Combatant rank and socialization to norms of restraint: examining the Australian and Philippine armies

ABSTRACT

How does combatant rank influence the adoption of international humanitarian law (IHL) norms—or “norms of restraint”—within military organizations? To date, few political science studies have directly examined the impact of rank in influencing combatant socialization to norms of restraint. Such a gap in the literature is striking: rank is perhaps one of the most fundamentally important characteristics that shapes combatant identity. This study helps to fill this gap by examining combatant rank and the transmission and adoption of norms of restraint in military organizations. To do so, it conducts the first known comparative research study exploiting original survey and interview data from two state armed forces—the Australian Army and the Philippine Army. Research results show that under some conditions combatant rank can significantly influence the norm socialization process. Data further suggest that the adoption of such norms may be linked to the nature of command relationships within the military: the relative influence possessed by senior officers and junior enlisted members may affect the degree to which official norms are transmitted to enlisted combatants. Finally, data reveal the potentially problematic paradox of rank: the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) most influential for junior enlisted soldiers may themselves be more resistant to norms of restraint than senior officers operating at higher levels of command. Such data provide noteworthy new data enhancing our understanding of rank, military culture, and combatant socialization to norms of restraint.

Comment le grade des soldats influence-t-il l’adoption de normes de droit international humanitaire (DIH) - ou de « normes de retenue » - dans les organizations militaires ? Jusqu’ici, seules quelques études de sciences politiques ont directement examiné l’influence du grade sur la socialization des soldats aux normes de retenue. Une telle lacune de la littérature est frappante: le grade est en effet peut-être l’une des caractéristiques les plus fondamentalement importantes façonnant l’identité des soldats. Cette étude contribue à combler cette lacune en examinant le grade des soldats parallèlement à la transmission et à l’adoption de normes de retenue dans les organizations militaires. Pour ce faire, cette étude a mené la première recherche comparative connue qui exploite des données d’enquête et d’entretiens originales issues de deux forces armées d’État: l’armée australienne et l’armée des Philippines. Les résultats de cette recherche montrent que dans certaines conditions, le grade des combattants peut considérablement influencer le processus de socialization aux normes. Les données obtenues suggèrent par ailleurs que l’adoption de telles normes peut être liée à la nature des relations de commandement au sein de l’armée: l’influence relative des officiers supérieurs et des jeunes recrues peut affecter le degré de transmission des normes officielles aux combattants enrôlés. Enfin, les données obtenues révèlent le paradoxe potentiellement problématique du grade: les sous-officiers ayant le plus d’influence sur les jeunes recrues peuvent eux-mêmes être plus résistants aux normes de retenue que les officiers supérieurs opérant à des niveaux de commandement plus élevés. De telles données fournissent de nouvelles informations marquantes améliorant notre compréhension des grades, de la culture militaire et de la socialization des combattants aux normes de retenue.

¿De qué manera el rango del combatiente influye en la adopción de normas del derecho internacional humanitario (international humanitarian law, IHL), o “normas de restricción”, en las organizaciones militares? Hasta la fecha, pocos estudios de ciencias políticas han analizado de manera directa el impacto del rango en la influencia de la socialización de combatientes ante las normas de restricción. Tal falta de datos en la bibliografía es sorprendente: el rango quizás sea una de las características más fundamentalmente importantes que determina la identidad del combatiente. Este estudio ayuda a completar esta falta de datos al analizar el rango de combatientes y la transmisión y la adopción de normas de restricción en las organizaciones militares. Para esto, lleva a cabo el primer estudio de investigación comparativo conocido aprovechando datos originales de encuestas y entrevistas de dos fuerzas armadas estatales, el Ejército de Tierra de Australia y las Fuerzas Armadas de Filipinas. Los resultados de la investigación muestran que, en determinadas condiciones, el rango del combatiente puede influir de manera significativa en el proceso de socialización de normas. Los datos también sugieren que la adopción de tales normas puede relacionarse con la naturaleza de las relaciones de mando en las fuerzas armadas: la influencia relativa que poseen los oficiales de rango superior y los miembros alistados de menor categoría puede afectar al grado en que las normas oficiales se transmiten a los combatientes alistados. Finalmente, los datos revelan la paradoja potencialmente problemática del rango: los suboficiales (noncommissioned officers, NCO) más influyentes para los soldados alistados de menor categoría pueden ser más reticentes a las normas de restricción que los oficiales de rango superior que operan en niveles más altos de mando. Tal información brinda nuevos datos notables que mejoran nuestro entendimiento del rango, la cultura militar y la socialización de combatientes ante las normas de restricción.

