Australian reactions to Britain's declining presence in Southeast Asia, 1955–63

Abstract

This article examines Australia's long-held doubts about Britain's willingness and ability to maintain a significant military presence in Southeast Asia, where Australia's main strategic interests lay. The article argues that Australian concerns long predated the Wilson government's attempt to disengage from east of Suez in the mid-1960s. In doing so, it shows that the Menzies government had since the mid-1950s become increasingly concerned about Britain's resolve and capacity to station substantial forces in the region. In illustrating the extent to which policy-makers in Canberra became suspicious of British long-term strategic aims in Southeast Asia, this article reveals some interesting aspects of the changing nature of Anglo-Australian relations in the post-war period.

Notes

1. Dockrill, Britain's Retreat from East of Suez, chs 4–6; Pham, ‘The End to “East of Suez”’, chs 1–2. It must be noted that in this paper ‘east of Suez’ refers to a vast area stretching from the Persian Gulf to Hong Kong. Southeast Asia denotes a strategic sub-region of the larger ‘east of Suez’ area which included the British bases of Singapore and Malaya/Malaysia and where the Wilson government's policy of withdrawal most affected Australian security.

2. See ‘The Repercussions in South East Asia of the Separation of Singapore’, a memorandum tabled by British officials at the London quadripartite talks in September 1965.The text of the British memorandum can be found in Australian High Commission (henceforth AHC) London to Department of External Affairs (henceforth DEA), cablegrams 7578 and 7579, 2.9.1965, A1838/346, TS3006/10/4/1 part 1, National Archives of Australia, Canberra (henceforth NAA).

3. See Benvenuti, ‘The End of the Affair’, ch. 4. For the concept of ‘forward defence’ see para. 1.

4. On the Wilson government's decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia, see Dockrill, Britain's Retreat, ch. 9; Pham, ‘The End to “East of Suez”’, chs 6–7.

5. Day, The Great Betrayal; Macintyre, The Oxford History of Australia, 335; Bolton, ‘The United Kingdom’, 210; Millar, Australia in Peace and War, 122.

6. Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, 206.

7. Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, 158, 140–44.

8. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 34.

9. Ward, Australia and the British Embrace, 75–77.

10. Under the so-called ANZAM arrangements Australia, Britain and New Zealand had undertaken to co-ordinate their strategic planning for the conduct of military operation in a vast area which included the Australian and New Zealand homelands, and the British territories in Malaya and Borneo, along with the adjacent sea areas. See Umetsu, ‘The Origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve’, 510.

11. Singapore was granted self-government in 1959.

12. For an examination of AMDA, see Hack, 223–33.

13. Joint Planning Committee Report 34/1957, ‘United Kingdom Defence Policy – South East Asia. Memorandum by the Defence Committee’, July 1957, A1838/269, TS692/2 part 1, NAA.

14. Australia's colonial possessions were Papua (since 1906) and New Guinea (since 1921), Cocos Islands (since 1955), Christmas Island (since 1958), Heard Island and McDonald Islands (since 1947). As for Nauru, the Pacific island had since 1921 been jointly administered by Australia, Britain and New Zealand. In practice, Australia provided the actual administration.

15. The Australian naval contribution to the CSR included two destroyers or frigates and one aircraft carrier on annual visits of six to eight weeks. The ground contribution amounted to a battalion group. The air force component consisted of a bomber wing of two squadrons (Canberras), a fighter wing of two squadrons (Avon Sabres) and an airfield construction squadron.

16. In June 1948 the British colonial authorities in Malaya declared a state of emergency (whence the term ‘Malayan Emergency’) to quell an insurgency led by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The state of emergency was lifted only in 1960. For Australia's involvement, see Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation.

17. See Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, 86–102.

18. See Grey, A Military History of Australia, 215–16. The Commonwealth Brigade included British, Australian and New Zealand ground forces in the CSR.

19. For Australia's policy in response to the establishment of SEATO, see Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’, 172–77.

20. Lowe, Commonwealth and Communism, 3–4.

21. See Reynolds, Australia's Bid for the Atomic Weapon; Arnold, A Very Special Relationship.

22. Reynolds, Australia's Bid, 6, 25.

23. Ibid., 24.

24. Goldsworthy, ‘Australian External Policy and the End of Britain's Empire’.

25. Pemberton, All the Way, 331.

26. ‘Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy: Report by the Defence Committee’, Jan. 1959, A2031/8, 4/1959, NAA.

27. ‘Defence Preparations Committee of Cabinet: Minutes of a meeting with Duncan Sandys’, Canberra, 26 Aug.1957, A5462/1, 12/1/3, NAA.

28. ‘The Future of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Relation to the Malayan Defence Agreement. Report by the Defence Committee’, July 1957, A4926/XM1, vol. 28, NAA.

