Conflict Resolution through Negotiation in a Railway Open Access Market: a Multi-agent System Approach

Abstract

Open access reforms to railway regulations allow multiple train operators to provide rail services on a common infrastructure. As railway operations are now independently managed by different stakeholders, conflicts in operations may arise, and there have been attempts to derive an effective access charge regime so that these conflicts may be resolved. One approach is by direct negotiation between the infrastructure manager and the train service providers. Despite the substantial literature on the topic, few consider the benefits of employing computer simulation as an evaluation tool for railway operational activities such as access pricing. This article proposes a multi-agent system (MAS) framework for the railway open market and demonstrates its feasibility by modelling the negotiation between an infrastructure provider and a train service operator. Empirical results show that the model is capable of resolving operational conflicts according to market demand.

Keywords:

• Railway
• open market
• track access pricing
• train scheduling
• multi-agent systems
• agent negotiation

This work is supported by the Department of Electrical Engineering of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.