On alleviating the debilitating effects of accountability on bargaining: Authority and self‐monitoring

Abstract

Prior research indicates that when a bargaining representative is held accountable by a constituency, tough, distributive bargaining is often the result and deadlocks become more probable. This study focuses upon two variables that have been hypothesized to mitigate against such debilitating effects: authority to reach agreements and self‐monitoring. The results confirmed the debilitating effects of accountability. Bargainers held accountable made more extreme initial offers, thought they were perceived to be less cooperative, took more time to negotiate, were more likely to deadlock, and were less satisfied with the outcomes than bargainers not held accountable. Authority interacted with accountability to influence straying from the group's aspiration level on initial and final offers. When accountable, bargainers with authority initially strayed further from the group's position but deviated less on their final offer than bargainers without authority. Delegated authority significantly reduced the number of deadlocks experienced by accountable bargainers but the level of deadlocks remained greater than when accountability was absent. Correlations involving self‐monitoring usually were significant only within the accountability conditions and indicated that high self‐monitors initially strayed less from the group's position but deviated more on their final offer than low self‐monitors.

Notes

Michael E. Roloff is Associate Professor of Communication Studies, Northwestern University, and Douglas E. Campion is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Communication Studies, Northwestern University. Portions of this article are based on the MA thesis of the second author completed under the direction of the first author. This paper was accepted for publication by the previous editor, Gerald R. Miller.