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Abstract
On the basis of the British diplomatic documents published in the Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO) volume, The Nordic Countries: From War to Cold War, 1944–1951, this article seeks to assess and discuss how and to what degree the documents reproduced in the DBPO volume may produce new insights into the Scandinavian alliance dilemmas of the early Cold War of choosing between a joint, but ‘neutral’ Scandinavian solution and Western alignment. The main argument is that the documents will not alter basic interpretations of why the Scandinavian option collapsed or about the driving forces behind the policy pursued by the Atlee government on the issue. However, the article also argues that the DBPO collection lends itself – in combination with the corresponding US documents published in the Foreign Relation of the United States series – to comparatively oriented research both in terms of assessing similarities and differences in the US and the UK approach to Scandinavian security and alliance involvement and to analysing the – differing and competing – attempts of Denmark, Norway and Sweden to obtain Western support for their individual approaches. Seen in a larger historical context, this picture seems to confirm a recurrent pattern of the post-1945 ‘grand designs’ in Nordic cooperation.
Notes
1 ‘The DBPO Mirror’ refers to the diplomatic source collection, Insall and Salmon, Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 1, vol. IX.
2 The importance of these transitions is also highlighted in the editors’ preface, ibid., ix–xi.
3 Finland, of course, has a different story due to its special relationship with the Soviet Union. Here it was rather the Soviet Union which took the position as primary (‘negative’) reference power.
4 FRUS, vol. III: Western Europe (1948) and vol. IV: Western Europe (1949).
5 On the need for more comparative Nordic research, see Olesen, ‘Under the National Paradigm’, 194 ff.
6 Lundestad, America, Scandinavia and the Cold War; Petersen, ‘Storbritannien, USA og skandinavisk forsvar’; and Petersen, ‘Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty’.
7 Telegram from Bevin to Inverchapel, 10 March 1948, PREM 8/788 (No. 123). A further reason for not inviting the countries of Scandinavia was, according to Bevin, that Scandinavia did not share ‘quite the same outlook’ on the problem of Atlantic security, meaning that it was far from certain that the Scandinavian countries themselves wanted to be invited. In the case of Denmark, this state of affairs had been clearly documented by Ambassador Randall in a letter to Bevin in early February 1948. Drawing on a conversation with Danish Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen, Randall made clear that the primary interest of Denmark was not military bloc-building in the West, but the Marshall Plan and the study of Northern Customs Union: see Mr. Randall (Copenhagen) to Mr. Bevin, 3 February 1948, FO 371/71367, N4688/61/15 (No. 113).
8 On the Soviet Pact proposal to Finland, see telegram from Scott to Bevin, 27 February 1948, FO 371/71405, N2258/83/56 (No. 115).
9 Telegram from Collier to Bevin, 8 March 1948, PREM 8/788 (No. 120) and telegram from Bevin to Inverchapel, 10 March 1948, PREM 8/788 (No. 123). See also telegram from Bay (US Ambassador in Norway) to the Secretary of State, 11 March 1948, aide-memoire from British Embassy, Washington, to the Department of State, 11 March 1948, telegram from Marvel (US Ambassador to Denmark) to the Secretary of State, 12 March 1948, all in FRUS, vol. III, 44–5, 46–8 and 51.
10 Memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, 7 February 1949, memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, 11 March 1949, verbatim report on a meeting between the Secretary of State and the Danish Foreign Minister, all in FRUS, vol. IV, 66–8, 193–4 and 210–13. See also record of conversation between Bevin and Lange, 14 February 1949, FO371/77398, N1656/1073/63G (No. 183).
11 Molin, Omstridd neutralitet; Sevón, Visionen om Europa; Silva, Keep Them Strong; Karl Molin argues convincingly that the Swedish SDU proposal must also be understood as an element in Swedish domestic politics as a means for the Social Democrats to ‘neutralize’ the mounting uneasiness in the bourgeois opposition and among high-ranking officers about the Swedish neutrality policy.
12 The DBPO collection has reproduced surprisingly little material documenting the initial British and American reactions to the Swedish proposal to Denmark and Norway from late April 1948 to examine the prospect of joint Nordic defence cooperation, but it is obvious from the volume that the idea was not welcome if such future cooperation would have to adopt a Swedish neutrality approach. But in the early phase during summer and early autumn the situation was still fluid enough for both the British and the Americans to hope that the Scandinavian discussions might work the other way round, that is to make Sweden less doctrinal on the neutrality issue and more open to cooperation with the West, see Telegram from Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Mr. Bevin, 24 September 1948 (FO 371/71716, N10363/9/42G (No. 147).
13 Minute from Bevin to Cripps, 14 February 1949, FO 800/500, SC/491 (No. 184). On the US tough line towards Sweden, see Silva, Keep Them Strong, 248–52.
14 Minutes by Bateman, Jebb and Sargent, 9 February 1949, FO 371/77398, N1473/1073/63G (No. 182). In an analysis by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on the military implications of a Scandinavian Pact in mid-December 1948 and subsequently endorsed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Greenland was the only one of a number of military aspects related to the forming of such a Pact that was considered ‘vital to US security’, see Grønland under den kolde krig, 94. In a conversation with Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, United States Senator Vandenberg even went so far as to claim that unless the US government was able to obtain bases in Greenland, it would have no interest in the Atlantic Pact. See record of the conversation between Bevin and Lange, 14 February 1949, FO 371/77398, N1656/1073/63G (No. 183).
