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Abstract
Post-civil war, Buddhism has gone from being a privileged religion in Sri Lanka to a hegemonic religion. If the ethnic conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam calcified Sinhalese Buddhist sensibilities, the comprehensive victory over the group has emboldened Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists who insist on majority superordination and minority subordination. This essay discusses how the nationalist ideology undergirding Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism has exacerbated religious intolerance especially towards the island's Muslims and Christian Evangelicals.
Notes
1 Harischanra Gunaratna, ‘Religious Affairs Ministry Secy: SL Saturated with Places of Worship’. The Island, April 28, 2014, at www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=102396. The pronouncement appears to build on a 2008 Circular on the Construction of New Places of Worship by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Moral Upliftment that local authorities have especially used to shut down evangelical meetinghouses and prevent new non-Buddhist places of worship.
2 As per a June 2017 Supreme Court ruling, the Ministry of Religious Affairs must also approve the construction of religious schools (such as madrassas).
3 Indian Tamils entered the island starting around the 1830s as indentured labourers. Sri Lankan Tamils, like Indian Tamils, originate in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, although various communities representing the former appear to have lived in the island since time immemorial. For population figures, see Department of Census and Statistics Sri Lanka, ‘Census of Population and Housing 2012’, 20–21, at http://statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.php?fileName=Key_E&gp=Activities&tpl=3.
4 Robert N. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967; Neil DeVotta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.
5 The 1978 constitution also declared Tamil an official language, but by then Sinhalese, and especially Sinhalese Buddhists, were well on their way to arrogating state employment and resources.
6 Quoted in U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Sri Lanka 2016 International Religious Freedom Report, at www.state.gov/documents/organization/269186.pdf.
7 See Raisa Wickrematunge, ‘At Cross Purposes: The Legality of Conversion’. Sunday Leader, January 4, 2012, at www.thesundayleader.lk/2013/06/23/at-cross-purposes-the-legality-of-conversion/.
8 The ruling was against the Jehovah's Witnesses who were seeking police assistance to prosecute those attacking and harassing them.
9 For the 1972 constitution, go to www.parliament.lk/files/ca/4.%20The%20Constitution%20of%20Sri%20Lanka%20%20-%20%201972%20(Article%20105%20%E2%80%93134)%20Chapter%20XIII.pdf. For a revised edition of the 1978 constitution (which incorporates all 19 amendments), go to www.parliament.lk/files/pdf/constitution.pdf.
10 Benjamin Schonthal, ‘Securing the Sasana through Law: Buddhist Constitutionalism and Buddhist-Interest Litigation in Sri Lanka’. Modern Asian Studies Vol. 50. Issue 6 (November 2016): 1962.
11 The LTTE promoted a secular culture but post-‘9/11’ some within the organization appear to have considered incorporating Hindutva as a way to draw support from right-wing Hindu groups in India. Author interview with LTTE supporter, Toronto, Canada, May 2009.
12 In this regard, it is important to recall that anti-Catholicism was a prominent feature among Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists in groups like the Bauddha Jatika Balavegaya (Buddhist National Force), which starting in the early 1960s worked successfully to reduce Catholic influence within the educational and professional sectors and pushed governments to promote programmes that privileged Buddhism and Buddhists in a Sinhala language milieu. See Benjamin Schonthal, ‘Configurations of Buddhist Nationalism in Modern Sri Lanka’, in John Clifford Holt (Ed.), Buddhist Extremists and Muslim Minorities: Religious Conflict in Contemporary Sri Lanka. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 100–104.
13 Verité Research, ‘Religious Violence in Sri Lanka: A New Perspective on an Old Problem’. Insights Vol. 5. Issue 1 (June 2017): at www.lankabusinessonline.com/religious-violence-in-sri-lanka-has-chronic-nature-verite/.
14 For details concerning both anti-Muslim and anti-Christian violence, see Gehan Gunatilleke, The Chronic and the Acute: Post-War Religious Violence in Sri Lanka. Colombo: International Center for Ethnic Studies & Equitas, 2015.
15 Laksiri Jayasuriya, ‘Just War Tradition and Buddhism’. International Studies Vol. 46. Issue 4 (2009): 428.
16 Neil DeVotta, Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka, Policy Studies 40. Washington DC: East-West Center, 2007, p. 1.
