Negotiating Serbia’s Europeanness. On The Formation and Appropriation of European Heritage Policy in Serbia

Abstract

In 2003, the Council of Europe and the European Commission launched their “Regional Programme for Cultural and Natural Heritage in South East Europe”. The heritage programme distinguishes itself from other heritage programmes of the Council and the Commission in that it is presented as a means to reduce grounds for conflict. But despite this insistence on using heritage for the purpose of reconciliation and regional cooperation, over time a shift has taken place in which this ideological conception of heritage has become overshadowed by a more practical and bureaucratic one. In this article I aim to show that this shift resulted from negotiations that took place between policy formation and its implementation. I will demonstrate how, in the specific case of Serbia, during this process clashes emerged between local, national and European interests leading to the circumvention of national and local agenda’s reducing possibilities for reconciliation and regional cooperation.

Keywords:

• EU
• Council of Europe
• Europeanization
• Heritage
• Serbia
• Policy Appropriation

Notes

[1] The programme was launched in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo (UNMIK), Romania and Bulgaria.

[2] “Europeanization” is understood here as the several processes of societal transformation, pointing to a reconfiguration of cultures, identities, and forms of governance that emerge from a changing Europe. This links up with the approach taken by Borneman and Fowler (1997) who see “Europeanization” as a process that effects identifications with territories and peoples and can be studied within domains of daily practices. Gisela Welz and Annina Lotterman (2009) take up this approach by referring to “Projects of Europeanization”, claiming that certain products, mechanisms and practices develop as a consequence of the increasing influence of the European institutions. Finally, Claudio Radaelli (2003: 30) states that “Europeanization” can be seen as a phenomenon that triggers processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization brought about by the implementation of EU policies, that influence political behaviour in the target countries.

[3] This phenomenon has been observed by Barbara Kirshenblatt‐Gimblett (1998, 2006) and Sharon Macdonald (2009) in their research about UNESCO world heritage and “European” monuments like those representing the holocaust. Their work touches upon the paradoxes and tensions in heritage management caused by disparities between transnational ideological visions and national agendas which often result in a move away from ideology.

[4] This links up with what Michael Herzfeld has referred to as disemia in his book “cultural intimacy” in which he refers to the tension between official self‐presentation and what goes on in the privacy of collective retrospection (Herzfeld 2005: 14). It also links up with what Laurajane Smith has observed with regard to heritage management. As she states: “the issue of community participation in framing and implementing heritage practices, teeters between a desire to include and a hesitancy to surrender or reduce the authority of the Authoritarian Heritage Discourse [in this case offered by the Commission and the CoE] and the heritage practitioners to wield it, and to recognize the inherently political and discordant nature of heritage” (Smith 2006: 48).

[5] In particular, the documentation of the CoE was relevant here since most documents are published online at a site reserved for this programme. This material was complemented with a study of the documents of the Commission about the programmes in which this particular project was embedded: The Culture 2000 programme and the Culture 2000–2007 programme, the Communications on the Western Balkans, and the documents published about regional cooperation and an analysis of academic accounts considering the cultural heritage policies of the Commission and the CoE.

[6] In total, nearly fifty in‐depth qualitative interviews were conducted which are supplemented with a great many informal conversations and shorter, less structured interviews that took place on several other occasions in the field. By means of participant observation other data was gathered in the form of the attendance of meetings and events organized for the regional heritage programme and by participating in the daily activities that took place at the sites. The research took place from the beginning of March until the end of August 2009.

[7] The “Western Balkans” is a term invented in 1999 by the EU to cover a heterogeneous group of countries that it had decided to draw together into a “Stabilization and Association Process”, designed to overcome the legacies of a decade of war in the former Yugoslavia (Batt 2007: 72). Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo (UNMIK) are all part of the Western Balkans.

[8] The conditionality policies that were introduced by the EU are based on the Copenhagen Treaty which refers to conditions the European countries should have in order to belong to the EU and the Acquis Communautaire, the body of EU legislation which candidate countries must adopt to become EU members (thirty‐one chapters that should be “closed” by the candidates). Serbia became a member of the CoE in 2003, which in the first years led to several monitoring procedures (CoE 2007).

[9] This was mentioned in the Thessaloniki Declaration in June 2003. This declaration was presented and signed at a summit of the EU in which the enlargement path of the Western Balkans was discussed by the heads of the EU member states, the heads of the states representing the Western Balkans and the main representatives of the European Institutions and the United Nations.

[10] “Too much ‘enlargement fatigue’, too little ‘absorption capacity’, combined with the failed adoption of a European ‘Constitutional Treaty’, are but the most visible factors explaining the EU’s current indecisiveness concerning the integration of the Western Balkans” (Petritsch et al. 2009: 11).

[11] This came to the fore in a recent opinion poll of the European Integration Office of the Government of Serbia (SEIO) which was carried out in June 2010. In this poll citizens were asked what they considered to be the main reason for slowing down Serbia’s accession to the EU. In this poll 50% stated that this was due to the policy of constant conditioning of the EU; 15% argued that this was a consequence of the failure to meet international commitments; 20% claimed that this was a result of the inability of domestic leaders; 7% that this had to do with people’s mentality and unwillingness to change; and 5% claimed that this had to do with the obstacles caused by reforms that had to take place in all kinds of areas. http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/Izvestaji/results_of%20public_opinion_poll_%20eu_jun%202010_en.pdf. (SEIO)

[12] See, for example, Grabbe (2006), Pridham (2005), Smith (2003) and Vachudová (2003).

