Abstract
The events of the ‘Arab Spring’ appeared to be animated by slogans and objectives of universalist orientations to liberty, dignity and social justice, a departure from the ethno-religious nationalisms that dominated the politics of the region. They raised questions regarding the ‘exceptionalism’ of Arabs and Muslims, whom many observers and commentators considered to be tied to sentiments and solidarities of patrimonialism, tribe and religion. Yet, the forces that seemed to benefit from the transformations in Egypt and elsewhere were not those that made the ‘revolution’ but precisely religious and patriarchal parties which benefited from popular constituencies in elections. A consideration of the political history of the main countries concerned can throw some light on these transformations. The nationalist, often military, regimes which emerged from the independence struggles of mid-twentieth century headed ideological, populist, nationalist and ‘socialist’ movements and parties and authoritarian regimes which eliminated oppositional politics and social autonomies in favour of a corporatist welfare state. These regimes, facing economic and geo-political contingencies of the later decades were transformed into dynastic oligarchies and crony capitalism which broke the compact of welfare and subsidies leading to intensified impoverishment and repression of their populations. Popular strata were driven ever more into reliance on ‘survival units’ of kin and community, reinforcing communal and religious attachments at the expense of civic and associational life. These ties and sentiments come to the fore when the ruling dynasties are displaced, as in Iraq after the 2003 invasion or Egypt after the removal of Mubarak. The ideological and universalist politics of the revolutionaries appear to be swamped by those conservative affiliations.
Notes
1. For an overview, see Owen (Citation2004), Rogan (Citation2009, pp. 277–354); see also Zubaida (Citation2011, pp. 77–114).
2. For an exposition and critique of Gellner's characterization of ‘Muslim society’, see Zubaida (Citation2011, pp. 31–76).
3. For a classic account of the Arab intellectual landscape of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Hourani (Citation1983); see also Zubaida (Citation2009, pp. 1–63).
4. I borrow this term from Norbert Elias who wrote on ‘survival units’ and ‘combat and defence units’ in the context of European feudal history. Their rivalries and power were eventually incorporated and surpassed by the centralizing/absolutist state which assumed functions of security and survival, and the socio-economic developments which aided individualization and civility. See, for example, Elias (Citation2000, pp. 382, 436) and many other contexts, such as Elias (Citation1978). For an elaboration of this concept, see Kaspersen and Gabriel (Citation2008).