Democracy and trade conflict*

An earlier version was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 1999.

Abstract

The record of formal disputes in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is largely one of conflict among democracies. I develop a theoretical argument to explain the prevalence of democratic states in the GATT's dispute process. Democracies face stronger pressures to initiate disputes; they are more attractive as dispute targets due to the political influence enjoyed by interest groups; they share norms of juridical dispute resolution; and they are more likely to uphold their policy commitments than nondemocracies. I develop an empirical model of the incidence of disputes among GATT members, finding that democracies are more likely to participate in disputes than nondemocratic states. I also find that democratic dyads are more likely to resolve their disputes cooperatively.

Key Words:

• GATT
• democracy
• trade policy
• conflict
• dispute resolution

Notes

An earlier version was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 1999.