The Sources of Rwandan Military Effectiveness: State Building, Security Assistance and the Cabo Delgado Campaign

Abstract

Rwanda’s mid 2021 military intervention meaningfully degraded the capability of the jihadist insurgents terrorising northern Mozambique. Rwanda’s early battlefield achievements were due to a combination of factors, including a suitable operational concept and strong infantry skills and combat motivation. These qualities were more a function of institutional history and internal state building, however, than of foreign-provided equipment or training; outside aid helped make the intervention possible but did not instil the critical drivers of Rwandan combat effectiveness. Because similar circumstances do not pertain in Mozambique, the prospects that the Rwandan armed forces can transfer the capability to prosecute a successful counter-insurgency to their Mozambican counterparts are dim. The Cabo Delgado campaign provides only a qualified vindication of American security co-operation and suggests important limits for western counterterrorism strategies predicated on African proxies.

Keywords:

• Rwanda
• Mozambique
• civil war
• state building
• insurgency
• terrorism
• security assistance
• proxy warfare

Acknowledgements

The author is indebted to Focus Group risk management company for granting complimentary access to subscription products related to the Cabo Delgado crisis on a research exchange basis. Focus Group reporting is cited here with express permission; all referenced products remain subject to applicable use and third-party disclosure restrictions. The author also thanks the editors of the Journal of Southern African Studies and two anonymous reviewers for suggestions that improved the published version of this article. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the official positions or assessments of the US Navy, the Department of Defense or the United States government.

Notes

1 C. de Coning, A.E. Yaw Tchie and A.O. Grand, ‘Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives, an African Response to Insecurity’, African Security, 31, 4 (2022), pp. 383–98.

2 S. Watts, T. Johnston, M. Lane, S. Mann, M.J. McNerney and A. Brooks, Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present (Santa Monica, RAND, 2018).

3 American authorities portray their work in developing the Rwandan security sector as an epitome of productive military capacity building; see S.L. Brown, ‘Strengthening UN Peacekeeping through the Global Peace Operations Initiative’ (Washington DC, US Department of State, 22 July 2021), available at https://www.state.gov/dipnote-u-s-department-of-state-official-blog/strengthening-un-peacekeeping-through-the-global-peace-operations-initiative/, retrieved 12 April 2023; J. De Laurentis, ‘Remarks at an International Peace Institute Virtual Event Previewing the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial’, New York, US Mission to the United Nations, 16 November 2021, available at https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-an-international-peace-institute-virtual-event-previewing-the-2021-un-peacekeeping-ministerial/, retrieved 12 April 2023.

4 J. Matisek, ‘International Competition to Provide Security Force Assistance in Africa: Civil-Military Relations Matter’, PRISM, 9, 1 (2020), pp. 103–13; see also M. Rubin, ‘A Small Security Investment in Africa Could Pay Enormous Dividends’, The National Interest, Washington DC, 8 June 2021, available at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/small-security-investment-africa-could-pay-enormous-dividends-187190, retrieved 12 April 2023.

5 ‘General Kazura Spearheads Kigali’s Continental Security Diplomacy’, Africa Intelligence, Paris, 11 November 2021, available at https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2021/11/11/general-kazura-spearheads-kigali-s-continental-security-diplomacy,109704115-eve, retrieved 12 April 2023; ‘How Kigali is Exporting its Military Expertise across Africa’, Africa Intelligence, 10 December 2021, available at https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2021/12/10/how-kigali-is-exporting-its-military-expertise-across-africa,109710456-ar2, retrieved 12 April 2023; J. Moody, ‘How Rwanda Became Africa’s Policeman’, Foreign Policy, Washington DC, 21 November 2022, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/21/how-rwanda-became-africas-policeman/, retrieved 12 April 2023.

6 J.H. Felter, Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: Effective Military Support to COIN (Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, 2008), p. 9; A. King, ‘Combat Effectiveness in the Infantry Platoon: Beyond the Primary Group Thesis’, Security Studies, 25, 4 (2016), p. 699.

7 On media censorship and statistical measurement challenges, see D.A. Bekoe, S.M. Burchard and S.A. Daly, Extremism in Mozambique: Interpreting Group Tactics and the Role of the Government’s Response in the Crisis in Cabo Delgado (Alexandria, Institute for Defense Analysis, March 2020), pp. 22–3; Cabo Ligado Monthly (abbreviated hereafter as CLM), (21 January 2022), pp. 6–7, available at https://www.caboligado.com/monthly-reports: December 2021; CLM, March 2022 (15 April 2022), pp. 2–4. All Cabo Ligado Monthly publications retrieved 3 May 2023.

8 Specifically, this article relies heavily on insights from the Cabo Ligado Conflict Observatory which are available online at https://www.caboligado.com and the Pretoria-based risk management company Focus Group, available at https://focusholding.net/, which has made its reports available to the author.

9 Regarding the insurgency’s nomadic nature and implications for the use of territorial control as a metric of counter-insurgency success in Cabo Delgado, see Focus Group, ‘Security Situation Update 220407-SEC001: Insurgents Remain Active in Cabo Delgado Districts, While Mozambican Authorities Announce Counterinsurgency Successes’, 7 April 2022.

10 E. Morier-Genoud, ‘The Jihadi Insurgency in Mozambique: Origins, Nature and Beginning’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 14, 3 (2020), pp. 396–412; Bekoe et al., Extremism in Mozambique, p. 21.

11 International Crisis Group (ICG), Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, Africa Report no. 303, 11 June 2021, pp. 4–9, 21–2.

12 ICG, Stemming the Insurrection, pp. 10–11; Bekoe et al., Extremism in Mozambique, p. 23.

13 Ibid.

14 ICG, Stemming the Insurrection, pp. 25–6. PRM’s elite Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) was specifically tasked to lead the early terrorism response in the north. FADM is the Portuguese-language acronym for Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique; PRM is officially the Police of the Republic of Mozambique.

15 ICG, Stemming the Insurrection, pp. ii, 12.

16 From 203 personnel originally deployed, Wagner reportedly suffered 11 killed in action – including several beheaded on the battlefield – and 25 wounded. See P. Fabricius, ‘Wagner Private Military Force Licks Wounds in Northern Mozambique’, Daily Maverick, Johannesburg, 29 November 2019, available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-29-wagner-private-military-force-licks-wounds-in-northern-mozambique/, retrieved 12 April 2023.

17 T. Lister, ‘Jihadi Insurgency in Mozambique Grows in Sophistication and Reach’, CTC Sentinel, 13, 10 (October 2020), p. 42.

