The new governance structure of French seaports: an initial post-evaluation

Abstract

France undertook a large port reform in 2008, which came into force in 2010–2011. It mostly applies a landlord port model to major French seaports, with the prediction that doing so will restore competiveness. This article presents the 2008 port reform, discusses why it was needed, notably with regard to the underperformance of container traffic, and details how new governing bodies are sharing their responsibilities amongst themselves. To this end, a textual analysis of the agenda items for the governing bodies created since 2011 of the largest French seaport, Port of Marseille, provides a means to compare the items discussed by the former management bodies. This analysis identifies a trend, in which the supervisory board focuses on global issues, the advisory board addresses local issues, and the board of directors considers internal issues. Even if ongoing, this transition creates favorable conditions to work more efficiently and may represent a step toward the better performance of French seaports.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the Grand Port Maritime de Marseille for providing access to the agendas of their governing bodies and thank reviewers for their relevant comments and suggestions. The authors also wish to acknowledge three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.

Notes

1. Similar estimates result when using French GDP instead of European GDP, because these two variables are highly correlated.

2. This council includes representatives from the state, local communities, and qualified members from French national railways (RFF) or inland navigation (VNF), for example.