Baltic liberation first-hand: Sweden’s pro-Baltic foreign policy shift and Swedish diplomatic reporting in 1989–1991

ABSTRACT

Sweden was one of the very few Western countries officially to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR in 1940 as lawful. While this naturally had a detrimental effect on the reputation of Sweden in Baltic liberation activist circles during the end stage of the Cold War, it also meant that Swedish diplomats did not have their hands tied to the same extent as those states that had not recognized the annexations. The first permanent Swedish ‘department office’ was already established in Tallinn in December 1989, and Swedish diplomats such as Lars Fredén and Dag Sebastian Ahlander could experience the rise of the Baltic liberation movement first-hand and at an early stage. This article focuses on Swedish diplomatic reporting from the emerging Baltic states and Russia in 1989–1991 as a source of the pro-Baltic policy shift in Swedish foreign policy, which challenged the dominant policy discourse in Sweden that prioritized appeasement of the USSR/Russia.

KEYWORDS:

• Sweden
• Baltic states
• Cold War
• diplomacy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The reports will be referred to using the following format: “UD <name of the author>, <date>”. They can be accessed online via the following link: https://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet.

2. Ahlander, Spelet om Baltikum; Fredén, Förvandlingar; Fredén, Återkomster.

3. Lundén and Nilsson, Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse; Nilsson and Lundén, 1989 med svenska ögon.

4. Regeringskansliet, Ett imperium imploderar, 7. All translations of quotes from Swedish to English are mine, except for those taken from secondary sources in English.

5. Ibid.

6. This was established by Wilhelm M. Carlgren, amongst others: Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum, 48.

7. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 406–407.

8. Ibid., 406–408.

9. See e.g. Eriksson, “Coping with a New Security Situation,” 62–63.

10. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 413–416.

11. About the non-recognition policy, see Himmer, “The Achievement of Independence in the Baltic States and Its Justifications,” 271–272.

12. About Swedish attitudes towards Baltic state continuity during the Cold War, see Hough, “The Annexation of the Baltic States,” 440–443.

13. See Arter, Scandinavian Politics Today, 368–381; Doeser, In Search of Security, 210–211. It should also be noted that at the same time as it was professing its non-alignment, Sweden engaged in secret military cooperation with NATO. See Holmström, Den dolda alliansen.

14. In the 1940s and 1950s, Swedish military intelligence also employed numerous Baltic refugees as its agents. See Ininbergs, Det svenska spionaget i Baltikum, 1943–1957.

15. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 417–418.

16. The quotations are from Palme’s speech in the Swedish parliament in 1983: Ahlmark, “Att tiga om Tingsten,” 13.

17. Küng, “Socialdemokraterna och Baltikum,” 117.

18. Doeser, In Search of Security, 218–219.

19. Mark Kramer points out that far from ‘letting go’ of Eastern Europe, the reforms were in many ways explicitly encouraged by Gorbachev, even if the process went further than intended: Kramer, “Realism, Ideology, and the End of the Cold War,” 123–130.

20. Doeser, In Search of Security, 216–217, 221.

21. Nilsson and Lundén, 1989 med svenska ögon, 17.

22. For a more developed discussion on the linkage between domestic political concerns and foreign policy, see Doeser, In Search of Security, 37–48.

23. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 418. About Bildt’s criticism of the Swedish foreign policy in spring 1990, see Bring, Neutralitetens uppgång och fall, 235, Doeser, “Sovjetunionens upplösning och utrikespolitisk förändring i Sverige,” 155; Küng, “Socialdemokraterna och Baltikum,” 118.

24. Arter, Scandinavian Politics Today, 408; Miles, “The Nordic Countries and the Fourth EU Enlargement,” 235.

25. Joenniemi, “Neutrality Beyond the Cold War,” 292–293.

26. Berner, Soviet Policies toward the Nordic Countries, 116–117.

27. About the changes in Swedish perception of the Soviet threat from 1989 onwards, see Doeser, “Sovjetunionens upplösning och utrikespolitisk förändring i Sverige.”

28. See Musiał, “Reconstructing Nordic Significance in Europe.”

29. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 401–402.

30. See Bergman, “Adjacent Internationalism,” 81–87.

31. About Swedish internationalism during the Cold War and its global focus, see e.g. Dahl, “Sweden: Once a Moral Superpower, Always a Moral Superpower?”; Doeser, In Search of Security, 211–212; Makko, “Sweden, Europe, and the Cold War.”

32. Nilsson and Lundén, 1989 med svenska ögon, 26.

33. Bergman, “Adjacent Internationalism,” 77–81.

34. Ibid., 73–74.

35. See also Musiał, “Reconstructing Nordic Significance in Europe,” 289–290.

36. A similar combination of realist and idealist explanations for the Swedish policy shift has been put forward by others, most notably Kent Zetterberg. See Zetterberg, “Sveriges stöd till Baltikum 1991–1995.”

37. Fredén, Förvandlingar, 221–222.

38. See Ibid., 9–23.

39. Spohr, Post Wall, Post Square, 391–392.

40. About the Baltic Way demonstration, see Eglitis and Ardava, “The Politics of Memory,” 1041–1043.

41. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 420.

42. Nilsson and Lundén, 1989 med svenska ögon, 23.

43. Ibid., 49.

44. See Åselius, “Revolutionen under kristallkronorna.”

45. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 420.

46. Ahlander, Spelet om Baltikum, 11–15, 25–26.

47. Fredén, Förvandlingar, 10–16, 40–45, 91–98.

48. UD, Fredén, Svensk Baltikumpolitik, 12.02.1991.

49. UD, Ahlander, Baltikum – inför Gorbatjovs besök, 22.05.1991.

50. See e.g. Jönsson, “Global Governance, Challenges to Diplomatic Communication, Representation and Recognition,” 33.

51. See e.g. Cornut, “To Be a Diplomat Abroad,” 388.

52. Fredén, Förvandlingar, 47–48.

53. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 421.

