Kohlberg and Gilligan: duet or duel?

Abstract

Most moral psychologists have come to accept two types of moral reasoning: Kohlberg's justice and Gilligan's care, but there still seem to be some unresolved issues. By analysing and comparing Kohlberg's statement on some theoretical issues with some of Gilligan's statements in an interview in April 2003, I will look at some key issues in the so‐called ‘Kohlberg–Gilligan conflict’. Some of the questions raised in this paper are: (1) Does Gilligan reject the idea of developmental morality? (2) Does Gilligan support Kohlberg's stage theory and his claim of universality? (3) Did Kohlberg reject Gilligan's proposal to expand his understanding of moral reasoning? (4) Was Gilligan's theory a critique of or an expansion to Kohlberg's theory? The findings of this analysis suggest that the first question be answered negatively, the second positively, the third negatively and the fourth that Gilligan's theory is an expansion rather than a critique.

Notes

1. The scope of this paper is rather limited in the sense that the main focus is on the perspectives of Kohlberg and Gilligan on moral reasoning, how they differ and how they complement each other. A comprehensive approach to the topic is not sought, and only a selected representation of the vast literature in the area is used to identify some issues that need closer attention. The reason for this limited approach is the need for greater clarity in the relationship between Kohlberg's and Gilligan's arguments in the area of moral reasoning and limitations on published paper length. The content of this paper is the starting point, or a point of reference, for a more comprehensive treatment of some of the issues in the area of cognitive moral reasoning in my dissertation.