18 ‘Dyck’s New Mozambican Wild Adventure’, The Zimbabwe Mail, Harare, 6 November 2020, available at https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/world-news/dycks-new-mozambican-wild-adventure/, retrieved 16 April 2023.

19 ICG, Stemming the Insurrection, pp. 13–14. Mocimboa da Praia, the epicentre of the rebellion in 2017, fell to insurgent control in August 2020, and was for a year the declared capital of Al-Shabaab’s proto-caliphate in Cabo Delgado. See CLM, March 2022, p. 6.

20 ICG, Stemming the Insurrection, p. 15; T. Lister, ‘The March 2021 Palma Attack and the Evolving Jihadi Terror Threat to Mozambique’, CTC Sentinel, 14, 4 (April/May 2021), pp. 19, 24–5.

21 ICG, Stemming the Insurrection, pp. 29–31, 33.

22 ‘Nyusi Consults Kagame Over Cabo Delgado Strife’, Africa Intelligence, 30 April 2021, available at https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_diplomacy/2021/04/30/nyusi-consults-kagame-over-cabo-delgado-strife,109662111-bre, retrieved 12 April 2023; ‘Kagamé Envisages Military Support for Nyusi’, Africa Intelligence, 13 May 2021, available at https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_diplomacy/2021/05/13/kagame-envisages-military-support-for-nyusi,109665696-art, retrieved 12 April 2023; ‘Rwanda’s Second Reconnaissance Mission in Pemba Continues in Nacala As SADC Gets Restless’, Africa Intelligence, 12 July 2021, available at https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2021/07/12/rwanda-s-second-reconnaissance-mission-in-pemba-continues-in-nacala-as-sadc-gets-restless,109679042-art, retrieved 12 April 2023.

23 C. Uwiringiyimana and M. Mucari, ‘Rwanda Deploys Troops to Mozambique to Help Fight Insurgency’, Reuters, Kigali, 9 July 2021, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rwanda-says-will-start-deploying-troops-mozambique-2021-07-09/, retrieved 12 April 2023.

24 ‘Rwandan Soldiers Move in to Allow TotalEnergies to Resume Work’, Africa Intelligence, 28 July 2021, available at https://www.africaintelligence.com/oil–gas_state-strategy/2021/07/28/rwandan-soldiers-move-in-to-allow-totalenergies-to-resume-work,109682745-gra, retrieved 12 April 2023; Cabo Ligado Weekly (CLW hereafter), https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-5-11-july-2021, (13 July 2021), p. 2.

25 RSF is an umbrella term referring to the RDF and RNP collectively.

26 G.R. Nyiringabo, ‘First Blood: At the War Front in Mozambique’s Troubled North’, The East African, Nairobi, 21 August 2021, available at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/first-blood-at-the-war-front-in-mozambique-s-troubled-north-3519702, retrieved 12 April 2023; CLW, 19–25 July 2021 (28 July 2021), pp. 2–3.

27 CLM, July 2021 (16 August 2021), p. 6.

28 J. Karuhanga, ‘Cabo Delgado: Rwandan, Mozambican Forces Encircle Major Port City from Three Fronts’, The New Times, Kigali, 7 August 2021, available at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/cabo-delgado-rwandan-mozambican-forces-encircle-major-port-city-three-fronts, retrieved 12 April 2023; CLW, 2–8 August 2021 (10 August 2021), p. 2.

29 J. Karuhanga, ‘Cabo Delgado: What Capture of Mocimboa da Praia Means’, The New Times, 9 August 2021, available at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/cabo-delgado-what-capture-mocimboa-da-praia-means, retrieved 12 April 2023.

30 A. Maolela, ‘Terrorist Leaders Remain at Large in Cabo Delgado’, Carta de Mozambique, Maputo, 24 September 2021, available at https://cartamz.com/index.php/politica/item/8930-lideres-terroristas-continuam-a-solta-em-cabo-delgado, retrieved 12 April 2023.

31 CLW, 6–12 September 2021 (14 September 2021), p. 1.

32 CLM, November 2021 (15 December 2021), p. 6; CLM, January 2022 (18 February 2022), p. 5; CLM, February 2022 (17 March 2022), p. 2; CLM, June 2022 (15 July 2022), p. 5.

33 Focus Group Weekly Media Review Mozambique (FGW hereafter) 409, 13–20 April 2022; CLW, 9–15 May 2022 (17 May 2022), p. 2.

34 CLM, April 2022 (20 May 2022), p. 4.

35 C. Onyango-Obbo, ‘In Mozambique’s War, Allies Rwanda and Tanzania Face Some Tricky Odds’, The East African, 27 March 2022, available at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/mozambique-s-war-allies-rwanda-tanzania-face-tricky-odds-3761198, retrieved 12 April 2023.

36 CLM, April 2022, p. 8; L. Nhachote, ‘Faltering Insurgency in Mozambique Still Threatens Lives – and Gas Projects’, Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 30 May 2022, available at https://mg.co.za/africa/2022-05-30-faltering-insurgency-in-mozambique-still-threatens-lives-and-gas-projects/, retrieved 12 April 2023.

37 CLM, June 2022, p. 2; FGW, 420, 29 June–6 July 2022.

38 Estimates at the end of December 2021 suggest that combined pro-government coalition offensives had reduced the group’s fighting strength from 3,000 to between 1,000 and 300. Most of that difference, however, was ascribed to expedient demobilisation and cross-border flight rather than direct combat attrition, which was believed to account for only about 200 killed in action. ICG, Winning Peace in Mozambique’s Embattled North, Africa Briefing no. 178, 10 February 2022, p. 4. As of November 2021, Rwanda estimated its contribution as approximately 100 slain insurgents; see comments by the Rwandan ambassador to Mozambique, Claude Nikobisanzwe, during an Institute for Security Studies Africa webcast, ‘Will Foreign Intervention Save Cabo Delgado?’, Pretoria, 8 November 2021, available at https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado, retrieved 12 April 2023.

39 Focus Group, ‘Mozambique Situation Report 220107-ARA001: Insurgent Activity Continues in Macomia, while Sporadic Attacks Occur in Meluco’, 7 January 2022; ICG, Winning Peace, pp. 4–5; CLM, February 2022, p. 6; FGW, 406, 23–30 March 2022; CLW, 25 April–8 May 2022 (10 May 2022), p. 2.

