On the post-structuralist critique of development: a view from north-west Namibia

Abstract

The Namibian government's long-standing plan to dam the Kunene River has generated heated discussion on a number of development issues, both within and outside the country. This article examines the discourses of the various groupings in the so-called Epupa debate by paying special attention to the ways they represent ‘development’, the project and the affected community; and it explores aspects of agency by focusing on Himba people's attempts to assert opposition to the project. The Epupa case also affords us the opportunity to evaluate aspects of the post-structuralist critique of development. The article suggests that the currently fashionable critique offers a simplistic interpretation of the development process and reveals the need for a more thorough (and insightful) scholarly engagement with development.

¹Assistant Professor of Socio-cultural Anthropology, Department of Social Science, Roosevelt Academy, Utrecht University. Based on research carried out in Windhoek, Namibia, in 1999, this paper is a revised version of a dissertation submitted to the University of Cambridge in partial fulfilment of the MPhil degree in Social Anthropology (Friedman, 1999). The author would like to thank Leo Howe, Keith Hart, Alan Macfarlane, Fatima Müller-Friedman and two anonymous reviewers for their encouragement and/or critical readings of earlier drafts; and the English Speaking Union of San Francisco, Darwin College, Sir Bartle Frere's Memorial Fund, and the Rivers Video Project for generous financial assistance that made the research possible.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Namibian government's plan to construct a 360-megawatt power station on the Kunene River has sparked a heated debate, both within and outside Namibia. Since 1992, the proposed Lower Kunene Hydropower Scheme (Epupa) project has been contested by a number of interest groups. At the heart of the public debate stands the fate of the Himba people, a group of semi-nomadic pastoralists who live on both sides of the river in the remote north-western portion of Namibia and southern Angola. As one of several Otjiherero-speaking peoples of southern Africa, the Himba group numbers approximately 12 000 (Crandall, 1996, NamAng, 1997), most of whom live on the Namibian side of the Kunene River, in an area known locally as Kaokoland. ²

If a dam is constructed, a number of Himba people residing in the project area will be forced from their land to make way for ‘development’. They will witness the inundation of their pastures, gardens, wild food sources and culturally significant ancestral gravesites. For these reasons, some people argue that the completion of the project will mark the end of the Himba pastoral lifestyle, and thereby completely destroy the Himba culture. Others, however, contend that the project will bring ‘development’ to a people who have long been neglected and who continue to remain marginalised from modern society. To them, the Epupa project marks a beginning for the Himba people, as it will thrust them into the midst of the new Namibian state. Finally, some pro-dam supporters believe that the construction of a dam on the Kunene is first and foremost an issue of national interest. They argue that Namibia is overly dependent on South Africa, and that ‘development’ requires a self-sufficient source of energy and electricity. Those adopting this last perspective argue that national interests should prevail over the interests of a relatively few Himba people.

Over the past 50 years, the construction of large dams such as the Epupa project has come to epitomise the process of development and modernisation. ‘Perhaps more than any other technology, massive dams symbolise the progress of humanity from a life ruled by nature and superstition to one where nature is ruled by science, and superstition vanquished by rationality’ (McCully, 1996: 237). The power of dams, both physically and symbolically, captures the imaginations of planners, nation builders and ordinary citizens. For the post-structuralist critics of development, dams could also serve as a powerful symbol, as a most appropriate signifier for the development problematic.

The post-structuralist critique of development was inspired by the work of Michel Foucault (1965, 1970, 1977, 1980). He argued that knowledge, though represented as objective and politically neutral, is imbued with power. Knowledge, therefore, constructs its subject in a distinctive way, while all the time exerting control and authority over it. The disciplines that arise out of this knowledge, then, help shape the reality of the object they intend to study.

