Immigration, presidential politics, and partisan polarization among the American public, 1992–2018

Abstract

We extend theories about “immigration backlash” and right-wing populism in three ways by analyzing trend data to examine the interplay between views of immigration, partisan polarization, and voting patterns in presidential elections. First, we document how immigration views became more aligned with partisan polarization between 2000 and 2018. Second, we show that immigration views were significantly more predictive of voting for Donald Trump in 2016 compared to Republican presidential candidates in the 1992 through 2012 elections. Due to increased partisan polarization, the indirect effects of immigration views on presidential voting (as mediated through political ideology and party identification) also increased over time, and were stronger in 2016 compared to previous elections. Finally, we show evidence of a post-Trump backlash on immigration views, with political independents and Democrats becoming significantly more favorable toward immigration after 2016. By 2018, the American public was more polarized over matters of immigration than at any time previous in the available data, and these views corresponded more strongly with voting patterns. These findings highlight the increasing importance of immigration for understanding partisan politics in the contemporary U.S., and reiterate the importance of anti-immigrant sentiment and partisan polarization to the success of right-wing populism in electoral democracies.

Data availability statement

GSS data are publicly available from the National Opinion Research Center: https://gss.norc.org/get-the-data. Data and code for replication are available from the authors.

Acknowledgment

There are no funding sources to report for this study.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 See, for example, the “immigration speech,” delivered on August 31, 2016. A transcript is available at: https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-immigration-address-transcript-227614.

2 We used a binary version of the immigration attitudes measure for this set of analyses for two reasons. First, conceptually we are primarily interested in people who have restrictive views of immigration, as ethnic antipathy is a key signifier of right-wing populism (Hogan and Haltinner 2015). Second, the binary variable makes the presentation of the information on immigration views simpler and clearer. In a supplemental model we analyzed the full five-outcome immigration views measure using an OLS regression model (see Table A2 in the Supplementary Appendix). The results mirror those presented for the binary outcome (see Figure A1 in the Supplementary Appendix).

3 For Dole’s stance on immigration during the campaign, see http://www.dolekemp96.org/agenda/issues/immigration.htm. Voters in 1996 with restrictive views of immigration were much more likely to vote for third-party candidate Ross Perot. In the 2000 GSS, 66% of Perot voters wanted less immigration, compared to 42% of Clinton voters, and 38% of Dole voters.

4 Z = 2.45; p < .01 for difference between 2016 and 2014 waves; Z = 2.67; p < .001 for difference between 2018 and 2014 waves.

5 Notably there is also a decrease in the proportion of Republicans who favored restricted immigration in the 2018 wave. Further analysis shows that this occurred entirely among those who said they were “not strong Republicans” or were “independent but lean Republican.” Among respondents who identified as “strong Republicans,” the percentage wanting less immigration actually increased further in 2018. By 2018, less than half of respondents of all political party identifications other than “strong Republican” wanted to restrict immigration. In contrast, among strong Republicans, 70% wanted to restrict immigration. This further attests to the now-entrenched nature of restrictionist views of immigration in the post-Trump GOP.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Joseph O. Baker

Joseph O. Baker is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology & Anthropology at East Tennessee State University. He has co-authored four books: American Secularism (NYU Press, 2015), Paranormal America (second edition, NYU Press, 2017), Deviance Management: Insiders, Outsiders, Hiders, and Drifters (University of California Press, 2019), and Fear Itself: The Causes and Consequences of Fear in America (NYU Press, 2020). He is currently the editor of Sociology of Religion.

Amy E. Edmonds

Amy E. Edmonds is an associate professor of Political Science and co-director of the Honors Program at Milligan University. Her research focuses on the influence of religion on authoritarianism and democratization, as well as nonviolent social movements. Her areas of expertise include Latin America, international relations, and comparative politics.