Assumptions of twentieth-century neuroscience: reductionist and computational paradigms

ABSTRACT

The term neuroscience originated in the early 1960s, but the questions it asks date to antiquity. The nineteenth-century reticular view of the brain as a diffuse net-like synctium was negated by the neuron doctrine, but certain aspects (e.g. glial cells) are better described as a synctium. System views of the brain were popular in the first half of the twentieth century, but a reductionist focus has since dominated with the development of experimental tools that focus on components. This article will begin by considering twentieth-century views of both philosophers and scientists that highlight the tension between integrating in a field while retaining the ability to think critically. This will be illustrated by considering two common assumptions in neuroscience: that reductionist approaches will explain the brain; and the technological metaphor that sees the brain as a computer.

KEYWORDS:

• Reductionism
• paradigms
• brain–computer metaphor
• psychopathology
• nervous system
• heterarchy
• ephapse
• hierarchy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

David Parker

David Parker is a lecturer at the Department of Physiology, Development and Neuroscience, University of Cambridge. His interest in nervous system plasticity started during his PhD and continued in his postdoctoral work on the lamprey locomotor network. He examined aspects of the locomotor network organization. Recently he examines changes in spinal cord function after injury.