Arturo Escobar (1984) was the first to apply Foucault's insights about power and knowledge in Western societies to the concept and practice of development in the ‘Third World’. This post-structuralist critique views development as ‘an apparatus that links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies’ (Escobar, 1995b: 213). The critique emphasises the way a hegemonic development discourse defines and creates non-Western peoples as ‘underdeveloped’. ³ In the view of post-structuralist critics, development discourse expands and perpetuates global poverty while at the same time excluding the possibility of imagining any alternative to the hegemonic development framework. The paradigm thus relies on discourse analysis as a way to deconstruct the language, thinking and practices of development. Deconstruction reveals the ways Western countries ‘manage and control, and, in many ways, even create the Third World politically, economically, sociologically and culturally’ (Escobar, 1984: 384). In addition, discourse analysis is supposed to create the space to imagine alternatives to development.

Today, the post-structuralist critique remains the dominant methodological paradigm for those attempting to usher in an ‘era of post-development’ (Escobar, 1995b). The critique is best exemplified in the works of James Ferguson (1990) and Escobar (1995a). Ferguson (1990) argued that in Lesotho development institutions generate their own form of discourse that constructs the country as a particular kind of object of knowledge. In this case, the World Bank constructs the country as a most promising candidate for the only type of intervention development agencies are capable of delivering: a development that is apolitical and technical in nature. Escobar (1995a) takes a similar approach by focusing on ‘regimes of representation’. He traces the establishment of the development apparatus and its discourse, and then analyses the way it functions through specific case studies in Colombia. A number of other scholars have also adopted the post-structuralist approach in their attempts to unravel the development problematic. For example, Cowen & Shenton (1996) undertakes an archaeology of development, while Sachs' (1992) dictionary attempts to excavate the origins and meanings of key development concepts. In a volume compiled by Crush (1995), the contributors focus on the way development is written, spoken and narrated in order to reveal the logic, coherence and effects of the discourse.

The post-structuralist critique has proven valuable for having increased awareness about the strength of development discourse. The analysis generates understanding about the way language shapes and limits our perceptions of the ‘Third World’, and it forces us to address the important relationships between power and knowledge, and poverty and politics. However, the post-structuralist critique of development maintains certain questionable assumptions regarding agency and the power of discourse in the development process.

This article details the debate surrounding Namibia's planned Epupa project as a way to reflect critically on the post-structuralist critique of development. The article has three main concerns. First, it analyses various representations in the Epupa debate – representations of development, the project and the Himba people themselves. Secondly, it explores aspects of Himba agency in the development process. Finally, it reflects on the Epupa case in order to evaluate aspects of the post-structuralist critique of development. How do the assumptions inherent in the post-structuralist critique stand up to this particular case of Namibian development?

2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EPUPA DEVELOPMENT

Following Namibia's independence in 1990, the governments of Angola and Namibia adopted a master plan as the guideline for development of the Kunene River. The two countries established a joint commission (the PJTC) before launching an initiative to further study the potential for a hydropower project in the Epupa Falls area. In 1992, the PJTC appointed a group of regional and international consultants (NamAng) to research development options. The ensuing studies, costing more than $US7 million and lasting nearly six years, were funded jointly by the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad) and the Swedish International Development Authority (Sida).

Even before the feasibility study began, the Epupa debate had swelled into a local, national and international controversy. In 1992, the first series of meetings between government officials and those living in the Epupa area led to misunderstandings and fostered mistrust (Bollig, 1997a). Strong Himba opposition to the project dates from these early meetings. For the next two years, the affected community remained outside the ensuing debate. During the first two public meetings held in Windhoek, for example, Kaokoland was represented only by individuals and groups who supported the construction of the dam. Himba representatives were neither invited nor informed of the events. Also at this early stage, Namibian and international environmental and indigenous rights organisations became alarmed at the potential impact of the project. The international press began carrying the story, while various public interest groups initiated anti-Epupa dam campaigns in Namibia, Europe and North America.

In early 1997, just over a year after the feasibility study had begun, the social impact and mitigation assessments had to be suspended when the then Deputy Minister of Mines and Energy declared publicly that the government was ‘looking at which site to build a dam, and not whether or not we will build a dam’ (Cunene Film Project, 1997). The statement gave a strong impression that the decision to build the dam had already been taken by the government, regardless of the outcome of the feasibility study. As a result, members of the Himba communities who were to be most affected by the project, feeling that their input was irrelevant, withheld their further participation from the study (Legal Assistance Centre, 1998).