KEYWORDS:

• IHL
• military socialization
• norms
• conflict
• rank

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website.

Notes

¹ Organizational factors such as unit and corps identity can also influence combatant socialization (Zais 2016). However, such factors lie outside the specific focus of this article, which examines the impact of rank specifically. See below for studies examining organizational factors and norms of restraint.

² For other treatments of rank and IHL training, see Kuper (2005) and Stubbins Bates (2014, 804).

³ An extensive literature review revealed no cases of a similar research design in existing literature.

⁴ Following international humanitarian law (IHL), in this article we use the term “combatant” to refer to any member of a state armed force eligible under international law to employ force, irrespective of whether such actors have actually directly participated in conflict (Dinstein 2010, 27).

⁵ Notably, this study focuses on comparison of norm adoption across categories of combatants. The term norm “adoption” is not used to mean change over time but instead the static level of norm internalization as assessed at the point of survey and interview assessment.

⁶ Rationalist studies highlight the material costs and benefits of targeting civilians in conflict (Downes 2008; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). On norms in international politics, see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).

⁷ Notable literature in sociology has also examined factors influencing combatant conduct toward civilians (Winslow 2004, 1999)

⁸ Kelman posited three different states of norm adoption as socialization outcomes: compliance; social identification; and internalization.

⁹ Checkel identifies such levels of socialization as type 0 (rational calculation), type I (role playing), and type II (identity or preference change). See, e.g., Checkel (2005, 804; 2017) and Gates (2017, 680–682).

¹⁰ For an overview of scholarship on military training in IHL, see Stubbins Bates (2014,2020). For an empirical comparative analysis of U.S. Army socialization to norms of restraint, see Bell (forthcoming)

¹¹ On socialization, and the “acculturalization” of military organizations to norms of restraint and IHL, see Stephens (2014, 2019b). On the impact of political ideology on adoption of norms of restraint, see Bell, Gift, and Monten (forthcoming).

¹² For sociological perspectives on military culture, see Winslow (2000). For political science scholarship, see, e.g., Manekin (2017). and Ruffa (2017, 2018).

¹³ Early socialization studies focused on US military officer training (Janowitz 1959; Lovell 1964). For ethnographic accounts of socialization in nonstate armed groups, see, e.g., Marks (2013).

¹⁴ A third and more marginal perspective, “Fragmentationism” rejects the potential for any normative coherence within military organizations (Soeters, Winslow and Weibull 2006).

¹⁵ See also Checkel (2017).

¹⁶ On organizational hierarchies in nonstate armed groups, see Daly (2014) and Lidow (2016).

¹⁷ In addition to these rank categories, many military organizations also incorporate a third category, that of warrant officer, which can be either separate from both commissioned officer and enlisted corps or subsumed into the enlisted corps. Note: this article uses terminology and concepts related ground-based military forces.

¹⁸ The AFP potentially may face similar circumstances again with under the current presidency of Rodrigo Duterte.

¹⁹ The AFP required no publication review following data collection. The ADF required publication review but made a single request for slight re-wording based on stylistic criteria. No substantive changes were made as part of this review.

²⁰ Due to space constraints, this section provides a necessarily brief overview of the promotion of norms of restraint in the Australian and Philippine militaries. Ongoing studies by the authors explore these socialization processes in greater depth.

²¹ This commitment has been evidenced in the ADF’s exhaustive ongoing investigation into special forces war crimes in Afghanistan, known as the Brereton Investigation (Doran 2020). Of note, that investigation examined conduct by ADF special operations forces, an elite military subpopulation not examined in this study of regular Army forces.