40 CLM, October 2021 (15 November 2021), p. 1; CLM, November 2021, p. 2; CLW, 9–15 May 2022, pp. 1–3; CLW, 30 May–5 June 2022 (7 June 2022), p. 3; FGW, 415, 28 May–1 June 2022.

41 CLM, March 2022, p. 2.

42 Statistics differ but this is a consensus assessment. Government officials claimed that by December 2021 insurgent violence against civilians had fallen by 68 per cent overall from the year prior; ACLED figures reveal a reduction of 59 per cent. Focus Group tracking shows insurgent-led security incidents continuing to increase across the conflict zone despite the deployment of foreign forces but weekly analyses repeatedly reference a marked reduction in insurgent-initiated activity in Rwanda’s assigned sectors; see CLM, December 2021, p. 6; FGW, 417, 8–15 June 2022. A suppressive effect has also been noted as loosely correlating with RSF deployments outside their primary districts; see CLM, November 2021, p. 6; FGW, 399, 2–9 February 2022.

43 Focus Group, ‘Mozambique Situation Report – 220304-ARM001: Insurgents Attack Nangade, while Sporadic Activity Occurs in Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia’, 4 March 2022.

44 CLW, 25 April–8 May 2022, p. 2; CLW, 6–12 June 2022 (14 June 2022), p. 3; CLW, 4–10 July 2022 (12 July 2022), p. 1; CLW, 18–24 July 2022 (26 July 2022), p. 1.

45 FGW, 414, 18–25 May 2022; FGW, 415, 28 May–1 June 2022; CLW, 23–29 May 2022 (31 May 2022), p. 3; CLW, 20–26 June 2022 (28 June 2022), p. 2; FGW, 421, 6–13 July 2022. A situation anticipated by analysts at Cabo Ligado; see CLM, November 2021, p. 7. By stubbornly refusing to concentrate and stand its ground, Al-Shabaab foiled the successive envelopment tactics that the Rwandan army used to decimate Hutu extremists during its counter-insurgency at home in northwest Rwanda in 1997 – see quotation from the former US defence attaché to Rwanda, Rick Orth, in M. Wrong, Do Not Disturb: The Story of a Political Murder and an African Regime Gone Bad (London, 4th Estate, 2021), p. 302.

46 Lister, ‘Jihadi Insurgency’, pp. 37–8; Lister, ‘The March 2021 Palma Attack’, pp. 20–1.

47 Focus Group, ‘Mozambique – Palma Attack 2021’, 16 April 2021; ICG, Stemming the Insurrection, p. 18.

48 Calibre Obscura, ‘The Weaponry of IS Central Africa (Pt 1): Insurgents in Mozambique’, 22 December 2021, https://www.calibreobscura.com/the-weaponry-of-is-central-africa-pt-1-insurgents-in-mozambique/; Lister, ‘Jihadi Insurgency’, p. 37.

49 P. Beaumont, ‘“Total Chaos”: Survivors Tell of Insurgent Attack in Mozambique’, The Guardian, London, 29 March 2021, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/29/total-chaos-survivors-tell-of-insurgent-attack-in-mozambique-palma, retrieved 12 April 2023; ExTrac, The Islamic State in Mozambique: A Profile, September 2021, pp. 12–14, available at https://public-assets.extrac.io/reports/ExTrac_ISCAP_090921.pdf, retrieved 12 April 2023.

50 E. Columbo, ‘The Secret to the Northern Mozambique Insurgency’s Success’, War on the Rocks, Washington DC, 8 October 2020, available at https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-secret-to-the-northern-mozambique-insurgencys-success/, retrieved 12 April 2023.

51 A.J. Venter, ‘A Dirty Little War in Mozambique’, AirForces Monthly, Stamford, 20 April 2020; N. Sturdee, ‘The Wagner Group Files’, New Lines Magazine, Washington DC, 27 September 2021, available at https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-wagner-group-files/, retrieved 12 April 2023.

52 Nyiringabo, ‘First Blood’; F. Mwasa, ‘On the Frontline in Mozambique’, The Chronicle, Kigali, 25 September 2021, available at https://www.chronicles.rw/2021/09/25/on-the-frontline-in-mozambique/, retrieved 12 April 2023. See also CLW, 3 August–5 September 2021 (7 September 2021), p. 1; CLW, 6–12 September 2021 (14 September 2021), p. 2; CLW, 27 September–3 October 2021 (5 October 2021), p. 2.

53 CLW, 19–25 July 2021, p. 3; CLW, 26 July–1 August 2021 (3 August 2021), p. 2; CLM, July 2021, p. 2; interview with western security official, Kigali, August 2021. Unless otherwise stated, all interviews were conducted by the author. Rwanda acknowledged four killed and 14 seriously wounded in action as of 25 September 2021, a suspiciously low number; see J. Karuhanga, ‘Nyusi: Kagame Understood Mozambicans’ Suffering, Gave His Best People to Help Mozambique’, The New Times, 25 September 2021, available at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/189684/News/nyusi-kagame-understood-mozambicansa-suffering-gave-his-best-people-tohelp-mozambique, retrieved 12 April 2023. Kigali has officially confirmed no further losses, but uncorroborated reports suggest additional RSF fatalities during hard fighting in the Catupa forests; see CLM, April 2022, p. 8.

54 ICG, Stemming the Insurrection, p. 11, note 53.

55 Ibid., pp. 10–16. See also Bekoe et al., Extremism in Mozambique, pp. 7–12.

56 CLM, January 2022, pp. 6–7; CLM, February 2022, 1; FGW, 399, 2–9 February 2022; Focus Group, ‘Mozambique Situation Report – 220513-ARA001: Resurgence of Insurgent Activity, with Attacks Reported Along the Cabo Delgado Coast’, 13 May 2022; FGW, 421, 6–13 July 2022; FGW, 423, 20–27 July 2022; FGW, 425, 3–10 August 2022. Analysts at Cabo Ligado have speculated that Al-Shabaab may selectively target SAMIM owing to the perception that SADC states have less tolerance for casualties and to the requirement for coalition consensus; see CLM, January 2022, pp. 6–7. That said, IS propaganda has at times prioritised the fight against Rwanda’s majority Christian ‘Crusader’ forces, suggesting countervailing pressure on the group to target the RSF; see ExTrac, The Islamic State, pp. 23–4. FDS is an umbrella term referring to Mozambique’s police and armed forces collectively.

