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Abstract
Ever since its inception during the 1960s, the Naxalite movement in India has been the focus of scholarly interest and political analysis. In spite of internal splits and external repression by the state, this agrarian mobilization continues to gain ground in Bihar and elsewhere. Both achievements and contradictions of such Maoist-inspired agency and ideology are examined via the life story of a Naxalite – an organic intellectual – from the Dalit community. Of particular interest are the difficulties of having to protect family members, as well as positive developments, such as shifts in the language of struggle (from caste to class), and negative ones at the level of political consciousness (the persistence of traditional beliefs, receipt of pro-poor funding from the state).
Notes
1 All the names of villagers appearing in this article are pseudonyms.
2 For an analysis of the difficulties in carrying out fieldwork in a context where violence is prevalent, together with the methodological implications of this fact, see Kunnath Citation2004.
3 Dalits and the upper castes live in different sections of the village; normally the Dalits are located in the south and the upper castes in the north. Various reasons – such as the inauspiciousness of the south, the directions of the wind, etc. – are given for such a spatial arrangement. Generally the wind direction in this part of the state is either easterly or westerly, hence the belief that the upper castes are protected from the polluting air coming from the Dalit quarters.
4 Along with the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People's War was one of the main Naxalite organizations engaged in armed struggle in central Bihar during the time of my fieldwork. In November 2004, both these organizations joined together to form a single party with the name Communist Party of India (Maoist). It is classified as a terrorist organization by the Indian state and the US government. Another Marxist-Leninist party, known as CPI (M-L) Liberation, also operates in this region. Although earlier this particular grouping was engaged in armed struggle, it has now shifted its activity to parliamentary politics. For the histories of these organizations in Central Bihar, see Bhatia Citation2000; Citation2005 and Louis Citation2002. My fieldwork was conducted mostly in the areas under the influence of People's War, a party to which Rajubhai himself belonged.
5 Each Naxalite group was engaged in an internecine conflict, a war of all against all. The MCC and the People's War had already come to a mutual understanding by 2003, but the CPI (M-L) Liberation continued its fight with People's War. All the latter fought with the armed squads of the Ranveer Sena, a private militia of the upper caste Bhumihars in the region.
6 Anthropologists are all too familiar with the fieldwork situation where an outside researcher is not just drawn into the social network of a figure like Rajubhai who is influential but becomes a conduit for the reproduction of the latter's influence in two specific ways. These involve external/internal status enhancement of the informant in question: in the eyes first of their own peer group, and second of the anthropologist himself. Hence the process of external status enhancement derives from an informant being able to tell the researcher how powerful/influential a person he (Rajubhai) is in the locality. The informant is simultaneously able to use the presence of the anthropologist for the purpose of internal status enhancement. It is true that my close association with Rajubhai seems to have had just such an effect. However, in the initial phase of fieldwork, my presence was more of a liability than an asset, due to the volatility of the situation.
7 As the indices of landlessness, outmigration, and rural poverty all confirm, Bihar has been and remains economically one of the most backward states in the Indian Union [Sharma and Gupta, Citation1987; Yugandhar and Iyer, Citation1993.
8 Useful accounts of agrarian struggles in India, both in the colonial era and the post-Independence period, are found in the now classic analyses by Dhanagare Citation1983 and Desai Citation1979; Citation1986.
9 For the background to plus an account of the original uprising by tribal peasants in Naxalbari, organized by the CPI (M-L) during the 1967–72 period in Darjeeling District of West Bengal, see Sen Citation1982: 214–19].