The draft final feasibility report on the Lower Kunene Hydropower Scheme was released as ‘incomplete’ in late 1997. During the ensuing year, a number of public hearings were held in order to discuss the contents of the draft report. Again, the Himba communities residing closest to the proposed project refused to discuss the report or mitigation measures (Multidisciplinary Research Centre, 1998). Unable to overcome the breakdown in communication, the feasibility study team submitted its final report to the Namibian government at the end of 1998 without a social mitigation plan. In its introduction, the report conceded that ‘there has not been sufficient dissemination of information concerning the scheme, or local community consultation, participation and involvement in the details of site selection and development of an acceptable social mitigation programme’ (quoted in Menges, 1998). Despite the incompleteness of the findings, the Namibian and Angolan governments were left with the choice of two proposed sites, as well as the obligation to develop a social mitigation package for those who would be affected adversely by the project. ⁴

3. CHARTING THE EPUPA DEBATE

The Epupa project is a highly contested one indeed. Here are found multiple sets of actors, each possessing distinct interests and filling the debate with multiple representations of both the project and those who will be most affected by it. By viewing sets of actors in the debate as a ‘network of nodes’ (Escobar, 1995a), we are better able to accommodate a flexibility of interaction that flows through and between layers, and in multiple directions rather than unilinearly. We are offered the opportunity to recognise contested domains and the multi-vocality of development discourse. The following sections therefore examine five ‘nodes’ which share and contest the ‘socioepistemological space’ (Escobar, 1995a) in the debate over Namibia's proposed Lower Kunene Hydropower Scheme.

3.1 The Namibian government perspective

For the Namibian government, the Epupa project is connected intricately with modernisation and national development goals. Both the government and Nampower, Namibia's parastatal energy firm, are the main supporters of the scheme. Viewing energy as ‘the engine of all development’, they argue that Namibia requires increased capacity to support the country's drive toward industrialisation (Mwilima, 1996a). Leake Hangala, the managing director of Nampower, contended that Namibia will require a strong energy base if it is to develop and attract foreign investors. His predecessor, Polla Brand, stated the position more emphatically: ‘Without an independent energy supply, investment will suffer and established industries will be forced to close’ (quoted in Burling, 1992). Likewise, such supporters believe that the project will help alleviate the country's high level of unemployment. The government thus frames the Epupa debate around national interests, for ‘the wider development needs of the country justify the construction of the Epupa hydro-electric power station’ (Mwilima, 1996b).

The government's discourse not only emphasises the relationship between energy and development but also incorporates the notion of self-sufficiency and national sovereignty. Currently, Namibia imports approximately fifty per cent of its energy from South Africa, though it aims to become self-sufficient in energy production by the year 2010 (Republic of Namibia, 1995: 290–1). In the government's discourse, this drive toward self-sufficiency is linked closely to Namibia's nation-building process. Continued dependence on South African energy supplies is viewed as a national threat, for it will ‘jeopardise our development strategies and planning’ (Nyamu, in Cunene Film Project, 1997).

The most contentious aspect of the Epupa project concerns the fate of the Himba communities whose livelihood and culture will be most affected if the hydropower scheme is completed. In order to participate in the debate, all coalitions are forced to address the social impacts of the project and, in doing so, they must inevitably represent the Himba people. The Namibian government constructs the Himba people as conservative, traditional and undeveloped. According to the former Mines and Energy Minister, ‘the culture we are talking about is that of backwardness, of primitiveness’ (quoted in Nicoll, 1997), while the former Prime Minister Hage Geingob referred to the Himba group as ‘primitive people with their bare breasts’ (quoted in Van Niekerk, 1995). From a government perspective, it is ‘tradition’ and an inherent resistance to change that constitutes the root cause of underdevelopment. The Himba people are depicted as a people who have protected themselves from the influences of modernity. Writing in the government-owned newspaper, New Era, one journalist argued ‘The Himba people's immunity to cultural change shrugs off even simple temptations … Indeed, like the rich who have built fortresses around their material wealth, they, too, have erected one around their culture’ (Nkuruh, 1991).