17 Jayadeva Uyangoda, ‘Militarization, Violent State, Violent Society: Sri Lanka’, in Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz (Eds.), Internal Conflicts in South Asia. London: Sage, 1996, p. 129, n. 5.
18 DeVotta, Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology.
19 Those attacked as traitors and detractors are the same groups that authoritarian regimes typically target. In that sense, the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist ideology can facilitate authoritarianism (especially when promoting Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarianism).
20 There indeed are monks who in their commentaries at least appear to eschew majoritarianism. In this regard see Elizabeth J. Harris, ‘Buddhism in War: A Study of Cause and Effect from Sri Lanka’. Culture and Religion Vol. 2. Issue 2 (2001): 197–222. Also see Nirmal Ranjith Dewasiri, New Buddhist Extremism and the Challenges to Ethno-Religious Coexistence in Sri Lanka. Colombo: International Center for Ethnic Studies, 2016; Ananda Abeysekara, Colors of the Robe: Religion, Identity and Difference. Colombia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002.
21 D. C. Vijayavardhana, The Revolt in the Temple. Colombo: Sinha Publications, 1953, p. 3.
22 The Economist, ‘Fears of a New Religious Strife’. July 27, 2013, p. 35.
23 Quoted in Roshan Peiris, ‘Rahula Hits Back’. Sunday Times (Colombo), May 5, 1996, at www.sundaytimes.lk/970921/news2.html.
24 Cyril Matthews, Diabolical Conspiracy. Dematagoda, Sri Lanka: n.p., 1980, p. 6.
25 The terminology pitribhumi and punyabhumi stems from Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? New Delhi: Hindi Sahitya Sadan, 2003 [1923], pp. 115–116.
26 The Economist, ‘Beating the Drum’. November 18, 2010, 49.
27 For details on Soma Thero and the monk-led political party he inspired, see Neil DeVotta and Jason Stone, ‘Jathika Hela Urumaya and Ethno-Religious Politics in Sri Lanka’. Pacific Affairs Vol. 81. Issue 1 (Spring 2008): 31–51.
28 U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Sri Lanka 2014 International Religious Freedom Report, at www.state.gov/documents/organization/238718.pdf.
29 U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Sri Lanka 2016 International Religious Freedom Report, at www.state.gov/documents/organization/269186.pdf.
30 Personal communication with author. Also see https://slchurchattacks.crowdmap.com/.
31 Author interviews with pastors in various areas of Sri Lanka (beginning in 2003 but mainly between 2012 and 2017, in person and over the phone). Also see the U. S. Department of State reports above. According to the NCEASL, the violence committed against Christian clergy includes “murder of clergy, physical assault, arson, demolition and desecration of churches, intimidation, and displacement from homes”. See its Sri Lanka Summary Report on Religious Freedom. Colombo: National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka, 2013, p. 7.
32 U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Sri Lanka 2016 International Religious Freedom Report, at www.state.gov/documents/organization/269186.pdf.
33 Lorna Dewaraja, The Muslims of Sri Lanka: One Thousand Years of Ethnic Harmony 900–1915. Colombo: The Lanka Islamic Foundation, 1994; John D. Rogers, ‘Racial Identities and Politics and Early Modern Sri Lanka’, in Peter Robb (Ed.), The Concept of Race in South Asia. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 146–164.
34 K. M. De Silva, ‘The Muslim Minority in a Democratic Polity: The Case of Sri Lanka: Reflections on a Theme’, in M. A. M. Shukri (Ed.), Muslims of Sri Lanka: Avenues to Antiquity. Beruwala, Sri Lanka: Jamiah Naleemia Institute, 1986, pp. 443–452.
35 The start of the civil war in 1983 and the sense that Colombo's Muslim elites were insufficiently attuned to Muslim needs in the northeast appear to have influenced the SLMC's formation. While Muslims vote for candidates representing the two main parties during presidential elections, most vote for the SLMC and All Ceylon Muslim Congress during parliamentary elections.
36 A. R. M. Imtiyaz and Amjad Mohamed-Saleem, ‘Muslim in Post-War Sri Lanka: Understanding Sinhala-Buddhist Mobilization against Them’. Asian Ethnicity Vol. 16. Issue 2 (2015): 186–202.
37 Quoted in Samanth Subramanian, This Divided Island: Stories from the Sri Lankan War. Haryana, India: Penguin Books, 2015, p. 226.