15 In early February 1949, the British Chiefs of Staff were even inclined to believe that a Scandinavian Defence Union based on neutrality was a better military solution than one which did not mobilize the Swedish forces. See minutes by Bateman, Jebb and Sargent, 9 February 1949, FO 371/77398, N1473/1073/63G (No. 182). This view, however, was not shared by the Swedish Service Chiefs who favoured a Scandinavian union with some linkage to the West. See letter from Farquhar to Hankey, 13 January 1949, FO 371/77400, N552/1074/63G (No.167).
16 Memorandum by Hankey, 30 September 1948, FO 371/71454, N11084/637/63G (No. 148).
17 Record of a meeting chaired by Bateman, 22 October 1948, FO 371/71454, N1 1864/637/63G (No. 152). See also Petersen, ‘Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty’, 260–2.
18 Minute from Hankey to Bateman, 13 January 1949, FO 371/77391/, N390/1071/63G (No. 166).
19 Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Norway, 14 January 1949, FRUS, vol. IV, 27. Identical telegrams were also sent to the US embassies in Copenhagen and Stockholm. See also Olesen and Villaume, ‘I blokopbygningens tegn’, 108–11.
20 A clear example of the tougher British government approach to the Scandinavian neutrality alternative can be found in Bevin's conversation with the Swedish Ambassador in London in mid-January 1949, see telegram from Bevin to Farquhar, 16 January 1949, FO 371/77392, N547/1071/63 (No. 169). See also Petersen, ‘Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty’, 262–5.
21 The Finnish government had made it clear that it appreciated ‘with thanks’ that Sweden brought the Finnish issue into the defence union negotiations. Hankey also pointed to Finland as one of the arguments which could recommend a non-aligned Scandinavia solution. See despatch from Scott to Bevin, 15 December 1948, FO 371/71412, N1 3450/100/56 (No. 160) and minute from Hankey to Bateman, 13 January 1949, FO 371/77391/, N390/1071/63G (No. 166).
22 FRUS, vol. IV: Letter from Marvel (Ambassador in Denmark) to the Secretary of State, 26 January1949, 47.
23 Molin, Omstridd neutralitet, 28–30; Silva, Keep Them Strong, 248–52 and 284–5.
24 Olesen and Villaume, ‘I blokopbygningens tegn’, 118–25; Bjereld, Sveriges säkerhet og världens fred, 99–111. Both interpretations even speculate whether the Swedish offer to commit Sweden to a Scandinavian defence was completely sincere and – even if it were – whether the Swedish government would have been able to obtain the necessary domestic majority for the project.
25 A clear example of Norwegian suggestions designed to put Sweden under pressure is contained in the report of a conversation between Halvard Lange and Assistant Under Secretary of State Sir Gladwyn Jebb in November 1948, see minute from Hankey to Bateman, 30 November 1948, FO 371/71455, N1 2650/3001/63G (No. 158).
26 Telegram from Bevin to Farquhar, 16 January 1949, FO 371/77392, N547/1071/63 (No. 169).
27 Telegram from Collier to Bevin, 14 January 1949, FO 371/77391/63 (No. 168). Telegrams from Marvel (Ambassador in Denmark) to the Acting Secretary of State/Secretary of State, 10 January 1949 and 26 January 1949, both in FRUS, vol. IV, 17 and 47. See also Olesen and Villaume, ‘I blokopbygningens tegn’, 120.
28 Letter from Collier to Hankey, 18 March 1949, FO 371/77396/, N2886/1072/63 (No. 191).
29 Olstad, Einar Gerhardsen, 229–49.
30 Telegram from Collier to Bevin, 17 January 1949, and minute by Hankey, 20 January 1949, FO 371/77392, N551/1071/63G (No. 170). It was Marvel's telegram (27) to the Acting Secretary of State, 12 January 1949, in which Marvel supported the idea of equipping a neutral Scandinavian defence union with Western arms, which prompted Bay to deliver his ‘haywire’ diagnosis, see FRUS, vol. IV, 20–22.
31 A good example of the superficial analysis of the Danish position compared to that of Norway and Sweden is found in the minute from Hankey to Bateman, 22 December 1948, FO 371/71453, N13444/3001/63G (No. 162). In a letter from Collier to Hankey of 23 February 1949, FO 371/77398, N1985/63G (No. 185), the former characterized Hedtoft as suffering from ‘bewildered defeatism’. It should be stressed, however, that part of the problem related to the superficial Foreign Office treatment of the Danish position may be linked to the selection of documents in this DBPO collection. The number of documents related to the Danish position is clearly underrepresented compared to the Norwegian position – which is quite interesting compared to the FRUS collection where it is rather the other way around. In the latter case the reason may reflect the high US interest in Greenland.
32 Despatch from Randall to Bevin, 30 March 1949, FO 371/77396, N3157/1072/63 (No. 191).
33 Olesen and Villaume, ‘I blokopbygningens tegn’, 118–25.
34 See Olesen, ‘Kampen om eftermælet’.
35 For a recent analysis of the character and dynamics of Nordic cooperation, see Olesen, Den europæiske udfordring.
36 Minute from Rumbold to Northern Department, 1 December 1950, FO 371/87092, UR325/179 (No. 213).
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