Moreover, Himba people are perceived as obstacles to development, for their ‘strong ties with tradition and culture challenge change and retard development’. Such tradition proves threatening, for it is ‘becoming a hurdle to the development of the planned Epupa hydroelectric dam’ (Mwilima, 1996a). At the same time, the community is treated as helpless, the people unable to extricate themselves from their so-called primitive state. As the former managing director of Nampower explained: ‘The Himbas don't want to stay like baboons. They also want televisions and lights in their homes’ (Brand, quoted in Van Niekerk, 1995). Advocating the need for change, former President Sam Nujoma has urged the Himba people to ‘upgrade’ themselves by assimilating into the Namibian mainstream (Van Niekerk, 1995). In these ways, the government has treated the Epupa project as not only a source of energy but also a way to bring ‘Namibia’ to the Kaoko area in general. However, some dam opponents, especially those in the opposition parties, find ulterior motives in the government's position. National Counsellor Edward Mumbuu, for example, claims that the project is not about bringing ‘a developed Namibia’ to Kaoko, but rather about colonising Kaokoland with South West Africa People's Organisation (Swapo) party supporters. The region is currently an opposition party stronghold, although that could be reversed if thousands of Swapo-supporting workers immigrate to the area during the project's construction phase (Windhoek, personal communication, 1 July 1999).

Finally, the government, in its attempt to subvert ethnic identities in favour of a unifying national one, represents and advocates on behalf of all Namibians: ‘The OvaHimba people are an integral part of the whole Namibian society and cannot be treated differently from the rest of their compatriots. They have a right to development’ (New Era, 1994).

Or, as one concerned citizen stated less discreetly, ‘Namibians cannot be proud of “civilisation” and democracy while they leave behind a section of their people moving around half-naked and living in filth’ (Hilundwa, 1996).

3.2 Pro-dam representations from the Kunene region

A second pro-dam coalition is comprised of people based in the town of Opuwo (located 175 km south of the Epupa site) and southern Kaokoland. This group of local supporters includes shopkeepers and merchants, regional government officials and politicians, tour operators, urban youth, and many of the area's unemployed (including some who classify themselves as ‘Himba’). The discourse emanating from Epupa supporters in the region emphasises the area's historical neglect by both the former colonial regime and the present Namibian government. At this level, the focus shifts from energy production and nation building to regional unity and local development. The Epupa project is viewed as offering the potential for job creation, improved infrastructure and expanded service provision (The Namibian, 1996).

This node in the Epupa debate is perhaps best epitomised by the Kaoko Development League, a regionally based organisation that incorporates men and women from several political parties and ethnically defined groups. The Kaoko Development League aims to unify people within Kaokoland as a mechanism for promoting ‘development’ in the region (Miescher, 1997). The organisation's support for the Epupa scheme is linked to a series of demands which include preferential employment for local residents, improved rural and urban water supply, the implementation of large-scale rural irrigation projects and the construction of tarred roads, electricity networks, schools, health clinics and a bank. Additionally, the group has urged the government to invest twenty per cent of future electricity profits back into the region via development initiatives (Miescher, 1997).

In attempting to foster a regional identity, rather than an ethnic one, the organisation refocuses the Epupa debate away from the Himba people (i.e. the most affected community) in favour of Kaoko residents as a whole. In this way, the Epupa debate has generated a separate political controversy at the regional level. Who has the right to represent the area? The Himba communities living near the Kunene River dispute the legitimacy of those offering a regional, pro-dam perspective. A statement issued by the affected community highlights the contention, as ‘the discussion about Epupa has actually been stolen from the people who live in the area’. They argue that ‘[i]n any country, matters should be decided by the people who are the legitimate occupants of the place’ (International Rivers Network, 1996a).

