Surveillance and the City: Patronage, Power-Sharing and the Politics of Urban Control in Zimbabwe

Abstract

From 2000, ZANU(PF) suffered repeated electoral defeat in the cities and lost control of municipalities to the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This turned urban governance into a battlefield, as ZANU(PF) dramatically recentralised powers over local authorities, developed ‘parallel’ party structures and used militia to control central markets and peri-urban land. Taking the case of Harare and environs during the period of Zimbabwe's Inclusive Government (IG), this article explores contestations over urban authority, focusing on the office of councillor and urban spaces dominated by ZANU(PF)-aligned militia. I argue that surveillance was central to ZANU(PF)'s strategy for urban control and to the politics of patronage. Inconvenient councillors were disciplined by threats and enticements from the feared Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and were also vulnerable to suspension, while ZANU(PF) militia made political loyalty a condition of access to market stalls, land and housing cooperatives. Dominant political science characterisations of the African postcolonial state and ethnographic accounts of precarity and vigilance mislead in this context if they fail to capture the disciplining roles and social reach of a centralised partisan state security agency and militarised party structures that suffuse work and social life within local government institutions and contested city spaces. Analyses of power-sharing need to reach beyond the national stage not only because conflict over local authorities can undermine transitional political processes but also for the light they can shed on the changing character of the state and its relationship to reconstituted ZANU(PF) powers.

Notes

Some of the interviews used in this article were conducted under the auspices of an ESRC-funded project RES-000-22-3795. Grateful thanks to Kudakwashe Chitofiri, Tinashe Nyamunda and Caspar Takura for research assistance, and to those who gave interviews.

¹ K. Chatiza, ‘Can Local Government Steer Socio-Economic Transformation in Zimbabwe? Analysing Historical Trends and Gazing into the Future’, in de Visser, N. Steytler and N. Machinguta (eds) Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A Policy Dialogue. (UWC, South Africa, Community Law Centre, 2010), pp. 1–30. See also Institute for a Democratic Alternative in Zimbabwe (IDAZIM) Local Governance in Transition. Zimbabwe's Local Authorities During the Inclusive Government (Harare, RTI International and IDAZIM, 2010).

² In 2005 the MDC split, and the larger grouping remained under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai, hereafter MDC-T. This paper is focused on local politics in Harare and environs, where MDC-T dominates, and does not detail the politics of the smaller MDC formation.

³ Suspended Harare MDC-T city councillor, 3 September 2011.

⁴ MDC-T Minister of Public Service, Lucia Matibenga, Harare, 23 April 2012.

⁵ MDC-T did not have a clear policy on local government initially, and did not press the issue during the negotiations for the GPA.

⁶Zimbabwe Independent, 31 August 2012. See also SW Radio Africa 31 August 2012; See also ‘MDC Fires Corrupt Councillors’, The Zimbabwean 25 August 2012; ‘Battle Looms Over Fired Councillors’, Daily News 31 August 2012.

⁷Zimbabwe Independent, 31 August 2012.

⁸ ‘Freedom House Poll: MDC-T Under Spotlight’, The Standard, 2 September 2012. According to the poll, support for MDC-T plummeted from 38% in 2010 to 19% in 2012, while that for ZANU(PF) grew from 17% to 31%.

⁹ ‘Mwonzora Castigates Chombo for Protecting Councillors’ The Zimbabwean 3 September 2012.

¹⁰ On power-sharing see A.C. Le Van, ‘Power-sharing and Inclusive Politics in Uncertain Democracies’, Governance, 24, 1 (2011), pp. 31–53; I. Spears, ‘Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problem of Power Sharing’, Third World Quarterly, 21, 1 (2000), pp. 105–118; N. Cheeseman and M. Tendi, ‘Power-Sharing in Comparative Perspective: The Dynamics of “Unity Government” in Kenya and Zimbabwe’, JMAS, 48, 2 (2010), pp. 203–99; B. Raftopoulos (ed.) The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement (Harare, Weaver Press in association with Solidarity Peace Trust, 2013).

