The Great Game in Antarctica: Britain and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty

Abstract

This article is concerned with Britain's political and territorial interests in the Antarctic in the first half of the twentieth century, culminating in the signing of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Using in part the diaries of a Foreign Office advisor, Dr Brian Roberts, attention is given as to how successive British governments and their officials sustained a presence in the remote polar continent. Rival claimants in the form of Argentina and Chile made the task all the more difficult. Mapping and surveying were essential in maintaining British sovereignty even if the end results were at times disappointing. The article concludes by suggesting that the Antarctic Treaty, while important in promoting international scientific collaboration, did not manage to resolve the political and territorial disputes surrounding the Antarctic. Arguably, the 1982 Falklands War and its aftermath provided a vivid reminder that Britain's most southerly possessions still remain deeply contested.

Keywords:

• British Foreign And Colonial Policy
• Antarctica
• Decolonisation
• Geopolitics

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank James Ryan, Simon Naylor and the participants at the Royal Geographical Society annual conference in September 2005 for their helpful comments. I owe thanks to Peter Beck and the referees attached to the journal for their kind comments. Heather Lane at the Scott Polar Research Institute (University of Cambridge) was immensely helpful in allowing me to access the Roberts records. The Leverhulme Trust kindly supported this research with the award of a Philip Leverhulme Prize in 2005.

Notes

 [1] Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI), University of Cambridge MS 1308/9; BJ. Diaries of Brian Roberts for the Washington Conference, 15 October–1 December 1959; 133 pages and three annexes.

 [2] Meyer, DC Confidential.

 [3] See, for example, Darwin, Britain and Decolonization.

 [4] During the 1950s, Britain was prepared to increase investment in North Atlantic defence projects, especially those based around the testing of the Corporal missile. The Royal Navy was instructed to annex the remote outcrop Rockall in September 1955 as part of a wider strategic plan to ensure that the British could prevent the Soviet Navy from monitoring those rocket tests. See MacDonald, ‘Paul Strand and the Atlanticist Cold War’, 357–74.

 [5] Roberts Diaries, entry for 28 October 1959, 55.

 [6] Article IV of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty later embodied the decision to suspend the legal and political significance of territorial claims for the duration of the Treaty.

 [7] Livingstone, Putting Science in its Place, 180.

 [8] On the wider significance of these relationships within and beyond the British Empire see for example, Lester, Imperial Networks.

 [9] On the Great Game in Central Asia see for example, Hopkirk, The Great Game; Lieven, Empire; and Siegel Endgame. The term ‘Great Game’ has been used more recently to describe resource-based intrigue involving Russia, China and the United States in the Caspian Sea region.

[10] See, for example, , ‘Britain's Antarctic dimension’, 429–44 and his book International Politics of Antarctica.

[11] National Archives-Public Record Office, Kew (NA-PRO), FO 371/4328, Letter from Sir Leopold Amery to Governor-General of New Zealand, Lord Liverpool, 6 February 1920.

[12] The delegates attached to the 1896 International Geographical Congress had earlier called for renewed efforts to be made not only to reach the South Pole but also to definitively map the Antarctic continent.

[13] Mackinder, ‘The geographical pivot of history’, 421–37. Leopold Amery attended the presentation of the paper at the Royal Geographical Society in January 1904.

[14] Mill, Siege of the South Pole, 434.

[15] For one example of this particular view of Antarctica's strategic access see NA-PRO, CO 532/134, Memorandum from the Admiralty to the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, 30 September 1919.

[16] On American Antarctic activities see Klotz, America on the Ice, ch. 1.

[17] Hunter-Christie, The Antarctic Problem. One positive development that emerged from the Argentine-British-Chilean imbroglio was the 1948 Naval Agreement, which ensured that all parties agreed not to send warships below 60 degrees South as part of a conflict resolution measure.

[18] See Spiller, ‘Re-imagining the United States’, 31–53.

[19] NA-PRO, CO 78 198/2, Memorandum by M. Davies, 31 January 1935.

[20] NA-PRO, CAB 32/51/E130, Minutes of the Meeting on ‘British policy in the Antarctic’, 19 November 1926.

[21] National Archives of Canada, Ottawa (NAC), RG 25 61, Volume 1513 File 206: Letter from Lord Cushendun to British Embassy in Oslo, 18^th October 1928. Douglas Mawson was responsible for leading the 1911–13 Aurora Expedition, and Ernest Shackleton was responsible for the 1914–16 Endurance Expedition, which included the famous denouement in South Georgia and Elephant Island. Later in 1929, the British, Australian and New Zealand Antarctic Expedition (BANZARE) was launched which further strengthened Commonwealth co-operation in the field of polar exploration.