Regional political dynamics also contribute to the pro-dam coalition's representation of the Himba people. The Namibian government's strong language regarding Himba ‘backwardness’ and ‘primitiveness’ is tamed at the regional level by a more inclusive rhetoric. Speaking on behalf of the coalition at a Windhoek public hearing, Uaundjisa Muharukua urged that the Himba people not be treated as the protectors of tradition, but rather as equal partners in development (Mwilima, 1996c). Angelice Muharukua (1996), claiming to be the ‘first ever Himba parliamentarian in human history’, adopted a similar position:

Some say the construction of Epupa will destroy the culture of the Himbas. I am a Himba myself and would like Himbas developed … Why should the Himba remain the sign of underdevelopment? Why should they be kept custodians of a culture that everyone else has moved away from? They need development and the Epupa project will just do that. (Quoted in The Namibian, 1995)

In contrast to the national government's discourse that links Himba opposition to inherent conservatism, most of the statements emanating from regional dam supporters suggest that opposition to the project results from either a lack of information about the potential benefits of the dam, or from the machinations of outside interest groups who manipulate and bribe local leaders to oppose the scheme (see Hopwood, 1996; Muharukua, 1996; Mwilima, 1996c). Though ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’ are not to blame, the coalition still represents Himba people as incapable of generating their own opinions on the project. Any expressed opposition to the dam is attributed to external factors, rather than to an autonomously formulated and defensible position.

3.3 On the ‘anti-politics’ of the international donors

Another source of representation, albeit a very silent one, emanates from the international donor agencies that were involved in the Epupa project as funders of the feasibility study. Both Sida and Norad publicly state that their position on the hydropower scheme is neutral. Sida, for example, claims to have financed the study to help facilitate an informed decision. In justifying Sweden's involvement, the agency refers to its main global development objective – the eradication of poverty. ⁵ A statement by the Swedish ambassador to Namibia related support for the hydropower scheme to Sida's interest in promoting ‘sustainable production’ for economic growth, environment-friendly natural resource management, and democratic participatory development (Sveriges Ambassad, Windhoek, 1998). In evaluating the outcome of the study, though, Sida's position appears ambiguous. For example, the agency says that ‘According to the Rio Declaration, DAC, the OECD's development mission and Sida's own policy, natives are consulted and participate in decision making concerning dam constructions. This policy is deemed to have been followed [with respect to the Epupa study]’ (Sveriges Ambassad, Windhoek, n.d.).

However, the next sentence of the memorandum notes that ‘the Himbas have not participated in the research, but that a process has been conducted including hearings and discussions of the report’ (Sveriges Ambassad, Windhoek, n.d.).

In a similar fashion to what Ferguson (1990) observed when analysing World Bank projects in Lesotho, Sida has distanced itself from the highly politicised debate surrounding the Epupa project. They view themselves as providing only financial support and technical expertise in an evaluation of the proposed scheme, and refuse to question its potential impacts and the implications of their involvement. The agency does, however, acknowledge the controversial nature of the project:

[w]hether the criticism is right or wrong is more a question of values and norms than different opinion due to misunderstandings and lack of ‘technical’ information on the different aspects. It is thus fair to say that the bits and pieces to take an informed decision now are at hand for the two governments. It is a difficult decision that have [sic] to weight different interests (Sveriges Ambassad, Windhoek, 1998).

Interviews conducted with two Sida representatives in Windhoek met with similar responses. ⁶ When asked about the project, neither officer wished to stray from Sida's ‘official’ position. They viewed the agency's involvement in the feasibility study as a straightforward response to a request by the Namibian government. According to them, the Swedish government had fulfilled its obligation under the terms of the agreement, an obligation that was never intended to support the project beyond the feasibility study phase.

Though the two donor offices in Namibia have tried to stand aside from the Epupa debate by denying the problematic nature of their involvement, scepticism has been expressed by the very same agencies in Scandinavia. There, the donors have come under increasing attack by local interest groups that oppose the project on environmental and ethical grounds. The Director-General of Norad, Per Grimstad, eventually announced his opposition to Epupa by suggesting that the consequences were too great. He also questioned whether or not Namibia needed such expanded energy production. Similarly, reports from Sweden indicate an uneasiness about the project within Sida. Apparently, officials voiced concern that the process was moving too quickly and also had reservations about the project's social and environmental impacts (see Maletsky, 1995). It becomes apparent that the two donor agencies represent the project differently depending on whether they are addressing a Namibian or Scandinavian audience.