¹¹ T.B. Hansen and F. Stepputat, ‘Introduction: States of Imagination’, in T.B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds), States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State (London, Duke University Press, 2001), p. 14. See also Veena Das and D. Poole (eds) Anthropology in the Margins of the State (Santa Fe, School of American Research Press, 2004).

¹² Hansen and Stepputat, ‘States of Imagination’, p. 14. The most frequently invoked political science texts include J-F. Bayart The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London, Longman, 1993); P. Chabal and J.P. Daloz Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford, James Currey 1992).

¹³ Hansen and Stepputat, ‘States of Imagination’, p. 12. A. Hammar, ‘The Making and Unma(s)king of Local Government in Zimbabwe’, in A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds) Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis, (Harare, Weaver Press, 2003).

¹⁴Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013).

¹⁵ The Oxford dictionary definition is appropriate for the forms of watching discussed here, but has been criticised in relation to new surveillance technologies, see G. Marx, ‘What's New about the “New Surveillance”: Classifying for Change and Continuity’, Surveillance and Society, 1, 1 (2002), 9–29. ZANU(PF)'s use of technology is not discussed here, but see C. Mavhunga, ‘The Glass Fortress: Zimbabwe's Cyber-Guerrilla Warfare’, Journal of International Affairs, 62, 2 (2009), pp. 159–174.

¹⁶ A. Purdekova, ‘”Even if I Am Not Here, There Are So Many Eyes”’: Surveillance and State Reach in Rwanda', Journal of Modern African Studies, 49, 3 (2011), p. 476.

¹⁷ Purdekova, ‘Even If I Am Not Here’, p. 476.

¹⁸ Purdekova, ‘Even If I Am Not Here’, p. 478. See also D. Bozzini ‘Low-Tech Surveillance and the Despotic State in Eritrea’, Surveillance and Society, 9, 1,2 (2011), pp. 93–113.

¹⁹ H. Vigh, ‘Vigilance: On Conflict, Social Invisibility and Negative Potentiality’, Social Analysis, 55, 3 (2011), pp. 93–114.

²⁰Ibid., p. 94.

²¹ K. Chitiyo, The Case for Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe, London, Royal Services International, Occasional Paper (2009), p. 12.

²² This echoes aspects of the essentially non-culturalist approach in G. Blundo and J-P.Olivier de Sardan in Everyday Corruption and the State: Citizens and Public Officials in Africa (London, Zed Books, 2006).

²³ D. Matyszak, Law, Politics and Zimbabwe's “Unity” Government (Harare, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, 2010); B. Raftopoulos, ‘An Overview of the Global Political Agreement: National Conflict, Regional Agency, International Dilemma’ (forthcoming); International Crisis Group, ‘Resistance and Denial: Zimbabwe's Stalled Reform Agenda’ (ICG, Johannesburg/Brussels, 2011); Cheeseman and Tendi ‘Power-Sharing’; Chitiyo ‘The case’; Raftopoulos, Hard Road.

²⁴ N. Kriger, ‘ZANU(PF) Politics under Zimbabwe's “Power-Sharing Government”’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 30, 1 (2012), pp. 11–26.

²⁵ J. Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa (Princeton University Press, 2005).

²⁶Ibid., p. 22.

²⁷ G. Blundo and P-Y. Le Meur, ‘An Anthropology of Everyday Governance: Collective Service Delivery and Subject-Making’, in G. Blundo and Pier-Yves le Meur (eds), The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Collective Services (Leiden, Brill, 2005), p. 18.

²⁸ J. De Visser, N. Steytler and N. Machingauta (eds) Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A Policy Dialogue. (UWC, South Africa, Community Law Centre, 2010); Institute for a Democratic Alternative in Zimbabwe [IDAZIM] Local Governance in Transition: Zimbabwe's Local Authorities During the Inclusive Government (Harare, RTI International and IDAZIM, 2010).

