Mobilization and state formation on a frontier of Vietnam

Abstract

Defining mobilization as a powerful tactic and social process enables a critical analysis of state power as well as its spatial configurations and legitimation practices. Mobilization in the site of Đin Biên Ph first appeared during military confrontation (1952–54) and reappeared during land reform (1953–57) and collectivization (1959–60), all of which transformed agrarian community forms, political relations, and economic production – although not always as intended. Analyzing its use, meaning, and contingent effects on a frontier of an emerging Vietnam underlines how mobilization drew on and produced power to regulate relations of rule and production within an emerging nation-state. Drawing on historical sources and in dialog with literatures on social movements and comparative politics, this paper considers a series of mobilizations to represent distinct but inter-related stages in a process of statemaking.

Keywords:

• mobilization
• state formation
• frontiers
• Vietnam
• land reform
• agrarian change
• collectivization
• social movements
• revolutions

Notes

¹Even now, there is little consensus on what to call the political project – Vietnam or Viet Minh or DRV – that contested French colonialism between 1945–54 and, after 1954, ruled northern Vietnam. In order to avoid confusion and to restore a sense of historical accuracy, DRV refers to a statist project that emerged in 1945 and claimed monopoly rule between 1954–1975; the Viet Minh was a united front organization which assumed multiple forms between 1941–1955, many of whose allied organizations – but not all – were affiliated with the DRV project; Vietnam was an idea signifying an emergent (and imagined) national community associated ideologically with a particular territory. For scholarship in support of my analytical choices, cf. Marr (1995, 549), Bradley (2009), Goscha (2006), Brocheux and Hémery (2009, 348–57). For mixed perspectives, see essays in Goscha and Ostermann (2009) and Lawrence and Logevall (2007). For divergent opinions, cf. Wolf (1969) and Duiker (1996).

²The area under question is currently administered by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as the provinces of Đin Biên, Lai Châu, and Sn La and includes portions of Yên Bái and Lào Cai.

³For more on the Vietnamese revolution's dual goals, see Tr ng (1994, 321–3) and Đng (2001c, 73–6).

⁴Scholars have offered valuable insights into the Maoist and Marxist-Leninist genealogies among elite Vietnamese revolutionaries. For an overview, see Turley (1980). On Mao's war strategy, see McAlister (1967), Duiker (1996), and Lockhart (1989); on agrarian reform, see Moise's study comparing Vietnam with China (1983).

⁵Advocates of resource mobilization discount deprivation as a primary causal factor in the formation of social movements, preferring to focus on organizational capacity of leaders (McCarthy and Zald 1977). For an approach to the Vietnamese revolution that adopts a similar starting point, see Popkin (1979).

⁶Benedict Anderson (1991, 159) constructs a typology of nationalisms and places China and Vietnam in the late developing ‘official’ type, ‘i.e. something emanating from the state, and serving the interests of the state first and foremost’ (1991, 159). His analysis of Vietnam borrows from Marr (1981), who analyzes the emergence of a French-speaking intelligentsia and their role in guiding the nationalist anti-colonial movement.

⁷Though Arendt argues for mass against class as a basis of solidarity, she vacillates on the question of why these masses were often national both in organization and ideology, cf. Arendt (1994, 311 vs. 413).

⁸Note how Max Weber's (1946, 77) definition of the state as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory’ (italics in original) hinges on the idea of making a claim. Elaborating on this insight, Corrigan and Sayer (1985, 7) write that such ‘descriptive names (seemingly neutral, natural, universal, obvious) are in fact impositional claims’.

⁹Although by the 1950s Party and DRV elites advanced the idea of Vietnam as a nation-state allied against French colonial rule in Indochina, for much of the early to mid twentieth century these elites were divided on whether their domain would be Vietnamese or Indochinese, i.e. to what degree their claim to territorial sovereignty would mimic or depart from boundaries commensurate with colonial rule (cf. Goscha 1995).

¹⁰Building on Michel Foucault's elaboration of disciplinary methods of power, Mitchell (1991, 93) warns against overstating the ‘coherence of these technologies, as Foucault sometimes does’ because, he writes, ‘disciplines can break down, counteract one another, or over-reach’.

¹¹I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.

¹²For more on the content of cadre (cán b ) training, see Mau (1969). For an insightful discussion on the divided loyalties of the ‘peasant bureaucrat’, see MacLean (2005).

¹³Cf. Tr ng Chinh's presentation in Đng (2001c, 40–175). For an English translation cf. ‘On the Vietnamese Revolution’ in Tr ng (1994).

¹⁴The DRV's 1946 Constitution stated that ‘each citizen (công dân) must perform military service’. Legal reference to ‘dân công’ appeared in a July 1952 regulation (PTTg 1296). Đng et al. (2001, 194) define dân công simply as ‘conscripted labourers’ while Phan (2003, 116) defines it as, ‘people who perform duties on behalf of the nation such as irrigation, road repair, serving the frontlines’.

¹⁵After holding meetings with district and commune officials in August 1960, the Zone's Party Committee (Khu y) and its Administrative Committee authorized the Board to lead this movement. The Board resolved, ‘to implement a struggle to move thought from narrow to expansive, from in to out, from above to below; to make thought unanimous and of high-determination; duties of each branch and each level must be clear’ (UBHC 252).

¹⁶For excellent overviews of collectivization in the Mekong and Red River deltas respectively, see Ngô (1988), Kerkvliet (2005). For more on agricultural change in the historic Thái–Mèo Zone, see Sikor and Dao (2002), Sikor (2004). For analysis of collectivization's economic arrangements, see White (1985); for its influence on gross crop production over time, see Yvon-Tran (2002).

¹⁷Note that ‘Mèo’ is an outdated ethnonym referring to Hmong peoples. Though the Thái–Mèo Zone's name changed after 1962 to the Northwest (Tây B c), autonomy remained an official policy until 1975 when the newly established Socialist Republic of Vietnam abolished it in favor of uniform guidelines of spatial administration.

¹⁸In March 1960 the DRV had begun its first national census, a project ‘of great political meaning’, proclaimed a member of the steering committee (Đăng 1960).

¹⁹Though predicated on ostensible deregulation, ongoing ‘đi m i’ neoliberal reform policies correspond to active state regulation of land and property (Das 2007). Such regulatory capacity is predicated on collectivization's a priori strengthening of local state structures.

²⁰Conversations, bn Noong Nhai 2, xã Thanh X ng, huyn Đin Biên, tnh Đin Biên, 22 Aug and 17 Oct 2006.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christian C. Lentz

The author thanks Jason Cons, Adriane Lentz-Smith, Shelley Feldman, Max Pfeffer, Eric Tagliacozzo, Dirk Bonker, Brett Whalen, Jehangir Malegam, Kathryn Mathers, Emily Burrill, Saturnino Borras, Jr., and the anonymous reviewers for their feedback and insightful comments. Additional thanks go to Dr Trn Đc Viên, the staff of CARES, and other colleagues at the Hanoi University of Agriculture; and to the staff of National Archives of Vietnam Center 3. An early draft of this paper was presented at Yale University's Council on Southeast Asian Studies. Support for this research came from a Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Award; Cornell University's Southeast Asia Program and Einaudi Center for International Studies; the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation; and Duke University's Department of Sociology.