3.4 The environmental and indigenous rights discourse

A set of Namibian and international environmental and indigenous rights organisations constitute a fourth node of representation in the Epupa debate. Arguing that the dam will lead to environmental degradation and undermine the Himba people's right to social and cultural self-determination, the groups vehemently oppose the hydropower scheme. The International Rivers Network (USA) and Survival International (UK), for example, use the internet and the foreign press to mobilise support against the project. Locally, a group known as Earthlife Namibia works in co-operation with foreign advocacy groups and commands significant attention on the issue in Namibia. This local voluntary organisation maintains ‘a handful’ of active members, most of whom have an upper middle-class, ‘white’, urban professional background. The organisation views itself as an environmental watchdog and, to this end collects, disseminates and applies public pressure on environmental issues in Namibia. (Personal communication, Windhoek, 9 July 1999)

Those advocating on behalf of the environment emphasise the negative ecological impacts of the proposed dam: the alteration of downstream wetlands, inundation of whole ecosystems of rare plants and animals, high evaporation rates and the drowning of ‘a beautiful waterfall and its surrounding oasis’ (International Rivers Network, 1996b). In their discourse, ‘Himba country’ (Ringberg, 1995) is characterised as a ‘little garden of Eden’ (Nicoll, 1997) and part of ‘Namibia's rich natural heritage’ (Beukes, 1997). Kaokoland is a ‘dark rugged region’ (Getaway, 1997) and the Kunene ‘one of Africa's last wild rivers’ (Van Niekerk, 1995). In response, representatives of the Namibian government view the environmentalists as Eurocentric and anti-development minded. Inge Zaamwani, former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, claimed that ‘environmental extremists in the West’ adopt a position whereby ‘no meaningful socio-economic development takes place in countries because the environment will somehow be “affected”’ (quoted in Earthlife Africa, 1997). Equally outraged, former President Sam Nujoma declared:

Namibia cannot afford to be the playground of people who have misused nature in their own countries, and now think they can safeguard the last paradise in our country at our people's expense. We are not against legitimate conservation measures that respect individuals' social and economic needs (quoted in International Rivers Network, 1996b).

On the other hand, those whose primary concern is to defend indigenous rights emphasise that the Epupa project will ‘critically harm or even entirely destroy the traditional economy and culture’ of the Himba people (Society for Threatened Peoples, 1997). Some equate the Epupa project with an act of ‘ethnocide’ (Beukes, 1997). They highlight the effects of inundation on pastoral lands, gardens and wild food sources that the Himba people depend upon for their livelihood. Additionally, the indigenous rights advocates draw special attention to the flooding of ancestral graves and its impact on Himba cosmology. Finally, such groups also point to the influx of an outside labour force during the dam's construction phase, and stress the potential effect of in-migration on the physical health and social stability of the Himba communities. According to one indigenous rights advocate, ‘resettlement for this project will mean that the Himba will be left with no jobs or means of earning a living, their traditional culture destroyed, family linkages broken, traditional authority structures undermined, and small cash payments in their pockets’ (Harring, 1997). In all cases, the emphasis is placed on the negative effects of change and the Himba people's inability to cope with it.

In analysing the environmental/indigenous rights coalition, one finds that a similar representation of the Himba people serves as the common ground which allows both the major fields of interest (the environment and indigenous rights) to be accommodated within a unified discourse. The protest against the destruction of graves, for example, attracts environmentalists because it seems to embody the Himba people's close relationship with nature (Bollig, 1997b). For both the environmentalists and the indigenous rights advocates, then, Himba society symbolises an ideal world where humans and nature live in complete balance. They depict it as a self-sufficient world that has yet to be corrupted by Western greed and ecological disregard. Gudrun Hübendick, Director of the Swedish Society for Conservation, argued that ‘the Himba people have a way of living that is sustainable, by far, much more sustainable than the way westerners live’ (Cunene Film Project, 1997). They are ‘a people living a life as close as you can get to sustainability’ (Beukes, 1997).