57 Venter, ‘A Dirty Little War’; ‘Moscow Remains Involved in Cabo Delgado Despite Wagner’s Exit’, Africa Intelligence, 2 December 2021, available at https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2021/12/02/moscow-remains-involved-in-cabo-delgado-despite-wagner-s-exit,109708624-gra, retrieved 12 April 2023.

58 B. Nhamirre, Will Foreign Intervention End Terrorism in Cabo Delgado?, Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief, Pretoria, 5 November 2021, pp. 3–4, available at https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/will-foreign-intervention-end-terrorism-in-cabo-delgado, retrieved 12 April 2023.

59 ‘Mozambique Extends DAG Mercenary Contract for Cabo Delgado War’, Zitamar, London, 16 July 2020, available at https://zitamar.com/mozambique-extends-dag-mercenary-contract-for-cabo-delgado-war/, retrieved 12 April 2023; ‘Dyck Advisory Group Deploys on Ground to Counter Cabo Delgado Insurrection’, Africa Intelligence, 28 August 2020, available at https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2020/08/28/dyck-advisory-group-deploys-on-ground-to-counter-cabo-delgado-insurrection,109602529-art, retrieved 12 April 2023; CLM, October 2021, p. 7.

60 Comments by Lionel Dyck during the DefenceWeb virtual conference, ‘Countering the Insurgency in Mozambique’, Johannesburg, 16 November 2021, available at https://webinars.defenceweb.co.za/mozambique2021/, retrieved 1 February 2024.

61 CLM, July 2021, p. 6; SABC News, ‘South African National Defence Force Has Reportedly Arrived in Mozambique: Darren Olivier’, YouTube video, 26 July 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wbzWBj80TAw, retrieved 12 April 2023.

62 R.B. Rehder, ‘From Guerillas to Peacekeepers: The Evolution of the Rwandan Defense Forces’ (MA thesis, US Marine Corps University, 2008) p. 9.

63 Ibid., p. 30; T.P. Odom, Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda (College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2005), pp. 263, 268–9; R. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil (Cambridge, Da Capo Press, 2004), p. 67. The RPA was formally rebranded as the RDF in June 2002; Rehder, ‘From Guerillas to Peacekeepers’, p. 27.

64 T. Cooper, Great Lakes Conflagration: Second Congo War, 1998–2003 (Solihull, Helion & Company Press, 2013).

65 The RDF’s western divisions are equipped, trained and conditioned to operate in densely forested mountains abutting the DRC that are often inaccessible by motor vehicle; see R. Karusisi, ‘Theater Sustainment Reserve for the Rwanda Defence Forces’ (MA thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2016), pp. 43–50. African armies exhibit a general tendency to infantry-centric structure; see J. Matisek, ‘Pathways to Military Effectiveness: Armies and Contemporary African States’ (PhD thesis, Northwestern University, 2018), pp. 112–14, but the political and operational imperatives appear especially acute for the RDF.

66 Regarding mechanisation, see International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2022 (London, IISS, 2022), p. 489; regarding infantry training, see ‘RDF Officers and Other Ranks Complete Advanced Infantry Training’, Rwandan Ministry of Defence (MoD) official website, 25 November 2021, available at https://www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/rdf-officers-and-other-ranks-complete-advanced-infantry-training, retrieved 12 April 2023. The six-month RDF course length compares favourably with US advanced infantry training, which was expanded to five and a half months in 2018; see M. Cox, ‘Army Will Add 2 Months to Infantry Course to Make Grunts More Lethal’, Military.com, 25 June 2018, available at https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/06/25/army-add-2-months-infantry-course-make-grunts-more-lethal.html, retrieved 12 April 2023.

67 CLM, July 2021, p. 6; CLM, August 2021 (15 September 2021), pp. 4–5.

68 Conservative estimates place the Mozambican ground force presence in Cabo Delgado at around 4,000 troops. See CLM, September 2021 (15 October 2021), p. 7. The initial Rwandan intervention force that reclaimed Palma and Mocimboa da Praia districts comprised 1,000 personnel. In light of the expeditionary nature of Rwandan operations, and the likely associated tooth-to-tail ratio required, the actual number of frontline combat troops was probably appreciably lower.

69 CLM, July 2021, p. 6.

70 King, ‘Combat Effectiveness’, pp. 710–3; Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan: Handbook 09-37 (Fort Leavenworth, US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, June 2009), pp. 78–82, available at https://info.publicintelligence.net/CALL-SmallUnitsAfghanistan.pdf, retrieved 12 April 2023.

71 Matisek, ‘Pathways’, pp. 296–8.

72 See, inter alia, Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Rwanda: The Patriotic Front’s Offensive’, 9 May 1994, pp. 1–4, available at https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/5763, retrieved 12 April 2023; J. Stejskal, ‘The Kitona Operation: Rwanda’s Gamble to Capture Kinshasa and the Misreading of an “Ally”‘, Joint Forces Quarterly, 68 (1st Quarter 2013), pp. 102–104; J.K. Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York, PublicAffairs, 2012), pp. 245–7, 273–6.

73 S. Biddle, Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2021), pp. 3, 6–11.

74 E.K. Damman, ‘Rwanda’s Strategic Humanitarianism: Lessons from a Janus-Faced State’, African Security, 8, 1 (2015), p. 43.

75 Hammer Of War (@HammerOfWar5), Twitter post, 27 September 2021, 1.50 p.m., available at https://twitter.com/HammerOfWar5/status/1442547124885983234, retrieved 12 April 2023; Hammer Of War, Twitter post, 4 February 2022, 9.42 a.m., available at https://twitter.com/HammerOfWar5/status/1489610269999382528, retrieved 12 April 2023; Hammer Of War, Twitter post, 7 October 2021, 1.53 p.m., available at https://twitter.com/HammerOfWar5/status/1446171741139750918, retrieved 12 April 2023; Hammer Of War, Twitter post, 13 September 2022, 1.40 p.m., available at https://twitter.com/HammerOfWar5/status/1569742722017140741, retrieved 12 April 2023.

76 As most Al-Shabaab weapons are sourced from the Mozambican security forces there is substantial arsenal commonality between the two; see Calibre Obscura, ‘The Weaponry of IS’.