10 Historically, the CPI had always exercised a strong influence over peasant agency by virtue of its powerful leadership position in the All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS). Even after the end of the Second World War, the CPI was still conducting what amounted to a national rather than a class struggle, in which its object was to make itself the standard bearer of Indian nationalism, thereby competing with and – if possible – replacing the electoral supremacy of the Congress Party. Given this reformist approach, its objective was unsurprisingly to establish as wide an electoral basis as possible. To this end, the 1950s programme of AIKS was designed to generate a broad Democratic Alliance. This is evident from the following programmatic statement [Rasul, Citation1974: Appendix I] by the AIKS: ‘Attention should be also be paid to the task of forging the solid unity of kisans [= peasants] with their allies in the towns, that is the working class organized in trade unions, the middle class employees and other sections of the urban poor, the small and medium shopkeepers and industrialists who are daily being squeezed out of existence because of the oppressive taxation and other policies pursued by the government.’ That components of this alliance might be separated in terms of class, and thus have not just different but antagonistic interests, was an issue that the CPI and the AIKS failed to address.
11 The CPI was dismissed by the CPI (M-L) as the embodiment of ‘modern Soviet revisionism’ [Roy, Citation1975: 272].
12 According to the CPI (M-L) programme of 1970, therefore, its object was ‘the complete overthrow of the rule [in the Indian countryside by] the big feudal landlord classes, the agents and lackeys of US Imperialism’ [Roy, Citation1975: 271]. In other words, the economic backwardness of the agrarian sector was seen as an effect of ‘semi-colonial’ foreign domination mediated via ‘semi-feudal’ landlordism.
13 The literature on bonded labour in rural India is vast, and the debate about this form of employment (whether such relations are – or are not – coercive, unfree, a specifically feudal form of exploitation, and compatible with capitalism) is correspondingly wide-ranging. For recent overviews of this debate, see Brass Citation1999; Citation2002a.
14 See Roy Citation1975: Appendix I]. Naxalite tactics took the form of ‘annihilation of class enemies’, a category that included not just landlords but also moneylenders (who were usually also substantial proprietors).
15 As Mitter Citation1977: 23–4] points out, there is some confusion as to what kind of rural subject comes in which category, and why. This is particularly true of the top end of the agrarian hierarchy, where the socio-economic distinctions between a small landlord (a foe in class terms) and a better-off peasant (a friend in class terms) are not always evident. There are additional problems. According to Marxism, the main historical subject in the transition to capitalism is the capitalist him/herself. In the case of agriculture, this may be either a capitalist landlord or a capitalist rich peasant. Similarly, the main historical subject in Marxist theory about systemic transition from capitalism (to socialism) is the working class, in the form of urban proletariat and agricultural workers.
16 Some of the larger backwards caste groups are the Dhanuk, Teli, Kahar, Kandu, Lohar and Nai communities. Among the Dalits, the major groups in the region are the Chamars (Ravidasi), the Paswans (Dusadh), the Musahars and the Dhobi.
17 These figures have been compiled from the list drawn up by Louis Citation2002: 241–6]. Individual killings are too numerous to include here.
18 Some 96 per cent of the upper castes belong in the landlord and rich peasant category; only 36 per cent of the Yadav, Kurmi and Koeri castes are found in this same category. Nearly all – some 93 per cent – Dalits are landless agricultural labourers. Between these two extremes come others who, because they own only small amounts of land, have to sell their labour-power in order to survive. The fact that 60 per cent of the rural population – those who owned insufficient or no land – were ranged against the 30 per cent who were upper caste landowners, plus a minority of proprietors from the Yadav, Kurmi and Koeri castes, sometimes gave the agrarian conflict the appearance of a caste and not a class struggle [Prasad, Citation1994: 180].
19 Under the zamindari system the various exactions included begar (forced labour), nagdi (cash rent), Bhaoli (rent-in-kind), and abwab (an additional cash or kind levy). For further details about these forms of surplus labour extraction, see Rakesh Gupta Citation1982, Mitra Citation1985 and Shaibal Gupta Citation1994.
20 Each landowning caste in Bihar had its own sena, most of which were formed during the 1980s to counter the rising challenge from landless labourers. Their zone of operation was in central Bihar (now south Bihar). That of the Kurmis was known as the Bhumisena, while the Loriksena was formed by the Yadavs, the Gangasena by the Rajputs, and the Sunlightsena by the Kisan Morcha. Most dreaded of all, however, was the Ranveer sena formed by the Bhumihar caste. From its inception in 1994, until the year 2000, it was responsible for some 26 massacres, in the process killing 247 people. Ranveer sena remains the most feared of all the private armies organized by the landed classes. For details about these senas, see the PUDR Report [1999] and Louis Citation2002.
