![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
Abstract
Recent advances in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience open up new vistas for human enhancement. Central to much of this work is the idea of new human-machine interfaces (in general) and new brain-machine interfaces (in particular). But despite the increasing prominence of such ideas, the very idea of such an interface remains surprisingly under-explored. In particular, the notion of human enhancement suggests an image of the embodied and reasoning agent as literally extended or augmented, rather than the more conservative image of a standard (non-enhanced) agent using a tool via some new interface. In this essay, I explore this difference, and attempt to lay out some of the conditions under which the more radical reading (positing brand new integrated agents or systemic wholes) becomes justified. I adduce some empirical evidence suggesting that the radical result is well within our scientific reach. The main reason why this is so has less to do with the advancement of our science (though that certainly helps) than with our native biological plasticity. We humans, I shall try to show, are biologically disposed towards literal (and repeated) episodes of sensory re-calibration, of bodily re-configuration and of mental extension. Such potential for literal and repeated re-configuration is the mark of what I shall call “profoundly embodied agency,” contrasting it with a variety of weaker (less philosophically and scientifically interesting) understandings of the nature and importance of embodiment for minds and persons. The article ends by relating the image of profound embodiment to some questions (and fears) concerning converging technologies for improving human performance.
This article is respectfully dedicated to the memory of Francisco Varela. Thanks to all the participants at the Tribute to Francisco Varela held at the Sorbonne, Paris, in June 2004 for useful comments and criticisms.
Notes
1. CitationSterling (2004, p. 116).
2. This is by no means an isolated case. Susan CitationHurley (1998) argues convincingly that perception typically involves whole cycles of input-output behavior in which sensing and acting dynamically combine to yield ongoing adaptive fit between whole organisms and the world. This perspective also fits well with recent work in so-called interactive vision (see CitationBallard, 1991; CitationBallard et al., 1997). The theme of active engagement is similarly visible in a variety of recent treatments that stress the importance of motor activity to perception (see e.g. CitationO'Regan & Noe, 2001; CitationChurchland, Ramachandran, & Sejnowski, 1994; CitationClark, 1999; CitationNoe, 2004).
3. In fact, it is rather doubtful that these kinds of Gibsonian invariant detection involve truly high-bandwidth coupling at all. But (given the extreme difficulty of finding a non-controversial measure of objective bandwidth) I am willing to grant this for the sake of argument. My point will be that such high-bandwidth coupling, even if present, does not undermine the idea of interfaces located at just those points.
4. A typical description reads: “Computational Grids enable the sharing, selection, and aggregation of a wide variety of geographically distributed computational resources (such as supercomputers, compute clusters, storage systems, data sources, instruments, people) and presents them as a single, unified resource for solving large-scale compute and data intensive computing applications” (Quote taken from the GRID computing information center at: http://www.gridcomputing.com/, last accessed September 2006).
5. See CitationBach-y-Rita & Kercel (2003); CitationClark (2003); CitationMussa-Ivaldi & Miller (2003).
6. See http://www.stelarc.va.com.au and full discussion in CitationClark, 2003, Ch. 5.
7. CitationGallagher (1998) expresses the difference like this: “Body schema can be defined as a system of preconscious, subpersonal processes that play a dynamic role in governing posture and movement … There is an important and often overlooked conceptual difference between the subpersonal body schema and what is usually called body image. The latter is most often defined as a conscious idea or mental representation that one has of one's own body.”
8. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this issue.
9. But see CitationSimons et al. (2002) for some important provisos.
10. For some more detailed explorations of this idea, see CitationO'Regan & Noe (2001); CitationClark (2002).
11. For a lovely example of this, see Gray & Fu (in press).
12. See, among many others, CitationVarela, Thompson, & Rosch (1991); CitationClark (1997); and CitationO'Regan & Noe (2001).
13. For some important explorations of these themes, see Heidegger (1927); CitationMerleau-Ponty (1945/1962); CitationVarela, Thompson, & Rosch (1991); Citationand O'Regan & Noe (2001).
Clark, A. (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(5/6), 2002. Reprinted in A. Noe (ed.). (2000). Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic.
González, J., & Bach-y-Rita, P. (ms). Perceptual adaptive recalibration: Tactile sensory substitution in blind subjects.