US MISSILE DEFENCE EFFORTS AND CHINESE RESERVATIONS IN EAST ASIA

ABSTRACT

Asia, with the world's largest population, extensive natural resources and fast growing economies, has become one of the world's most dynamic regions and a theatre for a variety of actors, distinct interests and national armament efforts. Focusing on East Asia, the most significant regional powers are the US and China, which although they are becoming competitors, also depend on each other over a large number of economic and regional security issues (e.g. North Korea). But on the whole, China and the US are struggling for regional hegemony and influence. They are pursuing large-scale armament efforts and investing heavily in emerging military technologies, thereby feeding the risk of violent confrontations and threatening stability and peace. In this connection, US Missile Defence represents one of China's major concerns. Focusing on US Missile Defence efforts in the Western Pacific region, this article presents an overview of the currently-deployed systems and plans for further development. It analyses the technological capabilities of associated sensor and interceptor elements and estimates their individual abilities to contribute to an integrated US Missile Defence architecture in this region. Finally, this state of short- to mid-term US Missile Defence capacity in the region is situated in relation to its impact on nuclear deterrence and strategic stability, taking account of both Chinese security concerns and US security interests. Assuming that both the US and China have a common interest in regional and strategic stability, the article concludes by discussing arms control measures. It suggests concrete options for confidence building and proposes achievable steps, which would promote a Sino-American discourse on joint security issues and strengthen crisis stability as well as regional security.

Keywords:

• East Asia
• Missile Defence
• US
• China
• Strategic Stability
• Arms Control

Notes

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6 Thomas Karako, ‘Bad Idea: Sectored Air and Missile Defense Radars’. Series: Bad Ideas in National Security, Defense360, CSIS International Security Program (ISP), December 21, 2018, https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-sectored-air-and-missile-defense-radars/ (accessed 28 April 2020).

7 Riqiang Wu, ‘South Korea’s THAAD: Impact on China’s Nuclear Deterrent’. RSIS Commentary Issue 192 (July 2016), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

8 George N. Lewis, ‘THAAD Radar Ranges’. Mostly Missile Defense Blog, July 17, 2016, https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2016/07/17/thaad-radar-ranges-july-17-2018/ (accessed 28 April 2020).

9 Park Hyun, ‘AN/TPY-2 Radar could Track Any Chinese ICBMs as they Pass Over the Korean Peninsula’. The Hankyoreh, June 2, 2015.

10 Wu, op. cit.

11 Ibid.

12 Ankit Panda, ‘What is THAAD, What does it Do, and Why is China Mad About it?’ The Diplomat, February 25, 2017.

13 Blanchard and Tait, op. cit.

14 Jane Perlez, Mark Landler and Choe Sang-Hun, ‘China Blinks on South Korea, Making Nice After a Year of Hostilities’. The New York Times, November 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/world/asia/china-south-korea-thaad.html (accessed 28 April 2020).

15 The Straits Times, ‘Taiwan Deploys Advanced Early Warning Radar’. The Straits Times, February 3, 2013, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/taiwan-deploys-advanced-early-warning-radar-system (accessed 28 April 2020).

16 NTI, ‘Taiwan Pushes Back on U.S. Pressure to do more on Missile Defense’. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 6, 2014, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/taiwan-pushes-back-against-us-pressure-do-more-missile-defense/ (accessed 28 April 2020).

17 Michael J. Cole, ‘New Radar Tracks North Korea Rocket: MND’. The Taipei Times, December 13, 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/12/13/2003550023 (accessed 28 April 2020).

18 Focus Taiwan, ‘Talk of the Day – Taiwan Formally Commissions New Radar System’. Focus Taiwan News Channel, February 3, 2013, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201302030023 (accessed 28 April 2020).

19 John Keller, ‘Raytheon to Upgrade Taiwan Missile Defense Surveillance Radar to Mitigate Obsolescence Issues’. Military & Aerospace Electronics, November 30, 2016, http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2016/11/radar-surveillance-upgrade.html (accessed 28 April 2020).

20 For detailed information and infographics see the Raytheon Website, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/amdr/ (accessed 28 April 2020).

21 George N. Lewis, ‘New Aegis Radar to be 100 Times More Sensitive than Current Radar’. Mostly Missile Defense Blog, May 22, 2019, https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2019/05/22/new-aegis-radar-to-be-100-times-more-sensitive-than-current-radar-may-22-2019/ (accessed 28 April 2020).

22 Jane Judson, ‘Pentagon Terminates Program for Redesigned Kill Vehicle, Preps for New Competition’. DefenseNews.com, August 21, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/21/dod-tanks-redesigned-kill-vehicle-program-for-homeland-defense-interceptor/ (accessed 28 April 2020).

23 Ronald O’Rourke, ‘Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issue for Congress’. Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RL33745 (April 2019): 6.

24 Ronald O’Rourke, ‘Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issue for Congress’. Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RL33745, (December 2017): 6.

25 George N. Lewis, ‘How Many Aegis BMD Ships in 2040?’ Mostly Missile Defense Blog, December 13, 2015, https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2015/12/13/how-many-aegis-bmd-ships-in-2040-december-13-2015/ (accessed 28 April 2020).

26 O’Rourke, ‘BMD 2019’, op. cit., p. 10.

27 George N. Lewis, ‘Update to “How Many SM-3 Block IIA Missiles?”’. Mostly Missile Defense Blog, May 20, 2018, https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2018/05/20/update-to-how-many-sm-3-block-iia-missiles-may-20-2018/ (accessed 28 April 2020).

28 George N. Lewis, ‘Strategic Capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA Interceptors’. Mostly Missile Defense Blog, June 30, 2016, https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2016/06/30/strategic-capabilities-of-sm-3-block-iia-interceptors-june-30-2016/ (accessed 28 April 2020).

29 George N. Lewis, ‘Update on Aegis SM-3 Block IIA against ICBMs’. Mostly Missile Defense Blog, June 5, 2018, https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2018/06/05/update-on-aegis-sm-3-block-iia-against-icbms-june-5-2018/ (accessed 28 April 2020).

30 MDA, ‘AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense: Status, Integration and Interoperability’. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), PowerPoint slides, May 6, 2008, https://mostlymissiledefense.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/2008-5-aegisbmd-statusintergrationandinteroperability.pdf (accessed 28 April 2020).

31 Wu, op. cit.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christian Alwardt

Dr. Christian Alwardt is a physicist and senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Germany. He is conducting interdisciplinary research in the fields of emerging technologies, arms control and international security.