The politics of incontournables: entrenching patronage networks in eastern Congo’s mineral markets

ABSTRACT

Years after the formal end of two devastating wars, the Congo’s eastern Kivu provinces meander in a limbo of contested politics, deep-seated insecurity and armed mobilisation. Through the prism of the artisanal mining sector, which is currently undergoing significant regulatory transformation, this article studies the convoluted networks of political and economic order that underpin (in)security. Investigating the links between violence, reform and patronage, it asks how powerbrokers adapt to changing logics of conflict and resource extraction amid transnational reform that aims at ‘conflict-free’ mineral sourcing. Revisiting the notion of patronage, the article argues that political and economic order are socio-spatially entwined and demonstrates how a certain type of stakeholder – known collectively as incontournables – commands multiple loyalties across entangled networks of mineral exploitation and trade that extend far into the political, economic and military spheres of authority.

RÉSUMÉ

Des années après la fin officielle de deux guerres dévastatrices, la région du Kivu à l’est du Congo bascule entre contestation politique, insécurité cinglante et mobilisation armée. À travers le prisme du secteur minier artisanal, qui subit actuellement une transformation régulatrice importante, cet essai étudie les réseaux politiques et économiques convolutés qui sous-tendent l’insécurité. En examinant les liens entre violence, réforme et patronage, cet article enquête comment les courtiers en pouvoir s’adaptent à l’évolution des logiques de conflit et d’extraction des ressources dans le cadre d’une réforme transnationale visant des chaînes d’approvisionnement minier « sans conflit ». Revisitant le concept de patronage, l’article soutient que politique et économie sont intimement liés sur le plan socio-spatial. Il démontre comment certains acteurs – les « incontournables » – gèrent de multiples loyautés à travers des réseaux enchevêtrés d’exploitation et de commerce de minerais qui s’étendent profondément dans les sphères d’autorité politique, économique et militaire.

KEYWORDS:

• Patronage
• conflict
• resource governance
• networks
• Central Africa
• peacebuilding

MOTS-CLÉS:

• Patronage
• conflit
• gouvernance des ressources
• réseaux
• Afrique centrale
• consolidation de la paix

Acknowledgements

I thank Timothy Raeymaekers, Josaphat Musamba, Loochi Muzaliwa, Chrispin Mvano, Lievin Mbarushimana, Lebon Mulimbi, Koen Vlassenroot, Benedikt Korf, Muriel Côte, Rory Rowan, Peer Schouten, Johannes Stahl and Judith Verweijen. Moreover, this article benefited from the help of many friends in eastern Congo, whom I cannot name, as well as from thoughtful comments by ROAPE editors and anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 As part of the review process and revision of this article, it was noted that these arguments needed to be better situated within my overall research. I am grateful to that reviewer for the opportunity to do so, as it explains why some aspects are not discussed in greater depth here. On ‘conflict minerals’, see for instance Vogel 2018; Vogel, Musamba and Radley 2018; Radley and Vogel 2015. On peacebuilding and ‘post-conflict’ debates, see Vogel and Musamba 2016; Vogel 2014; Vogel 2013.

2 This means that the previously unrecorded economies were converted into a bureaucratic architecture, including the registration of miners and production in order to make them taxable. Many cooperatives are subcontractors of concession holders or rooted in political networks or comptoirs (trading houses, some with a patchy reputation). Nonetheless, the petite mine – provided for under national legislation – is hailed by foreign stakeholders as a step towards ‘efficient’, ‘modern’ mining.

3 Regular reports point to the involvement of FARDC and the Republican Guard, the national army’s Praetorian unit, escorting lorries to facilitate nocturnal lake and border crossings.

4 The 2014 Mutarule massacre echoed how such manipulation can turn out locally, with civilian populations on the losing end. This ethnically bifurcated village (a Bafuliiro and a Barundi/Banyamulenge neighbourhood) in the Plaine chieftaincy (east of Lemera) exemplifies how outright violence can emerge from tit-for-tat logics, including cattle raids, which intensified after the 2012 assassination of mwami Ndabagoye.

5 The son’s networks involved pro-government politicians, the Lemera groupement chief and Molière’s militia. The half-brother gathered support from others, including opposition, politicians, the Luvungi groupement chief and, allegedly, Mai-Mai. While the situation is ongoing, this vignette only covers up to 2016.

6 Meanwhile, armed Biloko – composed of miners – even accompanied iTSCi audits as a customary security outfit.

7 The kalinzi lease system has a common history with customary land management in Rwanda, there called karinzi but also cikingi. Shi customary order also provides for rental agreements, which are referred to as bugule. I thank my friend Loochi Muzaliwa for deep insights into this complex issue.

8 Concession no. 5886 is a former SAKIMA (Société aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema) perimeter of 120 squares (mining concessions are demarcated as ‘squares’ by the cadastral office). It includes Mushangi, Zola Zola, D23, Mahamba, Nyamugengula, Chembeke, Nzibira, Kihande, Katchuba, Chaminyago and Muhinga. The concession involving Chaminyago used to be held by the firm Congo Eco Project that used to cooperate with COMIDEA. However, this permit has now expired, raising the possibility for artisanal miners to claim an artisanal exploitation zone.

9 Another cooperative-like entity is Générale des Coopératives du Sud-Kivu, led by a pastor who also runs a cooperative. Representing South Kivu’s cooperatives on paper, this organisation is de facto a tool of its powerful members, i.e. the respective cooperative presidents it regroups.

10 Similar observations can be made for other cases, e.g. in Nyabibwe, where customary interests underpin a rivalry between two cooperatives. While conflicts around 2010 had been settled, tensions continued between and within the cooperatives. This is illustrated in the interference of leaders vying for power within ‘their’ cooperative, such as in 2014 when the mwami of Buhavu tried to seize the presidency in ‘his’ cooperative.

Additional information

Funding

The author acknowledges the support to his research through grant no. S-75141-03-01 of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF/FNS).

Notes on contributors

Christoph Vogel

Christoph Vogel is Research Director of the Insecure Livelihoods Series at Conflict Research Group (CRG), Ghent University, and a Senior Fellow at Congo Research Group (GEC), New York University. Previously, he worked for the University of Zurich, the University of Cologne and the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.