29. McIntyre to Tange, memo 59, 16 Jan.1956, A816/52, 14/301/734, NAA.

30. Ibid.

31. PMM (D) (56) 1st meeting, 3 July 1956, A1838/269, 691/1 part 2, NAA. Britain's defence spending as a proportion of GNP was around 8 per cent.

32. McIntyre to Tange, memo 59, 16 Jan. 1956, A816/52, 14/301/734, NAA.

33. PMM (D) (56)1st meeting, 3 July 1956, A1838/269, 691/1 part 2, NAA.

34. For Australia's decision to standardise its equipment, see Lee, Australia Turns to the United States 1955–57, 8–14.

35. Memcon, Home, Sandys, Menzies and McBride (London), 25 June 1957, A1209/23, 1957/5380, NAA.

36. Pickering, Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez, 103.

37. For a detailed account of the 1957 White Paper see Jackson, Britain's Defence Dilemma, 49–71. In the Far East, the British government planned to cut the Army from 21,000 to 11,000 men, to withdraw three squadrons of ‘Venom’ ground attack fighters (compensated by the addition of two squadrons of ‘Canberra’ light bombers) and to cut two cruisers, four destroyers and three frigates (compensated by a carrier task group – that is to say, one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, four destroyers and four frigates – which was to cover all the area east of Suez). See Joint Planning Committee Report 34/1957, ‘United Kingdom Defence Policy – South East Asia. Memorandum by the Defence Committee’, July 1957, A1838/269, TS692/2 part 1, NAA.

38. The Army would for instance be cut from 21,000 to 18,000 personnel (instead of 11,000). As for the Air Force, Australian defence authorities were satisfied that ‘there [would] be a considerable increase in offensive air power’, while for the Navy, ‘the Carrier Task Group [would] now be based in Singapore which [was] a strengthening compared with the previous United Kingdom proposal’. See Defence Committee Agendum 115/1957, ‘United Kingdom Defence Policy in South East Asia – Discussions with Duncan Sandys: Notes for Minister of Defence’, 22 Aug.1957, A1838/269, TS692/2 part 2, NAA.

39. Memcon, Home, Menzies, Casey and McBride (Canberra), 15 March 1957, A1838/269, TS652/16/6, NAA.

40. Casey to Tange, 13 Aug.1957, A1838/269, TS692/2 part 1, NAA.

41. Ibid.; ‘United Kingdom Policy in South East Asia: Defence Committee Agendum no. 90/1957’, note by Tange, 2 Aug.1957, A1838/269, TS692/2 part 1, NAA.

42. The JPC was an advisory body to the Department of Defence. Its function was to advise the Defence Committee and/or the chiefs of staff on strategic issues and defence planning.

43. Ibid. According to the JPC, the forces to be retained in Southeast Asia would probably be only ‘adequate for the purpose of the anti-terrorist operations in Malaya and for the defence of internal security in Singapore if necessary’.

44. For the Australian rationale behind the creation of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve and the deployment of Australian defence forces in Malaya see Umetsu, ‘The Origins of the British Commonwealth Reserve’, 522–25.

45. Tange to Casey, message 1322, 26 Aug. 1957, A1838/269, TS692/2 part 3, NAA.

46. Cabinet Decision 1187, 10 Feb. 1958, 1945/28, 162/3/5, NAA; ‘United Kingdom Defence Policy – Southeast Asia – Memorandum by the Defence Committee’, A1838/269, TS692/2 part 1, NAA.

47. Defence Committee Report 19/1958, Feb. 1958, 1945/28, 162/3/5, NAA; Record of Meeting between Macmillan and Australian Ministers, 30 Jan. 1958, A4910/1, vol. 6, NAA.

48. Defence Committee Report 19/1958, Feb. 1958, 1945/28, 162/3/5, NAA. See also Cabinet Submission 1022, 10 Feb. 1958, 1945/28, 162/3/5, NAA. The Defence Committee was established in 1929. Its main task was to coordinate defence planning and to advise government on defence policy matters. Its membership consisted of a number of departmental secretaries (Prime Minister's Department, Defence, External Affairs and Treasury), the three service chiefs and the chief of general staff.

49. Cabinet Decision 1170, 28 Feb. 1958, NAA, A4910, vol. 6. See also Supplementary Record of a Meeting between Macmillan and Australian Ministers, 11 Feb. 1958, A4910, vol. 6, NAA.

50. ‘Future of ANZAM, UK memorandum’, 9 Jan.1958, A4940, C1962 part 1, NAA.

