![Sample our Education journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5932/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Education.jpg"})
Abstract
I pursue three of the many lines of thought that were raised in my mind by Kristjánsson’s engaging book. In the first section, I try to get clearer on what exactly Aristotelian character education (ACE) is, and suggest areas where I hope the view is developed in more detail. In the second and longest section, I draw some lessons from social psychology about the pervasive role of what I call ‘Surprising Dispositions,’ and invite Kristjánsson to take up the difficult challenge of clarifying how ACE would help to address their influence on our thought and action. Finally, in section three I consider whether there is any robust empirical support for ACE, and if not, where that leaves us.
Acknowledgment
I am very grateful to Nancy Snow for inviting me to be a part of this special issue. Work on this paper was supported by a grant from the Templeton Religion Trust. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton Religion Trust.
Notes
1. All in-text citations are to Kristjánsson, Citation2015.
2. I introduced this claim in Miller, Citation2015, Citation2016a.
3. These examples are adapted from Miller (Citation2015).
4. As Milgram wrote in an earlier paper, ‘The person brings to the laboratory enduring dispositions toward authority and aggression …’ (Citation1965, p. 274)
5. These examples are adapted from Miller, Citation2015. Most of these studies are based on undergraduates in the USA.
6. For more on replication troubles, as well as examples of other mood effect studies, see Miller (Citation2013, ch. 3).
7. See in particular Miller, Citation2013: chs 2–6, 9 and 10, and 2014, ch. 3. The Surprising Dispositions claim needs qualifying, though, first to participants from Western, industrialized societies, and second to our behavior towards strangers. Likely there would be different results for close friends and family members. These qualifications need to be kept in mind when I talk about what ‘most people’ are like.
8. We should not jump to the conclusion that they are constituents of moral vices either. In the same work, I try to show that that conclusion is implausible too. For related discussion, see also L. Russell (Citation2009).
9. For ‘most people,’ see note 7.
10. For philosophers arriving at this conclusion, see Miller (Citation2014, ch. 8). For Aristotle, see Miller (Citationforthcoming).
11. I first introduced this claim in Miller (Citation2016b).
12. Kristjánsson also claims that the studies situationists cite tend to be passive, extraordinary, and strong (pp. 58–59). But not so in the case of surprising dispositions. Take Bathroom, for instance. It is not clear that it is passive, extraordinary, or strong.
13. For examples of all three of these techniques being employed, see Miller et al Citation2015, chs 2, 29 and 30 respectively.