ABSTRACT
This paper addresses issues of cruise home port competition based on the cruise supply chain. A pricing model of the cruise market is developed considering the competitive cooperation behaviors of the participants in the cruise supply chain. Furthermore, a model of cruise home port competition is developed to investigate the impacts of subsidy participants in the cruise supply chain on cruise home ports. The results indicate that subsidy policies change the market equilibrium, promote the upstream and downstream integration of cruise supply chain, and enhance cruise home port competitiveness. Subsidies to cruise line increase the payoffs of cruise supply chain and ports’ profit. Subsidies to travel agency decrease passenger costs and improve all ports’ profits. For the long-term development of cruise home port, the consequents can be used as policy suggestions.
Acknowledgments
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China: [Grant Numbers 71671021, 71431001], and Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities: [Grant Numbers 3132016302, 20110116104].
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.