77 Author survey of news and social media images and video from Mozambique. See, inter alia, IGIHE, ‘Urugendo rwaganishije ku ifatwa rya Mocimboa da Praia | Ibyo utamenye| RDF muri Mozambique’, YouTube video, 9 August 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y8-CzU1XU-c, retrieved 12 April 2023; France 24 (English), ‘Embedded with Rwandan Troops Fighting Jihadists in Mozambique’, YouTube video, 4 October 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKtdI-duu4A, retrieved 12 April 2023; IGIHE, ‘Twageze Awasse: Ahabereye urugamba rw’inkundura rwa RDF n’ibyihebe mu minsi ine’, YouTube video, 18 August 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WlivdBaAvHU, retrieved 12 April 2023; RBA News, ‘Rwandan Security Forces Patrol Parts of Cabo Delgado Province on New Year’s Eve’, YouTube video, 2 January 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4z_1KXU3TM, retrieved 12 April 2023; IGIHE, ‘Twasubiye i Mocimboa da Praia! Dutere ijisho i Cabo Delgado, intara RDF ihanganyemo n’ibyihebe’, YouTube video, 28 January 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDOQWsy7sA0, retrieved 12 April 2023; Televisão de Moçambique TVM ‘FDS libertam dos terroristas o Posto Administrativo Pundanhar em Palma, Cabo Delgado’, YouTube video, 21 February 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiPbbOoL5Oc, retrieved 12 April 2023; Kivu Press Agency, ‘Back to Cabo Delgado (Part 1–3)’, YouTube video, 28 February 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ttJYBBmHYEM, retrieved 12 April 2023; Televisão de Moçambique TVM, ‘Teatro operacional Norte: Abatidos 54 terroristas, em Cabo Delgado, nos últimos dois meses’, YouTube video, 13 May 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=imSn_YlS3hI, retrieved 12 April 2023.

78 Regarding the relative stability in small arms technology and overriding influence of skill on infantry engagement outcomes, see L. Blanken, K. Thaxton and M. Alexander, ‘Shock of the Mundane: The Dangerous Diffusion of Basic Infantry Tactics’, War on the Rocks, 27 February 2018, available at https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/shock-of-the-mundane-the-dangerous-diffusion-of-basic-infantry-tactics/, retrieved 12 April 2023.

79 Experiments have shown that armour weight and bulk reduce soldier mobility, situational awareness and shooting response time. See L. Fish and P. Scharre, Super Soldiers: The Soldier’s Heavy Load, Center for New American Security, September 2018, available at https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Super-Soldiers_4_Soldiers-Heavy-Load-FINAL-2.pdf?mtime=20180926112023&focal=none, retrieved 12 April 2023.

80 Venter, ‘A Dirty Little War’.

81 S. Lesedi, ‘Cabo Delgado: Rwandan Army Brings to Bear it’s Ratel BAU-23X2 RCWS’, Military Africa, 6 August 2021, available at https://www.military.africa/2021/08/cabo-delgado-rwandan-army-brings-to-bear-its-ratel-bau-23x2-rcws/, retrieved 12 April 2023; S. Lesedi, ‘Rwanda Army Operating Isotrex Phantom II Armor’, Military Africa, 5 August 2021, available at https://www.military.africa/2021/08/rwanda-army-operating-isotrex-phantom-ii-armor?v = 65d8f7baa677, retrieved 12 April 2023; Hammer Of War, Twitter post, 8 August, 2021, 9.32 a.m., available at https://twitter.com/HammerOfWar5/status/1424362935921614855, retrieved 12 April 2023; Hammer Of War, Twitter post, 18 October 2021, 10.01 a.m., available at https://twitter.com/HammerOfWar5/status/1450099793800437762, retrieved 12 April 2023. Rwanda procured an additional 46 Cobra armoured vehicles from Turkey in 2021, possibly specifically for service in Mozambique; see IISS, ‘The Military Balance’ p. 489; CLW, 19–25 July 2021, p. 3.

82 Line of Actual Control, ‘The Men and the Machines: Mozambique’s Elite Motorized Infantry (Part 1: The Machines)’, 10 August 2020, available at https://actualcontrol.substack.com/p/the-men-and-the-machines-mozambiques, retrieved 12 April 2023.

83 E. Gibson, ‘SADC Forces Tread Dangerous Ground in Mozambique’, Business Day, Johannesburg, 19 September 2021, available at https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2021-09-19-sadc-forces-tread-dangerous-ground-in-mozambique/, retrieved 12 April 2023; CLW, 13–19 September 2021 (21 September 2021), pp. 2–3; CLW, 23–29 May 2022, pp. 2–3.

84 Line of Actual Control; Calibre Obscura, Twitter post, 13 July 2021, 8.17 a.m., available at https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1414921941102780418, retrieved 12 April 2023.

85 See author survey of news and social media images and video from Mozambique at footnote 78; see also Mwasa, ‘On the Frontline’.

86 See comments by Lieutenant Colonel Raoul Bazatoha during the International Peace Institute panel discussion ‘Lessons from the Implementation of the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations’, 29 May 2020, available at https://www.ipinst.org/2020/05/poc-lessons-from-the-implementation-of-kigali-principles#8, retrieved 12 April 2023. Regarding the RPA’s early adoption of Toyota pick-up trucks as troop transports and gun-platforms, see Odom, Journey into Darkness, pp. 189–90.

87 CLM, August 2021, pp. 1–2; FGW, 399; CLW, 9–15 May 2022, p. 2; CLW, 16–22 May (24 May 2022), pp. 2–3; CLW, 4–10 July, p. 3; CLW, 11–17 July (19 July 2022), pp. 2–3; CLM, July 2022, p. 4. The RDF appear to have struggled in Catupa, ultimately flushing out the insurgents but with meagre returns in inflicted casualties or captured materials.

88 Nyiringabo, ‘First Blood’.

89 See images of unmanned aerial systems in public-facing documents posted to the RDF’s official website, The Source: Official Publication of the Rwanda Military Academy, March 2021, pp. 29, 51, available at https://www.mod.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/Mod/Publications/Publications/RMA_Magazine_2021.pdf, retrieved 12 April 2023.

90 H.I. Sutton, ‘Landlocked Navy Goes to War: Rwanda’s Mystery “Squad 007” Boat Grabs Attention’, Covert Shores, 14 August 2021, available at http://www.hisutton.com/Rwandan-Navy.html, retrieved 12 April 2023.

91 Nor is this capability new – the same type of assault boats which participated in the liberation of Mocimboa da Praia were used by the RPA to re-take Iwawa Island from ex-FAR insurgents operating in the border lakes region between Rwanda and then Zaire in 1994. See Odom, ‘Journey into Darkness’, pp. 261–65.

92 To be clear, the argument here is not that the intervention would not have benefited from additional fire support or air mobility assets but that in light of resource constraints and capability trade-offs a significant and proficient light infantry capability promised – and delivered – better battlefield results.