51. Bunting to Menzies, 28 Jan. 1958; Bunting to Menzies, 30 Jan.1958, A1209/80, 1958/5040, NAA.

52. Bunting to Menzies, 28 Jan. 1958, A1209/80, 1958/5040, NAA; ‘United Kingdom Proposals on Future of ANZAM: Summary Statement of Views of the Defence Committee’, Jan. 1958, A4940, C1962 part 1, NAA.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Bunting to Menzies, 30 Jan. 1958, A1209/80, 1958/5040, NAA.

56. The Netherlands ruled over West New Guinea (Irian Jaya) until 1962. In 1963 it passed into Indonesian control.

57. Cabinet Submission 1183, 26 June 1961, A1838/269, TS899/1/4 part 2, NAA.

58. Ibid. On the question of Singapore, see also an earlier DEA paper, ‘The Future Status of Singapore’, 22 Jan. 1958, A1838/280, 3024/2/1 part 6, NAA.

59. Cabinet Submission 1183, 26 June 1961, A1838/269, TS899/1/4 part 2, NAA.

60. Pickering, Withdrawal, 117.

61. ‘“United Kingdom Study of Future Policy (1960–70)”: Observations by Department of External Affairs’, 12 Jan. 1961, A1209/142, 1961/544, NAA.

62. Goldsworthy, ‘The British Colonial Order, 1948–60’, 142.

63. McNicol to Tange, 30 Jan. 1960, A1838/280, 3004/12/11 part 1, NAA.

64. Ryan to Tange, memo 1051, 15 July 1961, A1838/277, 3004/12/11 part 2, NAA.

65. Harry to Tange, 12 March 1962, A1838/2, 67/1/3 part 2, NAA. For Canberra's earlier misgivings about Britain's attitude towards SEATO see ‘Discussions between Macmillan and Australian Ministers, 11 February 1958 - South and South East Asia - Brief for Australian Ministers’, 10 Feb. 1958, NAA, A1209/80, 1958/5040.

66. Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, 158.

67. FP(60)1, 24 Jan. 1961, Cabinet Office (henceforth CAB) 129/100, The National Archives, London (henceforth TNA). For the genesis of the ‘Study of Future Policy (1960–1970), see Pickering, Withdrawal, 108–14.

68. FP(60)1, 24 Jan. 1961, CAB 129/100, TNA.

69. Ibid.

70. ‘Brief Account of Discussion between the Four Prime Ministers’, undated, A1209/142, 1961/544, NAA.

71. ‘Notes on the Brook Paper’, undated, A1838/269, TS899/6/6/4, NAA.

72. ‘“United Kingdom Study of Future Policy (1960–70)”: Observations by Department of External Affairs’, 12 Jan. 1961, A1209/142, 1961/544, NAA.

73. Ibid.

74. Tange to Menzies, 13 Jan. 1961 and Harry to AHC London, 24 Jan. 1961, A1838/269, TS899/6/6/4, NAA.

75. Subritzky, ‘Britain, Konfrontasi, and the End of Empire in Southeast Asia, 1961–65’, 212.

76. Cable quoted in ibid.

77. In a recent study on Konfrontasi Matthew Jones has cast doubts on Macmillan's resolve to keep Britain engaged in the region. He has shown how the Laos crisis in 1961 pushed British policy-makers to review not only Britain's commitment to SEATO, but also its overall military presence in Southeast Asia. In September 1961 Macmillan produced a paper on future overseas policy calling for a ‘radical and imaginative’ review of Britain's commitments to the region. In October 1961 the Cabinet's committee on future policy was reconvened to discuss Macmillan's ideas. According to Jones, in accepting the plan for a Greater Malaysia, British ministers recognised the need for a gradual scaling back from the area. They agreed to consider Singapore as a ‘Class II’ base, where freedom of action might be inhibited by local sensibilities. Hence, retaining the Singapore base might not be practicable after the establishment of the new federation. In these circumstances, they wondered whether British and Commonwealth forces there should not be redeployed to a new base in Australia. See Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia 1961–1965, 24–28.

78. Letter to the author, 25 May 2002.

79. Bunting (Note for file), 14 May 1960, A1209/142, 1961/544, NAA.

80. ‘“United Kingdom Study of Future Policy (1960–70)”: Observations by Department of External Affairs’, 12 Jan. 1961, A1209/142, 1961/544, NAA.

81. Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, 159.

82. For the ‘Greater Malaysia’ plan, see Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 61–97.

83. Subritzky, ‘Britain, Konfrontasi’, 210.

84. In July 1961 rebels defected from the PAP (People's Action Party) and established the Barisan Sasialis, committed to Singapore's complete independence from Britain and the implementaion of a socialist constitution. Lee Kwon Yew, Prime minister of Singapore, was left with a majority of only one in the assembly (26 out of 51).