38 Neil DeVotta, ‘Sri Lanka: From Turmoil to Dynasty’. Journal of Democracy Vol. 22. Issue 2 (April 2011): 130–144.
39 BBC News, ‘The Hardline Buddhists Targeting Sri Lanka's Muslims’. March 25, 2013, at www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21840600.
40 Quoted in Hilmy Ahamed, ‘Yahapalanaya Lapses – Is Mahinda the Option for Muslims?’. Daily FT, January 21, 2017, at www.ft.lk/article/592912/Yahapalanaya-lapses-%E2%80%93-Is-Mahinda-the-option-for-Muslims. Muslim elites in Colombo repeated this during this author's interviews in June 2014.
41 Author interviews with Muslim civil society leaders in May 2014.
42 See Neil DeVotta, ‘A Win for Democracy in Sri Lanka’. Journal of Democracy Vol. 27. Issue 1 (January 2016): 157–158; Athambawa Sarjoon, Mohammad Agus Yusoff, and Nordin Hussin, ‘Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Violence: A Major Threat to Ethnic Reconciliation and Ethnic Harmony in Post-War Sri Lanka’. Religions Vol. 7. Issue 10 (October 2016), at www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/7/10/125.
43 See Sandya Hewamanne, ‘Duty Bound?: Militarization, Romances and New Spaces of Violence among Sri Lanka's Free Trade Zone Garment Factory Workers’. Cultural Dynamics Vol. 21. Issue 2 (July 2009): 153–184.
44 Farzana Haniffa, ‘Piety as Politics among Muslim Women in Contemporary Sri Lanka’. Modern Asian Studies Vol. 42. Issue 2/3 (March-May 2008): 347–375.
45 Indeed, the dependence on Middle Eastern funding to promote Muslim education and upward mobility led to Muslim leaders emphasizing practices that donor countries preferred, which appear to have contributed to the more austere and puritanical Islamic consciousness. See Meghan O'Sullivan, ‘Conflict as a Catalyst: The Changing Politics of the Sri Lankan Muslims’, in Siri Gamage and I. B. Watson (Eds.), Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka. New Delhi: Sage, 1999, pp. 268–269.
46 Author interviews with Muslim elites, Colombo, July 2013. Also see Sandya Hewamanne, ‘Trouser Wearing Women: Changing Landscape of Fashion among Global Factory Workers and Contemporary Political Tensions in Sri Lanka’, in Lipi Begum, Rohit Dasgupta, and Raina Lewis (Eds.), Styling South Asian Youth Cultures: Fashion, Media and Society. London: I. B Tauris, forthcoming.
47 ‘“With A Little Political Backing We Can End The Rise Of Muslims,” Gnanasara Who Wishes To Emulate Prabhakaran Declares’. Colombo Telegraph, September 21, 2016, at www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/with-a-little-political-backing-we-can-end-the-rise-of-muslims-gnanasara-who-wishes-to-emulate-prabhakaran-declares/.
48 Quoted in BBC News, ‘The Hardline Buddhists Targeting Sri Lanka's Muslims’.
49 Kalinga Tudor Silva, ‘Gossip, Rumor, and Propaganda in Anti-Muslim Campaigns of the Bodu Bala Sena’ in Buddhist Extremists and Muslim Minorities, 130.
50 While there are many monoethnic Sinhalese and Tamil villages, Kattankudy town stands out for its population size, density, and conspicuously demonstrative Islamization.
51 P. K. Balachandran, ‘32 Sri Lankans from Four Families Have Joined ISIS, Says Minister’. Indian Express, November 18, 2016, at www.newindianexpress.com/world/2016/nov/18/32-sri-lankans-from-four-families-have-joined-isis-says-minister-1540001.html.
52 See James John Stewart, ‘Muslim-Buddhist Conflict in Contemporary Sri Lanka’. South Asia Research Vol. 34. Issue 3 (2014): 241–260.
53 Shilpa Samaratunge and Sanjana Hattotuwa, Liking Violence: A Study of Hate Speech on Facebook in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Center for Policy Alternatives, 2014, p. 127.
54 Ibid., 71.
55 Neil DeVotta, ‘Island of Violence: Sinhalese Buddhist Majoritarianism and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Sri Lanka’, in Ali Riaz, Zobaida Nasreen, and Fahmida Zaman (Eds.), Political Violence in South Asia. London: Routledge, 2018, forthcoming.
56 Author interviews with community leaders, Dharga Town, Aluthgama, February 2015.