93 H. Lamarque, ‘Insulating the Borderlands: Policing and State Reach in Rwanda’ (PhD thesis, SOAS University of London, 2017), pp. 96–7.

94 B.R. Asiimwe, ‘Peacekeeping: 15 Years Contributing to Peace in Conflict Affected Countries’, RNP official website, 28 May 2020, available at https://police.gov.rw/media-archives/news-detail/?tx_news_pi1%5Bnews%5D=15202&cHash=e0e1f4cb42e55942771103c578782b12, retrieved 12 April 2023.

95 P. Foradori, ‘Cops in Foreign Lands: Italy’s Role in International Policing’, International Peacekeeping, 25, 4 (2018), p. 501.

96 The RNP contributed 300 personnel to the initial 1,000-personnel RSF deployment; see ‘DIGP Namuhoranye Briefs Police Officers Prior to Mozambique Deployment’, RNP official website, 9 July 2021, available at https://www.police.gov.rw/media-archives/news-detail/news/digp-namuhoranye-briefs-police-officers-prior-to-mozambique-deployment/, retrieved 28 September 2023.

97 Onyango-Obbo, ‘In Mozambique’s War’.

98 L. Hultman, J. Kathman and M. Shannon, ‘Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting’, American Political Science Review, 108, 4 (November 2014), pp. 743–7.

99 Author survey of news and social media images and video from Mozambique at footnote 82. See also J.I. Natacha and E. Ashimwe, ‘Cabo Delgado: A Closer Look at Rwanda-Mozambican Forces’ Joint Operations’, The New Times, 16 August 2021, available at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/cabo-delgado-closer-look-rwanda-mozambican-forces-joint-operations, retrieved 12 April 2023.

100 Lamarque, ‘Insulating the Borderlands’, pp. 138–9, 144–6, 149; Matisek, ‘Pathways’, p. 305.

101 Lamarque, ‘Insulating the Borderlands’, pp. 183–6.

102 Rwandan National Police, ‘Graduation Ceremony of Officer Cadets Intake 09/16–17’, The Fountain: A Police Training School Publication, 2017, available at https://police.gov.rw/uploads/tx_download/The_fountain_Magazine_-__Graduation_Ceremony_of_Officer_CadetsIntake_0916-17.pdf, retrieved 12 April 2023.

103 The RNP only established a formal relationship with the carabinieri in 2017 but it appears to be the most influential of the organisation’s many foreign co-operation arrangements. As of 2021, over 900 RNP officers had received training from the carabinieri in Rwanda or Italy. The carabinieri maintain a brigadier general as a semi-permanent liaison officer in Rwanda and are the only uniformed international attendants at recent RNP basic training graduation ceremonies; see E. Ashimwe, ‘Italy’s Police Chief Teo Luzi Visits Rwanda’, The New Times, 11 October 2021, available at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/italian-police-chief-teo-luzi-visits-rwanda, retrieved 12 April 2023; ‘Motorbike Riding Course Opens at Police Training School’, RNP official website, 6 July 2021, available at https://www.police.gov.rw/media-archives/news-detail/news/motorbike-riding-course-opens-at-police-training-school/, retrieved 12 April 2023; The New Times, ‘Graduation Ceremony of the Cadet Course Intake 11/2020–2021’, YouTube video, 28 October 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tb8vrldmjU4; retrieved 12 April 2023.

104 Regarding the effectiveness of the Italian carabinieri in counter-insurgency and peacekeeping environments, see C. Friesendorf, How Western Soldiers Fight: Organizational Routines in Multinational Missions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018).

105 W. Jones, ‘Between Pyongyang and Singapore: The Rwandan State, Its Rulers, and the Military’, in M. Campioni and P. Noack (eds), Rwanda Fast Forward: Social, Economic, Military and Reconciliation Prospects (New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), pp. 235–6, 242.

106 Biddle, Nonstate Warfare.

107 For a wider examination of how RDF institutional development has balanced the competing requirements of personalised political loyalty and technical professionalisation, see M. Jowell, ‘Rwanda: Civil–Military Relations’, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Military in Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2022).

108 T.A. Dempsey, ‘The Transformation of African Militaries’, in A.R. Krakowka and L.J. Hummel (eds), Understanding Africa: A Geographic Approach (West Point, United States Military Academy, 2009), pp. 405–6.

109 J. Kuehnel and N. Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military as a People’s Army: Heroes at Home and Abroad’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 12, 1 (2018), pp. 154–71.

110 Jones, ‘Between Pyongyang and Singapore’, pp. 236–7, 240; A. Purdeková, F. Reyntjens & N. Wilén, ‘Militarisation of Governance After Conflict: Beyond the Rebel-to-Ruler Frame – the Case of Rwanda’, Third World Quarterly, 39, 1 (2018), pp. 158–74. Regarding the influence of national identity and ideology on security assistance effectiveness, see M. Shurkin, J. Gordon IV, B. Frederick and C.G. Pernin, Building Armies, Building Nations: Toward a New Approach to Security Force Assistance (Santa Monica, RAND, 2017).

111 B. Chemouni, ‘Paying Your Soldiers and Building the State in Post-Genocide Rwanda’, Africa at LSE, blog, 15 October 2014, available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2014/10/15/paying-your-soldiers-and-building-the-state-in-post-genocide-rwanda/, retrieved 12 April 2023; P. Behuria, ‘Centralising Rents and Dispersing Power While Pursuing Development? Exploring the Strategic Uses of Military Firms in Rwanda’, Review of African Political Economy, 43, 150 (2016), pp. 636–9, 642.

112 M. Jowell, ‘Cohesion Through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8, 2 (2014), pp. 278–93.

113 Odom, Journey into Darkness, pp. 263, 268–9; D. Smith, ‘Rwandan Soldiers Joined Forces with Congo Rebels, UN Told’, The Guardian, 4 December 2012, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/04/rwandans-congo-rebels-un, retrieved 12 April 2023; N. Peyton and H. Holland, ‘U.N. Experts: Rwanda Has Intervened Militarily in Eastern Congo’, Reuters, London, 4 August 2022, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/un-experts-say-rwanda-has-intervened-militarily-eastern-congo-2022-08-04/, retrieved 12 April 2023; M. Jowell, ‘Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Rwanda’, April 2018, available at https://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/03/30/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-rwanda/, retrieved 12 April 2023.