²⁹ De Visser et al., Local Government, and IDAZIM, Local Governance commend Zimbabwe's history of professionalism in light of regional comparison.

³⁰ S. Bracking, ‘Political Economies of Corruption Beyond Liberalism: An Interpretative View of Zimbabwe’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 30 (2009), pp. 35–51.

³¹ Interviews, Harare, e.g., 3 September 2011.

³² K. Chatiza, ‘Can Local Government’.

³³ K. Chatiza, ‘Can Local Government’.

³⁴ Norton and Ruwa provided interesting comparisons, in that Ruwa was upheld by the MDC-T as a model council and had managed to build two new schools under the IG, while Norton suffered more typical failings.

³⁵ Interviews were conducted with 21 MDC-T councillors (9 from Harare, 8 from Norton and 3 from Ruwa), 3 ZANU(PF) councillors from ZANU(PF)-dominated Norton council 2003–8, plus 6 executive officers. As councillors and officials wished to remain anonymous, it has sometimes been necessary to be vague and unspecific about particular wards or councils, unless information is already in the public domain through media coverage.

³⁶ On the normalisation of a ‘state of unease’ in Eritrea, see Bozzini ‘Low-Tech Surveillance’, p. 110.

³⁷ J. McGregor, ‘The Politics of Disruption: War Veterans and the Local State in Zimbabwe’, African Affairs, 101, 402 (2002), pp. 9–37. There were precedents in Rhodesian traditions of control and in the suspension of ZAPU councils in Matabeleland and Midlands in the 1980s.

³⁸ A. Kamete, ‘The Return of the Jettisoned: ZANU(PF)’s Crack at “Re-Urbanising” in Harare', JSAS, 32 (2), pp. 255–71.

³⁹ Chatiza ‘Can Local Government’.

⁴⁰ This was possible through the Provincial Councils and Administration Act.

⁴¹ Interview, Harare, 29 August 2011.

⁴² Interviews, Harare and Norton, 31 August 2011; 2 September 2011.

⁴³ Council officials' reasons for declining interviews.

⁴⁴ A. Kamete, ‘Cold-Hearted, Negligent and Spineless? Planning, Planners and the (R)ejection of “Filth” in Urban Zimbabwe, International Planning Studies, 12, 2 (2007), pp. 153–77, p. 154. See also J. Fontein, ‘Anticipating the Tsunami: Rumours, Planning and the Arbitrary State in Zimbabwe’, Africa, 3 (2009) 369–38; D. Potts, ‘Restoring Order? Operation Murambatsvina and the Urban Crisis in Zimbabwe’, JSAS, 32, 2 (2006), pp. 273–91.

⁴⁵ Senior planners and consultants cited in Kamete, ‘Cold-Hearted’, p. 158.

⁴⁶Ibid.. p. 159.

⁴⁷ Made law through the Local Government Laws Amendment Act, December 2007.

⁴⁸ Through an Amendment to the Urban Councils Act in early 2008.

⁴⁹ See Mike Davies’ challenges, http://www.swradioafrica.com/2012/03/14/transcript-of-harare-mayor-on-question-time-part-2/, retrieved 31 July 2012.

⁵⁰ Interview Lucia Matibenga, 23 April 2011; Interviews, Harare and Norton councillors, e.g., 11 September 2011, 16 April 2011.

⁵¹ ‘3000 Face Axe at City Council’ Daily News, 21 April 2011; ‘City Rules Out Retrenchment’, The Herald, 12 May 2011.

⁵² Interview, Norton councillors, 16 and 17 April 2011.

⁵³ Interview, Harare councillor 3 September 2011. ‘Stolen Meat Found in Jameson Hotel’, Zimeye 20 August 2009.

⁵⁴ Interview, Harare councillor, high-density ward, 14 December 2011.

⁵⁵ Interviews, 1 September 2011, 11 September 2011.

⁵⁶ Interview, 1 September 2011.

⁵⁷ J. Alexander and K. Chitofiri, ‘The Consequences of Violent Politics in Norton, Zimbabwe’, The Round Table, 99, 411 (2011), pp. 673–86.

