Britain and Norway: from War to Cold War, 1944–1951

Abstract

The article begins with an outline of how the Norwegian government in exile perceived its position towards its great power allies in the final year of the war: a feeling of uncertainty if not outright abandonment, as Britain and the United States failed to understand or share Norwegian concerns at being left alone to face a possible Soviet ‘liberation’ of northern Norway. After the end of the war Norway's interim solution to its security dilemma was to put its trust in the United Nations while seeking to develop practical military cooperation with the United Kingdom. Seeking to avoid provoking the Soviet Union, Norway tried to stall Molotov's claims for shared sovereignty over Svalbard before finally rejecting the proposals in February 1947. That combination of formal non-alignment and informal ties with the United Kingdom broke down under the pressure of events beginning with the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. Initial moves to seek reassurance of Western support, in parallel with ultimately unsuccessful attempts to construct a Swedish-inspired Nordic defence alliance, ended with Norway joining the Atlantic Pact in April 1949. The documentary evidence now at hand, in the volume just published, suggests that it took quite some time before the British government came to understand and share Norway's concerns. Initially swayed by the self-fulfilling prophecy of a Norwegian return to isolationism and pacifism, a realization of Norway's determination to stand and be counted against the Soviet challenge only gradually began to emerge through 1947. Yet Britain's own inability to offer substantial security assistance to the Scandinavian region meant that any reassurance of Western support had to await a political commitment from the United States.

Keywords:

• Norway
• Soviet Union
• Great Britain
• foreign policy
• Cold War
• United States
• Svalbard
• security

Notes

1 For a detailed study of Anglo-Norwegian wartime relations see Riste, ‘London-regjeringa’. For a brief survey in English, see Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations, especially ch. 8.

2 The Three Years’ Plan was presented in Stortingsmelding (White Paper) No. 32 (1945–1946). The quoted passage is my translation.

3 Leading article in the government-in-exile's newspaper Norsk Tidend, 15 July 1942, on ‘Vår kamp og Nordens fremtid’.

4 Holtsmark, A Soviet Grab for the High North?, 79–83.

5 For a brief survey in English, see Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations, ch. 9 and 10.

6 Letter from Sargent to General Hollis (Cabinet Office), 10 March 1944, FO 371/43248, N1586/1586/30 (No. 1).

7 Letter from Hankey to Group Captain Stapleton (Cabinet Office), 16 December 1946, FO 371/56287, N15346/220/G (No. 82).

8 Telegram from Bevin to Collier, 30 January 1946, FO 371/56293, N882/539/30 (No. 47).

9 Report by the Joint Planning Staff of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 4 June 1947, FO 371/65961, N6750/127/63G (No. 93).

10 Letter from Collier to Hankey, 27 December 1947, FO 371/71485, N34/34/20 (No. 105).

11 Minute from Hankey to Bateman, 13 January 1949, FO 371/77391, N390/1071/63G (No. 166).

12 Ibid.

13 Wahlbäck, ‘USA i Skandinavien’, 193.

14 I first outlined this long-term perspective on the Norwegian foreign policy tradition in Riste, ‘The Historical Determinants of Norwegian Foreign Policy’.