²² All Australian Army officers are commissioned through the officer training program conducted at RMC-D. Some cadets additionally attend a three-year military academy program at ADFA.

²³ On the importance of training and exercises in fostering combatant internalization of IHL, see Stephens (2019a).

²⁴ Interviews with Australian Army soldiers #AUSFGV2 (multiple).

²⁵ Stephens (2019a) also categorizes recent Philippine Army multinational exercises which emphasize the implementation of IHL in rules of engagement and operational practice.

²⁶ See the “Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity.” Additionally, the Philippines have increased enforcement of torture through the recent “Anti-Torture Act of 2009.”

²⁷ In the Australian Army, officer ranks are represented by majors and lieutenant colonels; enlisted ranks (known as “other ranks” in the Australian Army) are represented by privates, lance corporals, and corporals. In the Philippine Army, officer ranks are represented by majors and lieutenant colonels; enlisted ranks are represented by privates, privates first class, and corporals.

²⁸ SES is typically defined by three key indicators: education, income, and occupation (APA Task Force on Socioeconomic Status, 2007). These factors are highly correlated with the distinction between managerial-oriented officer corps positions and labor-oriented enlisted corps positions.

²⁹ For recent social science literature on gender differences, aggression, and conflict, see McDermott (2015) and Sjoberg and Gentry (2007).

³⁰ See Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 1977, the Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8(2)(b)(iv). See also Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, and Alvermann (2005, 47) and Solis (2010, 252, 521). Force protection definition drawn from DoD Joint Publication 1–02. See also Solis (2010, 284).

³¹ Gregory (2019). Existing political science literature primarily examines the tension between force protection and civilian protection. See, e.g., Cronin (2018) and Smith (2008). For a strategic-level examination of the three principles as part of a counterinsurgency policy “trilemma,” see Zambernardi (2010). Ons the combatant’s trilemma in the law of armed conflict, see Schmitt (2012); Gardam (1993); Geiss (2012).

³² See Felter and Shapiro (2017, 53).

³³ See below for a more detailed explanation of survey format.

³⁴ Italics not included in the original survey. Note: Australian surveys used the phrase “use lethal force against”; Philippine surveys used the term “kill.” While this study does not directly compare combatant responses to specific questions across armed forces, it should be noted that this language variation may somewhat limit any direct comparison of Australian and Philippine responses for this question and question #2.

³⁵ Italics not included in the original survey. Note: Australian surveys used the phrase “use lethal force against”; Philippine surveys used the term “kill.” Recent counterinsurgency conflicts have highlighted the blurred distinction between civilian and combatant categories, and under international law civilians directly participating in hostilities can be directly targeted. See (Solis 2016, 579)**.

³⁶ Ordered logistic analysis is also appropriate for modeling Likert scale categories as ordered and not continuous items (Wakita, Ueshima, and Noguchi 2012).

³⁷ See, e.g., interviews #AUSFGV6P2, #AUSFGV4P2, #AUSFGV2 (multiple).

³⁸ Australian Army corporals (multiple), #AUSFGV3. The section is a platoon subunit consisting of approximately eight to fourteen soldiers. It is the equivalent of the “squad” in the U.S. Army.

³⁹ Australian Army corporal, #AUSFGV3P3.

⁴⁰ Australian Army private, #AUSFGV5P1.

⁴¹ Philippine Army master sergeants, #PHLFGV5P1, #PHLFGV5P2. Philippine Army staff sergeants (multiple), #PHLFGV2P1, #PHLFGV2P2, #PHLFGV2P3, #PHLFGV4P2.

⁴² See also Higate and Cameron (2006). On surveys and respondent views, see Rosenfeld, Imai, and Shapiro (2016, 1996), and FeldmanHall et al. (2012). The authors conduct more in-depth mixed method analysis of both survey and interview data in ongoing studies.

⁴³ Hypothetical questions similarly can mitigate important legal, ethical, and psychological health concerns in the administration of surveys related to battlefield conduct (Schwarz and Oyserman 2001).

⁴⁴ It should be noted that under Kelman’s framework, social desirability bias also provides evidence of socialization effects through respondents’ social identification with organization norms (type I socialization) (Kelman 1958).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross.