Models for intra-port container terminal cooperation based on volume and vessel transfer

ABSTRACT

Cooperation in maritime transport is a research area that has attracted the interest of academics and practitioners. Most models published in the literature on marine container terminal cooperation focus on the planning level and consider TEUs handled at each terminal as the decision variable. At the tactical/operational level, the vessel provides a more realistic selection as the decision variable for cooperation. The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of the choice of both decision variables for terminal intra-port cooperation. To do so, we present two main mathematical models for marine container terminal intra-port cooperation: volume-based and vessel-based models. For each model, two different cooperation schemes and seven different concession fee policies among terminals are considered. Based on the individual terminals’ before and after cooperation profits, the models are used to quantitatively assess and compare the proposed cooperation schemes and concession fee policies as well as to estimate indicators of terminals’ willingness to cooperate under each model. Results from numerical experiments using simulated data for three terminals (with high, medium, and low utilization) indicate significant differences in profit sharing and willingness to cooperate under the proposed cooperation schemes and concession fee policies between the volume- and vessel-based models.

KEYWORDS:

• Port cooperation
• container terminals
• maritime
• port operations

Acknowledgments

This study formed part of Dr. Karlis Pujats dissertation studies for the degree of philosophiae doctor (PhD) at the University of Memphis, which has been further developed and revised after the completion of my dissertation. This research has been partially supported by the Freight Mobility Research Institute (FMRI) USDOT University Transportation Center Grant # A17-0171. This study has been also partially sponsored by the Department of Computer Information Systems and Quantitative Methods, McCoy College of Business Administration, Texas State University. Any findings and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of FMRI, USDOT, or other sponsors. This article is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled: Marine Container Terminal Cooperation: A Nash Bargaining Approach presented at the 97th Annual Meeting of the TRB. Washington, DC, 2018. The authors would also like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments that helped improve the paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).