Conflict, complicity & confusion: unravelling empowerment struggles in Nigeria after the Return to 'Democracy'

Abstract

The national and international press report the recent upsurge of youth-led ethnic violence in Nigeria as if it were new. But Ifeka argues that in view of the catastrophic fall in Nigeria's GDP from $US93.1 billion in 1980 to US$40 billion in 1997 (Adedeji, 1999), youth's proclivity for violence is hardly surprising. Indeed, youth-led rebellions are not new. A political economy approach shows that developed economies exploitation of peripheral economies supplying raw materials sustains under-development and conditions spawning periodic revolt (Richards, 1996).

Poverty makes people depend for assistance on customary (kin-based) relationships between superior elders and junior youths. But educated (unemployed) youth are finding that dependency on elders thwarts their own development and that of their people. Militant youth articulate a general perception that development is being obstructed by 'selfish' elders and chiefs who 'chop' on government contracts for their own gain, not their people's advancement.