⁵⁸ Interview, councillor, high-density ward, Ruwa, 1 September 2011; Harare high-density councillors, 11 September 2011, 24 August 2010, 14 December 2011.

⁵⁹ Interview, 24 April 2012.

⁶⁰ Norton MDC-T MP explained: 'An audit identified the CEO in terms of misuse of funds, so he was to be suspended, but that was revoked by Chombo. It left the councillors in a weak state…Technocrats could fix problems, we have experienced personnel on our council, but they knew that will also help the councillors. It's not all individual technocrats, but the hierarchy is aligned to ZANU(PF). The council can't present a case without the technocrats' support. Technocrats can also organise a plan of action that will lead the ratepayers to attack the councillors', 19 April 2011.

⁶¹ Vigh ‘Vigilance’, p. 104.

⁶² Interview, Harare councillor, 20 April 2012.

⁶³ Interview, 25 March 2011.

⁶⁴ Interview, 16 April 2011.

⁶⁵ Interview, Norton and Ruwa, 16–18 April 2011, 1 September 2011.

⁶⁶ There has, however, been some leeway to reduce allowances.

⁶⁷ IDAZIM Local Governance, p. 44.

⁶⁸ ‘Disclose council executive salaries’ Daily News 7 September 2012; CHRA 12 March 2009.

⁶⁹ CHRA cites municipal police salaries ranging from $290–$500, 12 March 2009, i.e. when teachers were earning $100 per month.

⁷⁰ Interviews, Norton councillors, 16–19 April 2011. Ruwa council's ability to build schools under the IG was attributed partly to less intense politicisation and to the fact that there was a more significant presence of companies and hence potential for collecting taxes. Interview, Ruwa executive officers, 1 September 2011.

⁷¹ ‘Council attaches property in Mabvuku’, The Standard, 28 April 2012.

⁷² Interview 13 December 2011.

⁷³ City of Harare, Special Investigations Committee Report on City of Harare Land Sales, Leases and Exchanges from the Period October 2004 to December 2009 (Harare, 23 March 2010).

⁷⁴ Interview, Harare, 26 August 2010.

⁷⁵ N. Marongwe, S. Mukoto and K. Chatiza, Scoping Study: Governance of Urban Land Markets in Zimbabwe (Harare, Urban Landmark, 2011).

⁷⁶ On the politics of property, see J. McGregor ‘Sentimentality or Speculation? Dream Homes, Crisis Economies and Diasporic Re-shaping of Urban Space’, Geoforum (forthcoming). The Real Estate Institute and Estate Agents Council of Zimbabwe estimated that 50% of estate agents and property developers were disreputable. Interviews, REI executive, 6 April 2011; EAC executive, 22 March 2011.

⁷⁷ Interviews, Norton councillors 16–18 April 2011; the new Mariedale and Johannesburg estates were particularly severely affected.

⁷⁸ Interview, Norton, 16 April 2011.

⁷⁹ Interview, Norton, 17 April 2011.

⁸⁰ ‘Councillors Arrested on Chiyangwa's Orders’, Independent, 9 April 2010; ‘Chombo and Chiyangwa Fume as City of Harare's Land Audit Makes Revelations’, CHRA 20 April 2010; ‘MDC Slams Arrest Of Harare's Mayor, Councillors’, ‘MDC, Masunda, Councillors Let Out on Bail’, Financial Gazette 23 April 2010.

⁸¹ MDC Councillor Dumba Arrested' Daily News, 15 June 2011.

⁸² ZLHR, 17 October 2011.

⁸³Newsday, 7 March 2012.

⁸⁴ Interview, Harare, 19 April 2012.

⁸⁵ In less than a year, councils were billed $500,000 for probe investigations Financial Gazette, 23 August 2011.

⁸⁶ In Harare, they put pressure for 61 Helensvale, Mandara, worth $600,000 to be surrendered back to council. The Standard, 5 August 2011.