85. Jones, ‘A Decision Delayed’, 572.

86. Incidentally, Australian policy-makers were concerned that, were Singapore to become independent as a single entity, ‘it might gravitate towards China and provide an effective base for subversion, not only of Malaya but the whole of Southeast Asia’. See Lee and Dee, ‘Southeast Asian Conflicts’, 265.

87. Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 8–9.

88. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 290; Stockwell, ‘Malaysia’, 138–56.

89. Chin, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, 179; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 25–28.

90. Subritzky, ‘Britain, Konfrontasi’, 211.

91. For the differences between the Prime Minister's Department, traditionally more receptive to British views, and the DEA, under the tenure of Garfield Barwick as minister for external Affairs (Dec. 1961–April 1964), over the creation of a Greater Malaysia see Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, 145; Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 13–14; Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, 262. For a comprehensive documentary record of Australia's policy towards the creation of Malaysia see Dee, Australia and the Formation of Malaysia 1961–1966. For a concise but informative analysis of Australia's policy towards the creation of Malaysia, see Dee, ‘In Australia's Own Interests’.

92. Menzies to Oliver, 28 Aug. 1961, A6706/1, 61, NAA.

93. Menzies' concerns were justified. Since 1957 the Malayan government had been opposed to the use of British bases on its soil in support of SEATO operations in the region. This problem had hitherto been overcome by relocating CSR forces from Malaya to Singapore whence they could then be deployed in SEATO operations.

94. Macmillan to Menzies, 20 Oct. 1961, A6706/1, 61, NAA.

95. Bunting to Menzies, 1 Nov.1961, A6706/1, 61, NAA.

96. Macmillan to Menzies, 20 Oct. 1961, A6706/1, 61, NAA.

97. Bunting to Menzies, 1 Nov. 1961, A6706/1, 61, NAA.

98. In February 1963, at a quadripartite meeting in Washington between the representatives of the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Australia, the Australians voiced the concern that the British decision to establish Malaysia at all costs – that is, with or without Indonesian or Filipino concurrence – would certainly lead to Jakarta's (if not Manila's) long-term hostility towards the new state. Australia wanted to avoid being drawn into in a conflict with its closest Asian neighbour. See Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 50–51; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 136–37.

99. Subritzky, ‘Britain, Konfrontasi’, 209.

100. Macmillan quoted in Jones, ‘Decision Delayed’, 576.

101. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 290.

102. For the commitment of Australian troops to Konfrontasi, see Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, 340–44. British efforts to persuade the Australian (and New Zealand) government to commit troops to Malaysia had two aims. Not only would Australia's (and New Zealand's) involvement in the conflict help the British government share the burden of defending Malaysia, but it would also raise the possibility of an American intervention in support of Australia and New Zealand, should the latter two become involved in Malaysia. For a detailed account see Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 63, 79.

103. See Lee and Dee, ‘Southeast Asian Conflicts’, 270–77.

104. Ibid., 139. For a detailed account of the Wilson government's attempts to reduce the British military presence in Southeast Asia in 1965 and the resulting Australian response, see Pham, ‘The End to “East of Suez”’, chs 3–4; Benvenuti, ‘End of the Affair’, ch. 4.

105. DEA Policy Planning Study 1/63, ‘The Nature and the Extent of Current British Economic Interests and Military and Political Commitments in South and South-East Asia, Their Likely Course over the Next Ten Years and Implications for Australia’, 30 Aug. 1963, A1838/346, TS691/1 part 3, NAA.

106. Cabinet Submission 1183, 26 June.1961, A1838/269, TS899/1/4 part 2, NAA.

107. Ibid.

108. For American pressure, see Kennedy to Menzies, 2 Aug. 1962 quoted in Ward, Australia and the British Embrace, 203. See also Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, 293.

109. Ward, ‘A Matter of Preference’, 169–70.

110. Harry to Barwick, 17 Aug. 1962, A1838/275, 727/4/2 part 3, NAA

111. Ibid.

112. ‘Meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers: Britain's Common Market Negotiations. Paper by the Inter-Departmental Committee’, 29 Aug. 1962, A1838/275, 727/4/2 part 4A, NAA.

113. Memcon, Ball and Couve de Murville (Paris), 21 May 1962, doc. 39, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–63, vol. 13, West Europe and Canada (Washington, 1994). See also Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, ch. 10.

114. ‘Meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers: Britain's Common Market Negotiations. Paper by the Inter-Departmental Committee’, 29 Aug.1962, A1838/275, 727/4/2 part 4A, NAA.

115. DEA Policy Planning Study 1/63, ‘The Nature and the Extent of Current British Economic Interests and Military and Political Commitments in South and South-East Asia, Their Likely Course over the Next Ten Years and Implications for Australia’, 30 Aug.1963, A1838/346, TS691/1 part 3, NAA.

116. Ibid.