Abstract
In certain industries contracts are awarded on the basis of price bids submitted by a set of competing organizations. This study reports on an application of existing bidding theory in determining optimal bidding policies in the civil and mechanical engineering sectors of the economy.
Résumé
Dans certaines industries les sociétés attribuent leurs contrats en tenant compte des devis soumis par un certain nombre d’autres sociétés concurrentes. Dans la présente étude nous analysons la mise en pratique d’une théorie courante des devis pour déterminer la politique des devis la plus rentable dans les secteurs civil et méchanique de l’économie.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Yash Gupta
YASH GUPTA is an Associate Professor and Head, in the Department of Actuarial and Management Sciences at tbe University of Manitoba. He obtained his B sc ENG from Punjab University, India, M TECH from Brunei Utiiversity, U.K., and PH D from University of Bradford, U.K. His research interests are in the areas of Bidding Theory, Reliability Modelling and Injformation Theory. He has published in IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Microelectronics and Reliability, Engineering Costs and Production Economics, and Reliability Engineering.