Those who maintain this perspective construct the life of the Himba people as idyllic and timeless: ‘Namibia's Kunene River valley is the ancestral home of 12 000 Himba people, a semi-nomadic people who have lived there for more than 500 years, tending their flock and making sacred fires (okuruwo)’ (Pottinger, 1997). In this ‘old Africa’, we find Himba girls who possess ‘a natural earthy chic’ (Van Niekerk, 1995). We also find a local herder boasting about his cattle while ‘[u]nder a mopane tree his three wives, naked but for calfskin skirts and wild arrays of intricate jewellery, gently mixed gourds of milk and nursed their children’ (Nicoll, 1997). In their discourse, Himba society is unchanging, as ‘even 150 years of colonisation couldn't force them to abandon their traditional lifestyle’ (Getaway, 1997). In fact, ‘they live as they did when they first moved to these hills on the edge of the Skeleton Coast 500 years ago’ (Nicoll, 1997). The coalition then mixes a sense of fatalism with sentimentality in their final pleas to halt the Epupa project and save both the Himba people and their fragile environment. ‘This child's lifestyle could soon vanish’ reads the caption beneath one photograph (Getaway, 1997). A member of Earthlife Namibia feels ‘emotional’ and ‘sad’, calling the potential impact on Himba society ‘a big loss for humanity’ (personal communication, Windhoek, 9 July 1999). A Swedish journalist on a visit to Kaokoland completes a day of interviews, tucks himself into his sleeping bag, and ‘as the African darkness deepens, [he] ponder[s] the vulnerability of the Himba’ (Ringberg, 1995).

Despite such concerns, the environmental and indigenous rights advocates rarely engage with the concept of development itself, neither in relation to Namibia nor to the Himba people in particular. They treat Kaokoland as an isolated, rugged and idyllic wilderness, but neglect the reality of its inhabitants who suffer from inadequate health and educational services, rural water supply and basic infrastructure. They overlook the fact that the region and its inhabitants are marginalised from the country as a whole. Lastly, the coalition hardly ever addresses or acknowledges Namibia's national development needs. As a result, dam supporters feel justified in charging these groups with failing to provide development alternatives.

3.5 ‘Himba’ resistance: opposing Epupa

According to most accounts, the majority of the Himba people who live in the Kunene River basin and constitute the most affected community oppose construction of the Epupa dam. However, ‘the Himba position’ must be qualified from the outset, as it is certainly the most problematic of all those lining up in the Epupa debate. Major difficulties arise when attempting to contextualise this micro-perspective, for ‘the Himba perspective’ is not an undifferentiated one. Opinions on the project vary depending on age, distance from the proposed site and political and social standing within the community. In general, one finds greatest opposition to the dam among the local elite, elders and those living closest to the Kunene River; that is, among those who have the most to lose if the dam is actually constructed (Jacobsohn, 1997; Multidisciplinary Research Centre, 1998). Additionally, despite being a central subject of the debate, the Himba people are marginalised in their ability to participate in it. Most of the debate plays out in Windhoek and in the local and international press. Though all the other interested parties are given the chance to speak about the affected community, Himba people are rarely afforded the opportunity to speak for themselves. Those who live in the project area cannot get to the capital city or access the information generated by the public hearings and feasibility study, and the national medium of communication, English, presents yet another obstacle. Besides this, the affected Himba people have sometimes been deliberately excluded from the debate.

All of the above circumstances have helped create the space for others to represent ‘the Himba perspective’ in a relatively uncontested manner. Marginality, however, does not mean passivity. The filling of this space by the Namibian government, regional pro-dam supporters and the environmental/indigenous rights coalition has, in turn, afforded the opportunity for members of the affected community to leverage the process by manipulating and appropriating some of those very same representations in their own discourse. In such ways, some local actors are active in both furthering their own interests and influencing the outcome of the project. This section thus highlights Himba agency as it relates to the development process. In particular, some of the ways Himba people have responded to the proposed Epupa project are illustrated, as is how they have used the space in the debate to contest the scheme and assert their own position. ⁷

It is important to first emphasise that the Kunene River basin, the area that will be directly affected if the proposed scheme goes ahead, currently has four Himba leaders. Headman Hikuminwe Kapika has been the most vocal and active Himba opponent to the project and is viewed by most actors in the Epupa debate as the main representative of ‘the Himba community’. According to him, ‘they will have to shoot all the Himbas before they build the dam’ (quoted in Van Niekerk, 1995).