114 Odom, Journey into Darkness, p. 251.

115 Ibid., p. 189; Rehder, ‘From Guerillas to Peacekeepers’, pp. 11–12; Jowell, ‘Cohesion’, pp. 287–8. Regarding the role of human capital on unit-level fighting effectiveness, see S. Biddle and S. Long, ‘Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48, 4, (2004), pp. 7, 13–17.

116 Matisek, ‘Pathways’, pp. 306, 310–2.

117 Regarding Kigali’s standoffish attitude and selective approach to foreign solutions and client-state status in the defence sphere, see Odom, Journey into Darkness, p. 67; D. Beswick, ‘The Risks of African Military Capacity Building: Lessons from Rwanda’, African Affairs, 113, 451 (April 2014), pp. 221–3; Matisek, ‘Pathways’, p. 310. Regarding the RPF’s political imperatives to demonstrate self-reliance and distance itself from western powers, see B. Chemouni and A. Mugiraneza, ‘Ideology and Interests in the Rwandan Patriotic Front: Singing the Struggle in Pre-Genocide Rwanda’, African Affairs, 119, 474 (January 2020), pp. 136–9.

118 Dempsey, ‘The Transformation of African Militaries’, pp. 405–6. For a useful overview of some of the manifold ways security force assistance, the doctrinal term the United States applies to security aid specifically intended to improve a partner’s military capabilities, can go awry, see Ø.H. Rolandsen, M. Dwyer and W. Reno, ‘Security Force Assistance to Fragile States: A Framework of Analysis’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 15, 5 (2021), pp. 563–79. On the local subversion of military training aid – including by Rwanda – for a variety of individual and collective purposes unrelated to operational effectiveness, see M. Jowell, Peacekeeping in Africa: Politics, Security, and the Failure of Foreign Military Assistance (London, Bloomsbury, 2019), pp. 148, 170–4, 195, 199.

119 Rwandan Defence Force, ‘Exercise Shared Accord 2019’, YouTube video, 2 September 2019, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xnxYeUhYH_8, retrieved 12 April 2023; Military Breaking News, ‘Counter I.E.D. Training - Shared Accord - in the Central African Republic’, YouTube video, 25 August 2019, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VIp3IkyfDJk, retrieved 12 April 2023; see images for Exercise Shared Accord in Gabiro, Rwanda, Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, ‘U.S. Army Soldiers of Company C, 1st Battalion 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), speak with members of the Rwanda Defence Force and Rwanda National Police prior to the start of squad battle drill training during Exercise Shared Accord 2019’, 20 August 2019, NARA and DVIDS Public Domain Archive, available at https://nara.getarchive.net/media/us-army-soldiers-of-company-c-1st-battalion-502nd-da8d97, retrieved 12 April 2023.

120 Interview with western security official, Kigali, September 2021.

121 G.N. Ruhumuliza, ‘RDF and RNP: A True Internationalist, Revolutionary Movement’, The New Times, 11 July 2021, available at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/opinions/rdf-and-rnp-true-internationalist-revolutionary-movement, retrieved 12 April 2023; ‘“Police Month” Outreach Activities Begin Today’, The New Times, 14 July 2019, available at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/police-month-outreach-activities-begin-today, retrieved 12 April 2023.

122 Lamarque, ‘Insulating the Borderlands’, pp. 103–4, 138–9; interview with western security official, Kigali, December 2021.

123 Interview with western security official, Kigali, April 2021.

124 The circumstances of rebel victory and post-war integration are significant. Jowell’s useful paradigm classifies FADM as an ‘integrated stalemate’ force and the RDF as a ‘liberation/vanguard army’ – Peacekeeping in Africa, pp. 27, 31–4. See also R.R. Krebs and R. Licklider, ‘United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War’, International Security, 40, 3 (2015/16), p. 132.

125 A. Seegers, ‘From Liberation to Modernization: Transforming Revolutionary Paramilitary Forces into Standing Professional Armies’, in B.E. Arlinghaus and P.H. Baker (eds), African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities (Boulder, Westview Press, 1986), pp. 52–83; A. Malache, P. Macaringue and J.B. Coelho, ‘Profound Transformations and Regional Conflagrations: The History of Mozambique’s Armed Forces from 1975–2005’, in M. Rupiya (ed.), Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2005), pp. 155–97.

126 J. Fisher and N. Wilén, African Peacekeeping (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022), p. 17.

127 B. Baker, ‘Policing and the Rule of Law in Mozambique’, Policing and Society, 13, 2 (2003), pp. 139–58.

128 A. Arieff, Rwanda: In Brief (Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, 23 February 2021), p. 12.

129 While RDF sources claim that past years’ Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) aid improved the organisation’s overall institutional capacity, senior officers complain that US-provided training to counter asymmetric threats has failed to keep pace with the service’s aptitude and needs. See Matisek, ‘Pathways’, pp. 299, 311. Having graduated from a ‘train-the-trainer’ model, RDF personnel now reportedly conduct most ACOTA-funded training themselves, reflecting an intense desire and ability to rapidly indigenise external training; Fisher and Wilén, African Peacekeeping, p. 174.

130 The US Air Force provided strategic lift for previous deployments; see E. Elliot, ‘Airmen Begin Darfur Airlift Operations’, US Africa Command Public Affairs, 14 January 2009, available at https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/121390/airmen-begin-darfur-airlift-operations/, retrieved 12 April 2023; C. Guthrie, ‘US Airlifts Rwandans to Central African Republic’, US Air Forces in Europe and US Air Forces Africa, 21 January 2014, available at https://www.africom.mil/article/11659/us-airlifts-rwandans-to-central-african-republic, retrieved 12 April 2023.

131 Following initial troop lift by RwandAir Boeing 737s, RwandAir DHC-8 international callsign 9XR-WM conducted up to 51 sorties from 9 July–26 September 2021 between Nacala, Palma, Pemba, Maputo and Kigali. Author review of transponded air activity recorded by Flight Radar 24, a commercially available flight tracking software application, December–January 2022. See also IGIHE, ‘Twageze i Nacala aho RDF ibika ibikoresho yifashisha mu guhashya imitwe y’iterabwoba muri Mozambique’, YouTube video, 6 August 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onClCLIaKWw, retrieved 12 April 2023.

132 IGIHE, Twitter post, 27 January 2022, 2.09 a.m., available at https://twitter.com/IGIHE/status/1486597253921972228, retrieved 12 April 2023.