21 It should be noted that the concept of testimonio is problematic, as a recent exchange in this journal [Brass, Citation2002b; Beverley, Citation2004 underlines.
22 The Kurmis are the dominant caste in various districts of the Magadh region. In Dumari, all the land – apart from that in the hands of a few upper caste households – was owned by the Kurmis. Hence the struggle in this particular context was between on the one hand the Kurmis, and on the other the landless labourers who worked in the fields owned by the Kurmis.
23 All the interviews with Rajubhai were carried out during the one-year fieldwork period in Dumari. Interviews themselves were conducted in Hindi, the translations from which into English are mine. In doing this, every effort has been made to reproduce as accurately as possible the meaning conveyed by the informant in the course of the original conversation.
24 All the supporters of the People's War referred to their organization as Sanghathan.
25 On the private armies of the landowning castes, see above.
26 His sons would also phone from Gujarat, calls going to the telephone located in the village shop. A boy from the latter would run to inform Rajubhai and his wife about the call, for which errand he was paid Rs. 2. They would then go to the shop and await a second call.
27 This is merely to underline the importance of another familiar methodological issue that crops up in the course of participant/observation fieldwork. One should not, therefore, underestimate the extent to which the additional presence of an anthropologist put pressure on the already fragile household economy of Rajubhai and his domestic unit. Nor should one underestimate the unstinting generosity of hospitality offered by peasant families to those from other societies. Bhabhi went out of her way to provide the visiting researcher with an afternoon meal, mostly chuvira (flattened rice). On feast days everyone consumed special food, which is why – along with the family members – the anthropologist eagerly looked forward to holi, diwali, chatt and other Hindu festivals.
28 With regard to the latter designation, Gramsci Citation1971: 16] noted: ‘That all members of a political party should be regarded as intellectuals is an affirmation that can easily lend itself to mockery and caricature. But if one thinks about it nothing could be more exact.
29 Gramsci contrasts the role and position of the ‘organic intellectual’ – an authentic voice of and participant in grassroots agency – with that of what he terms ‘traditional intellectuals’. Although some of the latter may have emerged from the ranks of the rural poor, therefore, in doing so they shed this identity in part or in whole, and become the ‘other’ of their socio-economic roots. About the important and enduring role of these ‘traditional intellectuals’ Gramsci Citation1971: 14–15] observes: ‘One can understand nothing of the collective life of the peasantry and of the germs and ferments of development which exist within it, if one does not take into consideration and examine concretely and in depth this effective subordination to the [traditional] intellectuals. Every organic development of the peasant masses, up to a certain point, is linked to and depends on movements among the intellectuals.
30 When Gramsci used the term ‘organic intellectual’ to describe the agency of a ‘permanent persuader’ which resulted in the hegemonic domination by working class discourse over that of traditional intellectuals (priests, doctors, lawyers, scientists, technicians, etc.), he was referring to this external role. About this his view [Gramsci, Citation1971: 10] was as follows: ‘The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, “permanent persuader” and not just simple orator … One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing toward dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer “ideologically” the traditional intellectuals.
31 See, for example, the account by Krishnan Citation1971 of the founder of the Communist movement in Kerala, by Murugesan and Subramanyam Citation1975 of ‘the father of Communism in the South’, and by Namboodiripad Citation1976 of his own leftwards path.
32 This transformation is depicted somewhat differently by Crehan Citation2002: 129], for whom it is a largely cultural recasting. Her view is that an organic intellectual, the bearer of such change, was ‘crucial to the process whereby a major new culture’, one that represented the ‘worldview of an emerging class’, came into being. The view taken here, by contrast, does not confine the transformation wrought by an organic intellectual simply to the domain of culture. It has an impact both on politics, agency in furtherance of politics, and also on ideas about political economy.