[13] In order to create a sense of belonging among the citizens of the European community, culture has been employed more intensively by the EU since the end of the 1970s/beginning of the 1980s. The CoE has been very active in this field since the 1950s. While this desire to describe a common European culture first emerged with the recognition that economic integration was not sufficient to create a sense of belonging to the community among the European citizens, with regard to the enlargement countries the uncertainty of integration played a role in the use of culture for a broader set of European purposes (see Obuljen 2005).

[14] These programmes should not be seen in the light of “hard transfers” in which legislative and economic reforms are the main focuses and where strict rules, procedures and policy paradigms are at stake. Instead these kinds of programme aim to bring out “soft transfers” that emphasize the transmittance of “styles”, “ways of doing things” and “shared beliefs and norms” (Cf. Radaelli 2003: 30).

[15] Already from 1954, it was mainly the CoE that took the initiative with regard to heritage policies and cultural policies in general. It developed a set of conventions in the field of heritage: 1954: European Cultural Convention; 1969/1995: European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological heritage; 1987: European Convention of the Architectural Heritage of Europe: 2004: European Landscape Convention, 2005: Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society.

[16] It is therefore not coincidental that the programme can be found on the website of the CoE under the heading “regional cooperation” and not under the general heading “heritage and landscape”. See: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/cooperation/SEE/default_en.asp.

[17] The working title of the part of the programme that has the focus in this article contains this term: “Integrated rehabilitation plan/ survey in the architectural and archaeological heritage (IRPP/SAAH)”.

[18] Interesting in this respect is the similarity of the catchphrase “unity in diversity” with the “brotherhood and unity” which was the catchphrase used in Yugoslavia after the Second World War and was also an attempt to unite the different peoples in the Federation. More information about this “brotherhood and unity” can be found in the work of Wachtel (1998) and Majstorović (1980).

[19] You can find these lists on the following webpage: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/cooperation/SEE/documents_en.asp.

[20] This insistence on placing the citizen central to heritage management has become explicitly emphasized in the Faro Convention which can be seen as a guiding convention behind the Regional Heritage Programme. This convention builds on but also differs from the earlier conventions of the CoE, in that the involvement of people in heritage management became a focal point. Rather than heritage being served by society, the new concept was that heritage had to serve society (Fojut 2009: 17).

[21] Notice that this is not a development that is typical for Serbia or Southeast Europe. Similar developments have taken place in other countries in Europe in which the technical dimension preceded other more ideological dimensions of heritage. A typical example is how heritage management was organized in Western Europe after the Second World War. This also started as a highly technical project but is nowadays broadened and heritage has become increasingly employed for a set of other purposes than conservation and preservation only.

[22] In the first years of implementing the programme, this system consisted of the preparation of a National Assessment Report, the establishment of a “Priority Intervention List”, the preparation of “Preliminary Technical Assessments”, and the establishment of “Feasibility Studies”. From 2008 onwards, this was complemented with the preparation of a “Business Plan”.

[23] One example is Lepenski Vir, a famous Mesolithic archaeological site in the Northeast of Serbia. At this site heated debates were held about the construction of a roof above the excavations in which several parties wanted to take responsibility and have their share. This delayed the preparation of documents and aggravated cooperation in the field.

[24] As a key official involved in the programme explained to me during an interview, “we were preparing to organize one last event in Verona to conclude the programme. We had been working on a methodology for the region, had experimented with this methodology and tried to make adjustments when needed. We thought that was all we could do. Then the Commission unexpectedly made the decision to continue with the programme at an already planned conference in Ljubljana, room was made by the Commission to announce this protongation of the regional heritage programme. From this moment onwards, the programme entered a new stage which was called the “Ljubljana Process”.

[25] See: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/cooperation/SEE/IRPPSAAH/Ljubljana_precatalogue_E.pdf.

[26] For example, at the Ministerial Conference: “Rehabilitating our common European Heritage”, held in Ljubljana, 6–7 November 2009; at the “launch Senje Coal mine” which celebrated the official declaration that this mine was now the “pilot project” of the programme and during a conference organized in Belgrade: Ministerial Conference: “Cultural policy in the field of cultural heritage and the transformation of institutions” organized by the Ministry of Culture in Serbia.

[27] Quite a lot of projects that were first included on the list were being abandoned in 2008 as a result of these kinds of disagreement and different priorities of the IPM.

[28] One of the consolidated projects.

[29] The two local offices of the CoE and the Commission were not too engaged with this programme and focused more on other programmes that had been initiated. The Office of the CoE in Belgrade was not even aware of this programme in Serbia. Furthermore, in the five years during which the programme was implemented, experts from the CoE and the European Commission would only occasionally come over and cooperate in “the field”.

[30] The regional heritage programme is a programme carried out by the department of “International relations, European integration and the development of management in the field of culture”. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Culture also has a specific department for cultural heritage. In practice, both departments hardly cooperate and there is a lack of exchange of knowledge and information even within the department of international relations itself.

[31] In particular, in the 1990s, when cultural policies became highly centralized and international cooperation came to an end as a result of the wars, no other financial resources could be obtained except for those provided by the state.

[32] This is something that, in discussions with experts of the CoE, was referred to as a “communication gap”, as the country was not used to the new terminology and procedures introduced. This was aggravated by the fact that in the 1990s many of the Serbian intellectuals left the country and did not return; this caused an enormous lack of experts in the field.

[33] Grand National monuments such as Lepenski Vir and the Mileševa Monastery were removed from the list, since the European programme would mean yet another complication in the process of conserving and preserving these sites which aggravated any cooperation.