⁸⁷ Crisis Coalition, ‘Deal with Chipangano’, 30 March 2012.

⁸⁸ Comparable militia in other towns are: Top Six (in Chinhoyi), Jochomondo (Hurungwe), Jambanja (Marambapfungwe) and Alshabab (Kwekwe), Sokwanele, 18 September 2012. Crisis Coalition, ‘ZANU(PF) a Powerful Brand of Extortion’, 31 August 2012, http://www.crisiszimbabwe.org/, retrieved 30 July 2012.

⁸⁹ Namely ZANU(PF) Provincial Chair Amos Midzi and Brig. Hubert Nyanyongo.

⁹⁰ Kriger ‘ZANU(PF) Politics’.

⁹¹ ‘Chipangano ZANU(PF) Product: Didymus Mutasa’, The Zimbabwean, 24 July 2012.

⁹² Mbare results in 2008 were MDC-T 7520 vs ZANU(PF) 6121, http://www.sokwanele.com/election2008, retrieved 31 July 2012. The parliamentary seat was won by ZANU(PF) in 2013, along with 2 of the 4 Mbare council seats, http://www.sokwanele.com/elections2013, retrieved 1 October 2013.

⁹³ Interview, Mbare councillors 28 August 2010; 2 September 2011.

⁹⁴ On partisan allocation of stalls, ‘Breaking News on Harare Market Stalls’ CHRA 18 September 2009.

⁹⁵ ‘Chra in Solidarity with Council Decision to Reallocate Market Stalls’, CHRA 24 September 2009.

⁹⁶ ‘Breaking News on Harare Market Stalls’, CHRA 18 September 2009.

⁹⁷ ‘Elderly Woman Killed During Mbare Market Demonstration’, SW Radio Africa, 23 September 2009. Http://www.swradioafrica.com/, retrieved 30 July 2012.

⁹⁸ Mugabe Slams Violence' The Herald, 5 October 2009. Chitambira came from Mugabe's home area.

⁹⁹ Interview, 2 September 2011.

¹⁰⁰ ‘Tonde's death – residents up in arms against Harare council’, The Standard, 15 November 2009.

¹⁰¹ ‘Mbare man dies… as municipal police unleashes violence on vendors’, CHRA, 10 September 2009.

¹⁰² ‘Harare Councillors Probe Municipal Police Recruitment’, 11 November 2009, http://www.zimeye.org/?p = 10391, retrieved 31 July 2012.

¹⁰³ ‘MDC Supporters Take Revenge’, 2 March 2009, http://www.zimbabwejournalists.com/print.php?art_id = 5339, retrieved 31 July 2012.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.; ‘MDC Says Violence Against Supporters Continues’, Voice of America, 27 October 2009, http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-09-24-voa74-66760817/563542.html, retrieved 30 July 2012.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., ‘High Court Grants Bail to 8 MDC Activists from Mbare’, 3 March 2009 http://www.swradioafrica.com/, retrieved 31 July.

¹⁰⁶ Interview, 28 August 2010.

¹⁰⁷ P. Shumba, Majubeki Report: Housing Crisis – The Weak Suffer in Silence (Harare, Harare Residents Trust, September 2010), p. 2.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 2.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 4.

¹¹¹ ‘Councillor Walks Out Of Court a Free Man’, Newsday 7 July 2010.

¹¹² ‘Terror Grips Mbare’ The Zimbabwean, 23 February 2011; CCJP ‘Violence in Mbare: Testimonies from the Victims’, 18 July 2011 http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/ccjpztestimonies180711.htm, retrieved 31 July 2012.

¹¹³ CCJP, ‘Vendors’ diary', http://catholiccomforjusticeandpeaceinzimbabwe.wordpress.com/2012/03/27/vendors-diary-displacements-intimidation-and-violence-in-mbare/, retrieved 31 July 2012.

¹¹⁴ ‘Police Alliance with ZANU(PF) a Major Source of Threat’ The Zimbabwean, 9 Feb 2011.