54. UD, Ahlander, Läget i Baltikum i december 1989, 05.12.1989.

55. See note 48 above.

56. Jönsson, “Global Governance, Challenges to Diplomatic Communication, Representation and Recognition,” 32. For a broader discussion and more examples of covert activities conducted alongside or under the guise of diplomacy, see e.g. Scott, “Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy”; Dylan, “Secret Interventions and Clandestine Diplomacy.”

57. Nilsson and Lundén, 1989 med svenska ögon, 52.

58. UD, Starråker, Utvecklingen i Sovjetunionen/Östra Centraleuropa och dess säkerhetspolitiska konsekvenser, 20.09.1990.

59. UD, Magnusson, Europa – från splittring till enhet, 25.01.1990.

60. UD, Fredén, Litauen och Lettland, 01.23.1990.

61. UD, Olsson, Baltikum 1990: fortsatt frigörelse mot självständighet eller bakslag?, 10.02.1990.

62. Ibid.

63. See note 58 above.

64. UD, Fredén, Litauen, vissa PM om 22.03.1990; Olsson, Litauen, 02.04.1990.

65. UD, Berner, Sovjet och Europa – januari 1991, 01.07.1991. The fears that a Soviet civil war might break out in 1990–1991 were in 2009 recalled by Berner: Nilsson and Lundén, 1989 med svenska ögon, 19.

66. UD, Ahlander, Krisen i Baltikum – och Sovjetunionen, 21.01.1991.

67. Fredén, Förvandlingar, 51–57.

68. Küng, “Socialdemokraterna och Baltikum,” 118.

69. UD, Olsson, Litauen, 03.04.1990.

70. See note 48 above.

71. Fredén, Förvandlingar, 260–262.

72. UD, Ahlander, Läget i Baltikum i december, 1989 05.12.1989.

73. UD, Ahlander, Glimtar från det ryska återuppvaknandet, 28.02.1990.

74. UD, Berner, Sovjet och Europa – januari 1991, 07.01.1991.

75. UD, Berner, Den nya ryska revolutionen 19–25 augusti 1991, 26.08.1991.

76. UD, Berner, Sovjetunionen – det politiska läget försommaren 1990, 19.06.1990.

77. UD, Lyrvall, Myten om frivillig anslutning, 09.03.1990.

78. Fredén, Förvandlingar, 46–47.

79. UD, Ahlander, Läget i Baltikum i december 1989, 05.12.1989; Ahlander/Fredén, Lettland inför valen den 18 mars, 09.03.1990.

80. See Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum, 44–45.

81. UD, Ahlander/Fredén, Lettland inför valen den 18 mars, 09.03.1990.

82. UD, Fredén, Sverige, Baltikum och historien, 09.04.1990.

83. UD, Ahlander, Hur skall vi nu förhålla oss till Litauen – och övriga Baltikum?, 20.04.1990.

84. UD, Ahlander, Samtal med folkfrontsledaren Edgar Savisaar, 26.04.1990.

85. UD, Ahlander, Samtal med Estlands nye utrikesminister, 27.04.1990.

86. From a conference presentation in 1995 referred to in Bring, Neutralitetens uppgång och fall, 248.

87. About this designation evoked by Pierre Schori, see Dahl, “Sweden: Once a Moral Superpower, Always a Moral Superpower?” 896–897.

88. Nilsson and Lundén, 1989 med svenska ögon, 64.

89. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 422 Lundén and Nilsson, Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse, 61.

90. Wahlbäck, Baltisk befrielse, 19.

91. UD, Ahlander, Litauens självständighetsförklaring m. m., 15.03.1990.

92. Nilsson and Lundén, 1989 med svenska ögon, 36.

93. Doeser, In Search of Security, 224–225.

94. See Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, 198–199, 244–255.

95. See in particular UD, Ahlander, Krisen i Baltikum – och Sovjetunionen, 21.01.1991.

96. Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 424.

97. Bergmane, “Is This the End of Perestroika?,” 43.

98. Ibid., 44.

99. Doeser, In Search of Security, 228.

100. UD, Olsson, Baltikum 06.02.1991.

101. UD, Andersson, Brev till Sjevardnadze 11.01.1991.

102. Doeser, In Search of Security, 228–229.

103. Fredén, Förvandlingar, 184–185.

104. See note 49 above.

105. Ahlander, Spelet om Baltikum, 239–242.

106. Doeser, In Search of Security, 230.

107. Ibid., 243–244; Kuldkepp, “Swedish Political Attitudes,” 423.

108. See Dunlop, “The August 1991 Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics,” 116.

109. UD, Berner, Statskuppen, 20.08.1991.

110. See note 75 above.

111. Fredén, Förvandlingar, 222.

112. See note 75 above.

113. See note 37 above.

114. Ibid., 222–223.

115. UD, Berner, Utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiska aspekter på utvecklingen i Sovjetunionen efter den misslyckade statskuppen, 06.09.1991.

116. Lundén and Nilsson, Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse, 37–39.

117. UD, Wahlbäck, De baltiska staternas självständighet från svensk säkerhetspolitisk synpunkt, 16.09.1991.

118. Ibid.

119. Fredén, Återkomster, 36, 9–11.

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Notes on contributors

Mart Kuldkepp

Mart Kuldkepp (b. 1983) is Associate Professor of Scandinavian History and Politics at University College London (UCL). His research mainly concerns Baltic and Nordic political history in the 20^th century, especially Baltic-Nordic political and diplomatic contacts.