Ambivalent outcomes of statebuilding: multiplication of brokers and educational expansion in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2004–13)

ABSTRACT

This empirical article explores how the interaction between two key aspects of statebuilding (democratisation and decentralisation) and existing forms of governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo led to a multiplication in numbers of political and administrative brokers. Furthermore, it investigates how these brokers construct their roles well beyond official mandates. Responding to local demands, they circumvent formal procedures in order to obtain decrees accrediting public primary and secondary schools. As a result, the number of public schools has almost tripled since the early 2000s. Building on qualitative and quantitative empirical data, the article thus reveals that democratisation and decentralisation can reproduce clientelist structures. However, it also uncovers changing socio-spatial dynamics: certain historically neglected and conflict-affected districts have particularly benefited from brokers’ involvement. Despite these positive aspects, the article further illustrates how these outcomes counteract other central administrative and political objectives.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article empirique explore comment l’interaction entre deux aspects clés de la construction d’un État (démocratisation et décentralisation) et les formes existantes de gouvernance en République démocratique du Congo ont mené à une multiplication en nombre de courtiers politiques et administratifs. De plus, il explore comment ces courtiers conçoivent leurs rôles bien au-delà de leurs mandats officiels. Répondant à la demande locale, ils contournent les procédures formelles afin d’obtenir des décrets agréant les écoles publiques primaires et secondaires. Par conséquent, le nombre d’écoles publiques a presque triplé depuis le début des années 2000. Sur base de données empiriques qualitatives et quantitatives, l’article révèle ainsi que la démocratisation et la décentralisation peuvent reproduire des structures clientélistes. Cependant, elles mettent aussi au jour des dynamiques socio-spatiales changeantes : certains territoires historiquement négligés et affectés par les conflits ont particulièrement bénéficié de l’implication des courtiers. Malgré ces aspects positifs, l’article montre comment ces résultats vont à l’encontre d’autres objectifs politiques et administratifs centraux.

KEYWORDS:

• Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
• educational expansion
• broker
• statebuilding
• clientelism
• permanent provocation

MOTS-CLÉS:

• République démocratique du Congo (RDC)
• expansion de l’éducation
• courtier
• construction de l’État
• clientélisme
• provocation permanente

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his gratitude to Mieke Lopes Cardozo, Tom de Herdt, Christopher Starke, Nils Köbis and anonymous reviewers for the helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Note on contributor

Cyril Owen Brandt is a PhD candidate with the International Development Studies programme at the University of Amsterdam, within the Education and International Development research group. His research is focused on the relationship between education systems and state formation/public authority in the DRC. He studies negotiated public authority in Congolese educational decision-making; the real governance of teacher legibility; teacher payment modalities; and the government of displaced teachers in armed conflicts.

ORCID

Cyril Owen Brandt http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4346-0210

Notes

1. Whether or not schools facilitate quality education is not debated here. I consider parents’ demand as a sign of the value they attach to education.

2. As I explain in the next section, schools are governed by the government and faith-based organisations.

3. In the remainder of the article, the educational provinces are anonymised.

4. Through data triangulation I can claim that I have gathered most if not all relevant decrees between 2004–13.

5. In total, 352. I recorded 113 in-depth interviews, research colleagues conducted 16, and the rest ranges from handwritten notes during interviews to short conversations. Not all of them are directly used or quoted in this article, but have led to a holistic understanding of Congolese educational governance.

6. Next to the creation of administrative units, the constitution grants more autonomy to provincial ministries of education. However, this is not of relevance to this article as the deconcentrated administrative units still respond to the national Minister.

7. Especially Pentecostal communities.

8. Owing to armed conflicts and the occupation of one-third of Congolese territory by belligerent groups, the data of 2001–02 are probably not complete.

9. Networks are referred to either by their abbreviation or by their number (the 22nd for instance is called the vingt-deuxième).

10. As a limitation, my approach does not allow me to provide a clear answer to why some MPs get better access to accreditations than others. A political settlement approach drawing on bigger data sets could be a fruitful way of tackling this issue (Abdulai and Hickey 2016).