133 M.K. Gahigi, ‘Qatar and RwandAir Acquisition Deal On’, The East African, 1 June 2021, available at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/qatar-rwandair-deadlocked-on-staffing-but-deal-is-still-on-3421312, retrieved 12 April 2023; ‘Two RDF Officers Graduate as Pilots in Qatar’, Rwandan MoD official website, 28 January 2021, available at https://www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/two-rdf-officers-graduate-as-pilots-in-qatar, retrieved 12 April 2023; ‘Qatari Gazelles for Rwanda’, defenceWeb, Johannesburg, 11 March 2022, available at https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/qatari-gazelles-for-rwanda-2/, retrieved 12 April 2023.

134 ‘Rwandan Army Eyes Turkish Drones for Mozambique’, Africa Intelligence, 7 October 2021, available at https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_business/2021/10/07/rwandan-army-eyes-turkish-drones-for-mozambique,109696855-bre, retrieved 12 April 2023.

135 US Department of State, ‘Fact Sheet: U.S. Peacekeeping Capacity Building Assistance’, Washington DC, 11 January 2017, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/267066.pdf, retrieved 12 April 2023.

136 E. Ashimwe, ‘Rwanda, Mozambique Security Chiefs Discuss Current Cabo Delgado Situation’, The New Times, 9 January 2022, available at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/192639/news/rwanda-mozambique-security-chiefs-discuss-current-cabo-delgado-situation, retrieved 12 April 2023.

137 SABC, ‘SADC Leaders Agree to Extend the Deployment of Troops in Mozambique: Colonel Ronald Rwivanga’, YouTube video, 13 January 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tHJ6KLWW0W0, retrieved 12 April 2023; CLM, June 2022, p. 6.

138 CLW, 25–31 October 2021 (2 November 2021), pp. 1–3; CLM, January 2022, p. 7; ICG, Winning Peace, pp. 5, 10; CLW, 9–15 May 2022, pp. 3–4; CLW, 23–29 May 2022, p. 5; ‘Mozambique: Police Investigate Accusations Officers Tortured Civilians’, Club of Mozambique, 26 May 2022, available at https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-police-investigate-accusations-officers-tortured-civilians-217663/, retrieved 12 April 2023; ‘Agentes da lei e ordem divulgam informações secretas ao inimigo em Cabo Delgado’, O Pais, 16 June 2022, available at https://opais.co.mz/agentes-da-lei-e-ordem-divulgam-informacoes-secretas-ao-inimigo-em-cabo-delgado/, retrieved 12 April 2023. Mozambique’s defence minister acknowledges that, given the scope of reform required, this will be a very tall task – see quote from Major General Cristovao Artur Chume at note 25, ICG, Winning Peace, p. 6.

139 P.D. Williams and H.Y. Ali, The European Union Training Mission in Somalia: An Assessment, SIPRI Background Paper, December 2020, pp. 4–6, 9–12, available at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/bp_2011_eutm_somalia_3.pdf, retrieved 12 April 2023; A. Hickendorff and I. Acko, The European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic: An Assessment, SIPRI Background Paper, February 2021, pp. 8–11, 19, available at https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/bp_2102_eutm_rca_final.pdf, retrieved 12 April 2023; V. Baudais and S. Maïga, The European Union Training Mission in Mali: An Assessment, SIPRI Background Paper, April 2022, pp. 13–19, 27–8, available at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/bp_2204_eutm_mali.pdf, retrieved 12 April 2023.

140 EUTM Mozambique, launched in November 2021, is mandated to train 11 companies (approximately 1,500 personnel) from Mozambique’s army and marines as a quick reaction force; see the testimony of Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean before the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 26 January 2022, available at https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/subcommittee-on-security-and-defence_20220126-1345-COMMITTEE-SEDE, retrieved 12 April 2023.

141 The cultivation of tactical competence within the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service and within the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command are examples of this, as in both cases the parent conventional forces ultimately collapsed; see M. Knights and A. Mello, ‘The Best Thing America Built in Iraq: Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service and the Long War Against Militancy’, War on the Rocks, 19 July 2017, available at https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-best-thing-america-built-in-iraq-iraqs-counter-terrorism-service-and-the-long-war-against-militancy/, retrieved 12 April 2023; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to Its Demise (SIGAR 22-22-IP Evaluation Report), May 2022, pp. 15–16, available at https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/evaluations/SIGAR-22-22-IP.pdf, retrieved 12 April 2023.

142 See, for example, J. Mahoney, ‘Analyzing Path Dependence: Lessons from the Social Sciences’, in A. Wimmer and R. Kössler (eds), Understanding Change: Models, Methodologies and Metaphors (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), pp. 129–39.

143 S.P. Lalwani, ‘Selective Leviathans: Explaining State Strategies of Counterinsurgency and Consolidation’ (PhD thesis, MIT, 2014), pp. 12–17; S. Watts, J.H. Campbell, P.B. Johnston, S. Lalwani and S.H. Bana, Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context (Santa Monica, RAND, 2014), pp. 18–28; C.R. Day and W.S. Reno, ‘In Harm’s Way: African Counter-Insurgency and Patronage Politics’, Civil Wars, 16, 2 (2014), pp. 111–12, 120–1; J. Herbst, ‘African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and Combat Effectiveness’, Journal of Peace Research, 41, 3 (2004), pp. 363–4, 367.

144 Morier-Genoud, ‘The Jihadi Insurgency’.

145 ICG, Stemming the Insurrection, pp. 3–6, 19–20.

146 For an analysis of ruling Frelimo party internal decision-making processes, see CLM, April 2022, pp. 6–7. Regarding the perceived absence of external threat and low historical funding priority afforded to the defence ministry, see Malache et al., ‘Profound Transformations’, pp. 183–7, 193.

147 CLW, 20–26 September 2021 (28 September 2021), p. 3; CLW, 1–7 August 2022 (9 August 2022), pp. 3–4.

148 Matisek, International Competition, pp. 106–8.

149 Ibid., pp. 104, 110; M. Rubin, ‘The Islamic State Isn’t Defeated, but the United States Is AWOL’, The National Interest, Washington DC, 16 February 2022, available at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/islamic-state-isn%E2%80%99t-defeated-united-states-awol-200565, retrieved 12 April 2023.

150 See R. Shield, ‘Rwanda’s War in Mozambique: Road-Testing a Kigali Principles Approach to Counterinsurgency?’ (forthcoming).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ralph Shield

Ralph Shield Senior Researcher, Strategic and Operational Research Department, US Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, Rhode Island, 02841, USA. Email: [email protected]