33 This attempt by Rajubhai to eradicate alcohol production and consumption is not a moral stance, driven by a puritanical zeal on the part of Naxalites. The fact of excessive alcohol consumption in rural areas of the so-called Third World is well known, but the economic and social problems linked to this are not always made clear. Brewing in the domestic unit is frequently depicted in much of the anthropological literature – see, for example, the volume edited by Douglas Citation1987 – as no more than an income-generating form of informal sector economic activity, a benign type of petty trade that empowers women from poor peasant households. What is not said quite so often is that many females in rural areas attribute family poverty to expenditure by males on drinking, in furtherance of which the latter sometimes incur debts and enter bonded labour relations [da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, Citation1999: 107ff.].
34 Elsewhere the same point is made slightly differently [Thompson, Citation1978: 150]: ‘Class eventuates as men and women live their productive relations, and as they experience their determinate situations, within the ensemble of social relations, with their inherited culture and expectations, and as they handle these experiences in cultural ways’.
35 As Lenin Citation1961: 349ff.] pointed out, many grassroots components of ‘popular culture’ – religion, nationalism, and racism among them – are backward-looking, and the task of politicization by external/urban influences (intellectuals, trade unions, political parties) is precisely to challenge and then change such ideas. Whether Marx himself advocated such primary importance of the party in developing class consciousness is unclear. In The Poverty of Philosophy [Marx, Citation1963: 145] he observed: ‘Economic conditions had in the first place transformed the mass of the people into workers. The domination of capital created the common situation and common interests of this class. Thus this mass is already a class in relation to capital, but not a yet a class for itself. In the struggle, of which we have only indicated a few phases, this mass united and forms itself into a class for itself. The interests which it defends become class interests.’ The inference is that the proletariat would develop a consciousness of class by itself, simply through the process of class struggle.
36 The term Harijan, meaning ‘people of God’, was popularised by Gandhi. However, it rapidly acquired a derogatory meaning, and the Dalit movement in India rejected the term because it was first used by a Gujarati poet to denote children born to Devdasis (temple prostitutes).
37 Hence the view [Scott, Citation1976: 236] that ‘Folk religion may undergo a transformation that places it in sharp opposition to the religious and social doctrines of the elite.
38 See the volume edited by Washbrook Citation2005 for a similar tactic adopted by the Mexican state in an attempt to buy off the Zapatista rebels in rural Chiapas.
39 When fieldwork was conducted in this area of Bihar during the mid-1980s by Brass Citation1999: 117–23], bonded labour was frequently encountered in villages where it had previously been said this relation had ceased to exist. A case in point is the village of Pawapuri near the state capital Patna, where the Bihar government Department of Labour and Social Welfare declared in 1976 that ‘the bonded labour system does not exist’ (cited by Vijayendra, Ghatak and Rao Citation1984: 135]). Yet a decade later, research in Pawapuri indicated that bonded labour continued there unabated.
40 On this see Brass Citation1999: 115], who argues that a landless labourer or poor peasant may end up indebted to the landowner ‘as a consequence of cash or kind loans received in order to cultivate the sharecropped land’.
41 On November 13 in 2005, nearly 1000 cadres and supporters of the CPI (Maoist) stormed Jahanabad jail, rescuing many of their comrades imprisoned there, including the area commander Ajay Kanu. The jailbreak also resulted in the escape of more than 389 prisoners, and the seizure of police weapons. The Maoists also killed two leaders of the Ranveer sena, and took many others as hostages. As a propaganda victory, this episode is unsurpassed: it made front-page news in every leading daily in India. For details, see Bhatia Citation2005, Louis Citation2005 and Ramamkrishnan Citation2005.
42 The importance of symbolic action should not, however, be underestimated. In rural Bihar, where exploitation is also articulated through symbolic and ritual actions, such instances of lower caste retribution – a man/woman slapping the upper caste landowner, or garlanding him with slippers – in janadalats are indeed significant. It is nevertheless the case that structural change – that is to say, the roots of oppression and exploitation – is effected by mass agency, not symbolic punishment.