[22] The Times, ‘Argentina and the Antarctic’, 28 July 1939.

[23] NA-PRO, CO 78 211/9, Memorandum on ‘Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands’, 31 July 1939.

[24] Mill, ‘The Scott Polar Research Institute’, 332–3.

[25] Mill, ‘The Scott Polar Research Institute’, 333.

[26] Smith, Sir James Wordie.

[27] SPRI, MS 188 War Diary (Roberts)—Wartime Activities 1939–1946.

[28] Radio 4, Operation Tabarin (written and presented by Klaus Dodds), broadcast 5 January 2005.

[29] NA-PRO, ADM 1/19509, Report prepared by Lt Commander James Marr on Operation Tabarin 1943–1945.

[30] As acknowledged in academic publications such as Mason, ‘The FIDS’, 145–160 and more popular ones such as Fuchs, ‘2 Years in the Antarctic’, 981–2.

[31] On the importance of political and military intelligence to British colonial rule see Bayly, Empire and Intelligence, 1–9

[32] Ballantyne, ‘Race and the webs of empire’, para. 39.

[33] Heap, ‘Dr Brian Roberts CMG’, 3–4.

[34] NA-PRO, ADM 1/23561, Memorandum on ‘Falkland Islands Dependencies—Argentine activities 1952’.

[35] Interview with a retired FIDS pilot and surveyor, 1 October 2001.

[36] SPRI, MS 1308/22/11, FIDS Correspondence and Committee Papers 1959–1961.

[37] FIDS Scientific Reports Number 1: Organisation and Methods (London, HMSO, 1953).

[38] British Antarctic Survey, Cambridge (BAS) Archives, AD6/15/17/7, Letter from B. Roberts to E. W. Bingham, 6 December 1946.

[39] Stonehouse, ‘Antarctic adventure’, 7–9.

[40] NA-PRO, CO 537/4010, Political Instructions to the Leader of the FIDS, issued by the Colonial Office November 1948. Underlining in the original document.

[41] Dalgleish, ‘Two years in the Antarctic’, 62–65 and 111–117, quote p. 65.

[42] Comment by Sir Miles Clifford to the Meeting of the Polar Committee 24^th March 1953.

[43] NA-PRO, FO 371/97367, Memorandum by B. Roberts on Argentine Antarctic Activities, 29 May 1952.

[44] BAS, AD3/1/A5/155/A, (1) Memorandum produced by M. Willis of the Colonial Office, 2 July 1956.

[45] Beves, ‘Work of the FIDS’, 613–615.

[46] NA-PRO, FO 371/138980, Memorandum prepared by Henry Hankey (Foreign Office), 30 April 1959.

[47] NA-PRO, FO 371/138980, Letter from Norman Brain at the Foreign Office to Paul Rogers at the Colonial Office, 5 May 1959.

[48] For one review of the IGY see Fifield, International Research in the Antarctic.

[49] Royal Society, London (RS) CMB, 106a British National Committee for the IGY Minutes 1957–8. Ad Hoc Committee of Council on Antarctic Research, 8 May 1958.

[50] RS CMB, 106a British National Committee for the IGY Minutes 1957–8. Letter from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Physical Secretary of the RS, 26 September 1958.

[51] SPRI MS 1308/9; BJ Diaries of Brian Roberts for the Washington Conference, October–December 1959, 15. Thereafter the ‘Roberts Diaries’.

[52] Roberts Diaries, 18 October 1959, 6.

[53] Roberts Diaries, 20 October 1959, 12.

[54] Roberts Diaries, 24 October 1959, 25.

[55] Roberts Diaries, 22 October 1959, 31–2.

[56] Roberts Diaries, 4 November 1959, 74.

[57] RS Box 12 A and B British National Committee Papers 1958–1960. Letter from David Martin to Vivian Fuchs, 17 May 1960.

[58] RS Box 12 A + B British National Committee Papers 1958–60. Letter from David Brunt to David Martin, 12 May 1960.

[59] NA-PRO, T 225/1922, Report by Captain Graham of HMS Protector, 29 January 1962.

[60] These kinds of tensions are frequently under-specified in the historiography of Antarctic science more generally. See, for example, CFogg, History of Antarctic Science.

[61] At least one recent review of the 1982 Falklands conflict neglects entirely the Antarctic dimension. See Boyce, The Falklands War.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Klaus Dodds

Klaus Dodds is Professor of Geopolitics at Royal Holloway, University of London.