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Notes
2. Shari'a is (God-given) Islamic law: fiqh is Islamic legal theory and may be subject to interpretation.
3. John Gray, Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus: A Practical Guide for Improving Communication and Getting What You Want in Your Relationships, Harper Collins, 1992.
4. Regulating body for religious properties and bequests.
5. The sayings and deeds of the Prophet and his companions, which together form the sunna.
6. Personal investigation of religious sources based on the Qur'an and sunna.
1. Before he became head of the UIC, Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf was the leader of the semi-independent state of Puntland in northeast Somalia, which is home to the Majertine tribe.
2. Hostility to the Islamic courts did not prevent the warlords from also seeking to undermine the authority of the TFG. The government was forced, belatedly, to expel ministers who belonged to the ARPCT, which was threatening to take military action.
3. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development is an African regional organisation established in 1992 and its members are Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti.
4. This is the term for warlords who are members of the government.
5. In the early 1990s, when he was still only the leader of Puntland, Abdullahi broke the power of the Islamic movement there.
1. See especially the lengthy interview with Sheikh Sherif by Awdalnews Network, 9 June 2006, htpp://www.awdalnews.com.
2. Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, letter to UN Political Office in Somalia and others, 5 June 2006.
3. ‘Somalis protest at US backing’, BBC World Service, 2 June 2006.
4. Chris Tomlinson, ‘Somalia's Islamic extremists set US back’, Associated Press, 6 June 2006.
6. Crisis Group interview, Nairobi, June 2006; ‘Ethiopian troops are in Somalia’, BBC, 26 July 2006.
7. Crisis Group interviews, Nairobi, June/July 2006.
8. Crisis Group, electronic communication, June 2006.
9. See, for example, Crisis Group Report, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia (note Footnote6 above) and Crisis Group media release, ‘Don't Cross the Mogadishu Line’ (note Footnote6 above). Selected extracts from Africa Report No 116, International Crisis Group, 10 August 2006.
10. 10 August 2006)
1. See J. Keenan (2006), ‘Security and Insecurity in North Africa’, ROAPE Vol. 33, No. 108, pp. 269-296; J. Keenan (2005), ‘Waging war on terror: the implications of America's ‘New Imperialism2 for Saharan peoples’, Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 10, Nos. 3-4, pp. 610-638.
2. J. Keenan, ‘Tuareg Take Up Arms’, ROAPE, No. 108, 2006, pp. 367-8.
4. The research information contained in this Briefing comes mostly from a network of established and reliable field informants in the Tuareg regions of Niger, Mali and southern Algeria, with whom the last detailed interviews were undertaken by satellite phone in mid-October, a day or so before this Issue went to press.
5. See notes Footnote1, Footnote2 and M. Barth, ‘Sandcastles in the Sahara: US military basing in Algeria’, ROAPE, Vol. 30, No. 98, 2003, pp. 679-685. J. Keenan, ‘Americans & ‘Bad People’ in the Sahara-Sahel’, ROAPE. Vol. 31, No. 99, 2004, pp. 130-139; ‘Terror in the Sahara: the implications of US imperialism for North and West Africa’. ROAPE. Vol. 31, No 101, 2004, pp. 475-496; ‘Political Destabilisation and ‘Blowback’ in the Sahel’, ROAPE, Vol. 31, No. 102, December 2004, pp. 691-698; ‘The banana theory of terrorism: alternative truths and the collapse of the ‘second’ (Saharan) front in the War on Terror,’ Journal of Contemporary Africa Studies (Special Issue on ‘The Sahara’) (forthcoming 2007).
6. The reason why this disinformation strategy has been so successful is because the line agencies, such as those mentioned above, rely on the media's prevailing ‘cut and paste’ culture and have insufficient resources to check and research for themselves the stories fed to them by the intelligence services.
7. Ibid.
8. For example, the Niger government and the UN moved quickly to counter such a prospect, and in October (2005) announced a [euro][euro] 1.2 million development programme for Niger's Tuareg, financed by the UNDP, France, US and significantly Libya.
9. Algeria's reaction was to introduce a commercial blockade of the Kidal region which gets many of its commercial supplies from Algeria.
10. Approximately 0.1% of the country's total population.
11. ‘Kidnapped tourists freed in Niger’, BBC News 14 October 2006; online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6051320.stm).
12. According to a Tuareg spokesman for the Alliance quoted by Reuters (‘Mali Tuaregs say Algerian militant killed in clash’, Reuters 1 October 2006), the clash took place on 19 September. Almost all other reports put the date as 27 September.
13. Ibid.
14. For example: ‘Trois terroristes Salafistes auraient été abattus. Violent accrochage entre les Touaregs Maliens et le GSPC’, Liberté – Actualité, 1 October 2006.
15. I have read some two dozen press articles in the 2-week period between the date of the incident on 27 September and writing this briefing on 14 October.
16. See almost any Malian or Algerian newspaper between 27 September and 14 October, such as, for example, Liberté – Actualité 1 October 2006.
17. Note Footnote12.
18. See, for example, ‘Un des chefs GSPC tué au Mali’, El Watan, 9 October 2006.