¹¹⁵The Zimbabwean 17 October 2011.

¹¹⁶ ‘MDC Applauds Court Ruling on Reinstatement of Harare Councillors’, SW Radio Africa, 26 October 2011.

¹¹⁷ The MP and councillor have repeatedly reported to the press over 2011–12 that they cannot go to Mbare. See for example The Zimbabwean, 14 August 2012.

¹¹⁸ Interview, 2 September 2011.

¹¹⁹ ‘Chipangano Cost Residents New Houses’, 7 November 2011, SW Radio Africa, http://www.swradioafrica.com/, retrieved 31 July 2012.

¹²⁰ The service station was allocated a plot by council resolution, but construction was stopped by ZANU(PF) youth attacking the workers. Mashwede Diesel and ZANU(PF) District Coordinating Committee (DCC) negotiated an agreement that all employment opportunities be given to Chipangano. But ZANU(PF) youth continued to disrupt with violence, apparently on politburo instructions, as the owner of Maswede Diesel supported MDC activity in Masvingo. Jim Kunaka produced a letter on Harare City Council letterhead paper signed by the town clerk, ordering that construction work should stop. ‘How Chipangano Stalled Fuel Project’, Daily News 27 February 2012.

¹²¹ Interviews, Mbare councillor 2 September 2011.

¹²² Interview, 20 April 2012.

¹²³ Interview, Harare high-density councillor, 11 September 2011.

¹²⁴ Interviews Harare councillors, various high-density wards.

¹²⁵ Interview, suspended councillor, Tafara, 19 April 2012 sources.

¹²⁶ Interviews, Harare councillors, high-density wards.

¹²⁷ Between 1999 and 2011, central government delivered 53% of land coming onto Harare land markets, (68,740 residential stands), the City Council 13% and private sector 33%. The private sector was the most important supplier in the late 1990s/early 2000s, producing middle-/high-income housing; the Council and Council cooperatives were briefly important in 2005 after negotiating some land. Marongwe et al., Scoping Study, pp. 55, 58.

¹²⁸ Marongwe et al., Scoping Study, p. 59.

¹²⁹ Marongwe et al., Scoping Study, p. 58.

¹³⁰Ibid. 39% of Operation Garikayi allocations were in Harare, or 35,000 units by 2006. On Operation Garikayi in Bulawayo, see B. Mpofu, ‘Operation “Live Well” or “Cry Well”? An Analysis of the Rebuilding Programme in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’, JSAS 37, 1 (2011), pp. 177–92.

¹³¹ McGregor ‘Sentimentality or Speculation’.

¹³² Interviews, three members of MDC-T structures for Bobo, 20 April 2012.

¹³³ Interviews, MDC-T structures, Bobo, 20 April 2012.

¹³⁴ Interview, 20 April 2012.

¹³⁵ Interview, MDC-T structures, Bobo, 20 April 2012.

¹³⁶ Interviews, MDC-T structures, Bobo, 20 April 2012.

¹³⁷ Marongwe et al., Scoping Study; ‘Bogus Unions Invade Caledonia Farm’, ZBC, 8 January 2012; ‘Policy for Housing Coops’, The Herald, 12 October 2012; ‘Government Urged to Form Regulatory Framework for Land Development’, 3 September 2012 http://bulawayo24.com/, retrieved 30 July 2012.

¹³⁸ This section is based on interviews with members of the MDC-T structures living in Hopley and Woodford farms, 22 April 2012.

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Interview, April 2012.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³ Purdekova, ‘Even If I Am Not Here’, p. 477.

¹⁴⁴ Bozzini, ‘Low-Tech Surveillance’, p. 112.

¹⁴⁵ Vigh, ‘Vigilance’.

¹⁴⁶ Bracking ‘Political Economies’.

¹⁴⁷ Raftopoulos, ‘An overview of the GPA’.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

JoAnn McGregor

JOANN MCGREGORDepartment of Geography, School of Global Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, BN1 9SJ, United Kingdom. E-mail: [email protected]