conditions for being in an emotional state, causal regularities are empirical, so this reading would not meet his own criteria for an a priori definition. Moreover, showing that Frijda's laws are derivable from the definition thus understood would not undermine their empirical status. The non-causal reading is then examined and questions are raised about whether it can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a state to be a state of emotion. Finally, the suggestion is made that the central issue in the question of whether or not a theory of emotion is wholly empirical turns not on whether it can be derived from a definition of emotion, but, rather, on the extent to which the explanations proposed of the regularities governing emotions must appeal to a priori rationality constraints.

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