UZBEKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES: INTERESTS AND AVENUES FOR COOPERATION

Abstract

Uzbekistan has recently initiated a series of reforms in the wake of (former) President Islam Karimov's death in 2016. To what extent and why does Tashkent seek to liberalize? Concurrently, the United States - which curtailed ties with the Uzbekistani government in the aftermath of the 2005 Andijan massacre - has expressed renewed interest. What do Washington and Tashkent seek to gain by improving relations? This article posits that while the United States aspires to bolster regional support for the War in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is mainly interested in consolidating a new regime and balancing against nearby Great Powers. As such, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's reformist drive should not be construed as a categorical embrace of good governance but a means to reestablish Uzbekistan's geopolitical footing after more than a decade of isolation. Based upon this assessment, both sides can work to foster avenues for cooperation, while the United States encourages Uzbekistan to liberalize at its own pace.

Keywords:

• Uzbekistan
• Liberalization
• Reform
• United States
• Afghanistan
• Great Powers
• Andijan

Notes

1 A. Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007, pp. 192–198.

2 S. Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press, 2004, p. 457.

3 A. Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 31–32, 34.

4 Ibid., 39.

5 F. Hill and K. Jones, ‘Fear of Democracy or Revolution: The Reaction to Andijon’. The Washington Quarterly Vol. 29 Issue 3 (2006): 114–116, 121–122.

6 Cooley, p. 39.

7 B. Pannier, ‘Why are Uzbeks so Often Linked to Terror Attacks?’. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 1 November 2017, at https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbeks-and-terrorism-new-york-karimov-suspects/28829608.html (accessed 2 January 2019).

8 D. Trilling, ‘Uzbekistan: The Corruption Corridor’. Politico March/April 2014, at https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/uzbekistan-the-corruption-corridor-103961 (accessed 2 January 2019).

9 R. Standish, ‘Gulnara Karimova’s Fall from Grace’. Foreign Policy, 9 September 2014, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/09/gulnara-karimovas-fall-from-grace/ (accessed 2 January 2019).

10 ‘A Hopeful Moment for Uzbekistan’. The New York Times, 13 April 2018, at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/opinion/uzbekistan-mirziyoev-human-rights.html. B. Pannier, ‘How Shavkat Mirziyoyev Became Uzbekistan’s Supreme Leader’. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 3 February 2018, at https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-mirziyoev-consolidation-of-power/29016113.html (accessed 2 January 2019).

11 M. Marszewski, ‘Thaw in Uzbekistan. Reforms By President Mirziyoyev’. Centre for Eastern Studies (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich) Vol. 278 (16 July 2018): 3–5, at https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_278.pdf (accessed 2 January 2019).

12 Ibid., p. 3.

13 N. Imamova, ‘Uzbekistan’s New Era Might Just Be Real’. Foreign Policy, 21 June 2018, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/21/uzbekistans-new-era-might-just-be-real/ (accessed 2 January 2019).

14 E. Schatz, ‘How Western Disengagement Enabled Uzbekistan’s “Spring” and How to Keep it Going’. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 531, The George Washington University, June 2018, at http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm531_Schatz_June2018_0.pdf (accessed 2 January 2019).

15 Ibid.

16 ‘A Year of Economic Reforms with President Mirziyoyev’. Voices of Central Asia, 28 December 2017, at http://voicesoncentralasia.org/a-year-of-economic-reforms-with-president-mirziyoyev/ (accessed 2 January 2019).

17 Ibid.

18 A. Chughtai, ‘Afghanistan: Who Controls What’. Al Jazeera, 19 October 2018, at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/afghanistan-controls-160823083528213.html (accessed 2 January 2019).

19 R. Nordland, ‘The Death Toll for Afghan Forces is Secret. Here’s Why’. The New York Times, 21 September 2018, at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/world/asia/afghanistan-security-casualties-taliban.html (accessed 2 January 2019).

20 F. Mashrab, ‘Russia Tacitly Entices Uzbekistan with Benefits of EEU, CSTO Membership’. Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 14 Issue 149, at https://jamestown.org/program/russia-tacitly-entices-uzbekistan-benefits-eeu-csto-membership/ (accessed 2 January 2019).

21 ‘Tashkent Conference Backs Afghan Government’s Peace Offer’. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 27 March 2018, at https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-offers-host-talks-taliban-afghanistan/29127849.html (accessed 2 January 2019).

22 ‘U.S. Support for the New Silk Road’. U.S. Department of State, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/newsilkroad/index.htm (accessed 2 January 2019).

23 ‘The United States and Uzbekistan: Launching a New Era of Strategic Partnership’. The White House, 16 May 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/united-states-uzbekistan-launching-new-era-strategic-partnership/ (accessed 2 January 2019).

24 E. McGlinchey, ‘Central Asia’s Autocrats: Geopolitically Stuck, Politically Free’. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 380, The George Washington University, August 2015, at http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm380_McGlinchey_Aug2015.pdf (accessed 2 January 2019).

25 Schatz, ‘How Western Disengagement Enabled Uzbekistan’s “Spring” and How to Keep it Going’.

26 Ibid.

27 N. Imamova, ‘Uzbekistan’s New Era Might Just Be Real’.

28 The opinions expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent those of Nazarbayev University.