Rwanda's Vision 2020 halfway through: what the eye does not see

Abstract

This paper considers the progress made in the implementation of Rwanda's Vision 2020 programme since its launch in 2000. At the halfway point, the overall picture is quite encouraging. Rwanda's economy is thriving and reported growth figures have been impressive. The country is on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals in the fields of education and health care. Its political leaders have been praised for their quality of technocratic governance and their proactive approach to creating an attractive business climate. However, some indicators remain problematic. This paper argues that the current strategy – one of maximum growth at any cost – is counterproductive to the objective of achieving the greatest possible poverty reduction. Strong economic growth, concentrated in the hands of a small elite, results in a highly skewed developmental path with limited trickle-down potential. A possible alternative lies in an exploration of a broad-based inclusive growth model founded on existing strengths and the notion of capacity building among rural small-scale farmers. Striving for a more inclusive concept of growth would appear to be crucial not only for successful poverty reduction, but also with a view to promoting long-term stability and peace in Rwanda.

[Vision 2020 du Rwanda à mi-parcours: ce que l'œil ne voit pas.] Le présent article analyse les progrès accomplis dans la mise en œuvre du programme ‘Vision 2020 du Rwanda’ depuis son lancement en 2000. À mi-terme, le tableau d'ensemble est encourageant. L'économie du Rwanda est en plein essor et les chiffres de croissance rapportés sont impressionnants. Le pays est sur la bonne voie pour atteindre les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le développement dans les domaines de l'éducation et de santé. Ses dirigeants politiques ont été félicités pour la qualité de leur gouvernance technocratique et leur approche proactive de la création d'un climat propice au business. Toutefois, plusieurs indicateurs restent problématiques. Cet article soutient que la stratégie actuelle – celle d'une croissance maximale à tout prix – est contre-productive par rapport à l'objectif qui vise à atteindre la plus grande réduction possible de la pauvreté. La forte croissance économique, concentrée dans les mains d'une petite élite, résulte en une voie de développement très inégal avec un potentiel limité de retombées. Une alternative possible réside dans l'exploration d'un modèle fondé sur une croissance inclusive sur la base d'un renforcement des capacités des petits agriculteurs. Ceci semble crucial, non seulement pour réduire la pauvreté, mais aussi en vue de promouvoir la stabilité à long terme et la paix au Rwanda.

Mots-clés: Rwanda ; pauvreté ; croissance ; politiques de développement

Keywords:

• Rwanda
• poverty
• growth
• development policy

Acknowledgements

An earlier, shorter version of this article appeared in French in ‘L'Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2010–2011’. The authors would like to thank the editors of the yearbook for the permission to use the original version as a basis for this article. Furthermore, the authors would like to thank Jude Murison and Filip Reyntjens for their inputs and comments on this article.

Notes

The conclusions of this report were later called into question when a new report was presented by judges Trévidic and Poux in January 2013. This new report largely contradicted the conclusions of the Bruguière report. According to this second report, the missiles that hit President Habyarimana's plane were launched in the Kanombe camp held by Hutu (Le Monde 2012).

In 2004, the UK and Sweden suspended all aid to Rwanda in response to the country's announcement that it was considering renewing its military intervention in DRC. In 2008, the Netherlands and Sweden suspended budget assistance as a reaction to a UN report uncovering Rwanda's active support to the Nkunda militia (Zorbas 2011). However, there has been no coordinated donor reaction since 1994.

This index is used to capture inequality. It varies between 0 and 1 with higher levels representing greater inequality.

From the 1980s, inequality in the rural areas was reported to be rising and the rural–urban gap to be widening. No nationally representative data exists for the period of civil war from the early 1990s to the conclusion of the 1994 genocide. Nonetheless, Maton's study of a more limited scope shows that, in 1982, the 10% richest accounted for 20% of the total rural revenue; this share rose to 41% by 1992, to 45% by 1993 and to approximately 51% at the beginning of 1994 (Maton 1994).

Interestingly, this phenomenon could not be attributed to a widening gap between the urban and rural settings alone, given that the rural Gini coefficient also rose significantly (GOR 2006).

It is clear that the Rwandan government is very sensitive to the issue of rising inequality. The 2007 UNDP report that commends Rwanda's progress in terms of the Millennium Development Goals, also points to the problem of growing inequality. It states: ‘in order to operate a successful transition from recovery to long-term growth, Rwanda will have to tackle three major challenges (agriculture, population and income distribution) that could compromise the sustainability of its development’ (UNDP 2007, p. 85). Whereas the report was initially approved by Finance Minister Musoni, he subsequently retracted his support, accusing the Swedish editor of putting forward an unfounded and misleading interpretation of the figures (see also Ingelaere 2010a, Reyntjens 2011a). The incident is indicative of the Rwandan government's sensitivity to criticism of its poverty and inequality-related policy performance.

There is an important paradox in banning ethnicity when referring to the present, while emphasising ethnicity in narratives explaining the genocide (Eltringham 2011). Waldorf points out how the replacement of the term ‘genocide’ with that of ‘genocide of the Tutsi’ in the 2003 constitution places the ‘emphasis on collective Tutsi victimization’ and ‘implicitly imposes collective guilt on Hutu’, which ‘consequently makes it more difficult to achieve sustainable coexistence in Rwanda’ (Waldorf 2011, p. 49).

During our fieldwork, we investigated how performance targets are set. Interviewees in different locations explained how district-level authorities communicate targets to sectors and imidugudu. Sector and imidigudu authorities subsequently ‘sensibilise’ local inhabitants. Local constituents play no role whatsoever in such target setting. As a result, the priorities often fail to correspond with or even go against local concerns.

Its full name is the Organic Law Determining the Use and Management of Land in Rwanda (No. 08/2005 of 14 July 2005). It was published on 15 September 2005 in the official gazette of the Republic of Rwanda.

The poorest may however be exempt from this obligation. Such decisions are left to the village committee. Logie et al. (2008) mention that only 10% of the population were exempt (in 2004), whereas 15% to 30% (in 2005) qualified as too poor to have to pay the fee.