When listening in on the Epupa debate, then, one must recognise that Headman Kapika, though he often speaks on behalf of all Himba people, and though he is usually presented in the debate as the definitive Himba representative, is only one of several Himba leaders of equal standing. Headman Kapika is a particularly dynamic political actor who has strategically situated himself in the debate. People who have been close to the project or have worked directly with Headman Kapika label him a ‘savvy’ and ‘astute’ politician. One of those involved in the project believes that Kapika's position on the project is driven by self-interest and that he is using the Epupa controversy to his own advantage by ‘playing both sides against the middle’ (personal communication, Windhoek, 28 June 1999). Another person suggested that Kapika recognises Westerners' ‘save the Himba attitude’ and manipulates it in his favour (personal communication, Windhoek, 30 June 1999). Finally, a third Epupa participant believes that the affected community is ‘using the system in their own way’ and discovering benefits in the process (personal communication, Windhoek, 1 July 1999). ⁸

Evidence of Headman Kapika and the affected community using ‘the system’ as a way to oppose the hydropower scheme more effectively can be substantiated with particular examples. First, the community's decision to halt its participation in the feasibility study should be seen as a form of resistance to the project through the manipulation of development discourse. ⁹ Today, participatory processes have become so deeply embedded that ‘participation’ is deemed an essential component of any development project. The World Bank, for example, demands that any large-scale project involving displacement include participation by those affected in the resettlement plan. Likewise, projects of this nature are not considered ‘bankable’ by most international standards unless they include a proper mitigation plan – a plan that must be developed in collaboration with members of the displaced community. By withholding their participation, then, Himba communities in the project area have derailed efforts to develop a mitigation plan and thereby slowed or halted implementation of the Epupa scheme.

Another powerful method of Himba opposition entailed political lobbying in Europe. In mid-1997, Kapika and Paulus Tjavara, another Himba leader, toured five countries during a three-week campaign against the Epupa scheme. Sponsored by seven European environmental and indigenous rights organisations, the trip brought the two leaders together with members of the German parliament, European Ministers, representatives from financial institutions and high-ranking officials at Norad. Tjavara justified his tour by leveraging the way others construct the Himba people:

The only thing we received from our government was humiliation; that the Himba people have hanging breasts and are stupid. That is why I decided to turn to others for help. Construction of a dam in Epupa will kill people in the region; therefore, we ask for your support to stop construction of the dam. That is why we are here (quoted in Sveijer, 1997: 16).

Kapika, in turn, told Norad officials that ‘[i]f you decide to fund the project, you will take part in destroying everything that belongs to the Himbas’ (quoted in Pottinger, 1997). He explained: ‘We feel oppressed by the government of Namibia. We went to Europe to seek help from other human beings’ (quoted in Sveijer, 1997: 16).

What is more likely, however, is that Kapika and Tjavara were invited to Europe by members of the environmental/indigenous rights coalition. Once there, these two leaders took advantage of the dynamics in the debate by allying themselves with those who contribute to the objectification of the Himba people in the first place. It seems that they adopted the image given to them by their hosts in order to gain greater support in their fight against the construction of the dam. Kapika and Tjavara thus successfully appropriated the platform in order to further their claims.

Finally, after returning from the trip, and perhaps inspired by it, Headman Kapika capitalised on the Epupa debate by establishing a development organisation, the Kaoko-Epupa Development Foundation. According to Kapika, ‘the whole idea is to have a development project designed by the Himbas for the benefit of Himbas’ (quoted in Maletsky, 1998). The organisation focuses on developing the region's economy and maintaining and promoting local traditions and culture. The move is a significant one because the new organisation helps counter the image of an ‘anti-development’-minded Himba people who are conservative, passive and manipulated by outside interests. Statements issued by the affected community have shown a similar focus: ‘Our opposition to the dam does not stem from blind rejection of all forms of change, or from a lack of understanding of the project. We have discussed the proposed dams in detail and have come to our own conclusions independent of outside groups’ (Indigenous Affairs, 1998).

Similarly, in a letter requesting financial support from the government of Finland, the Foundation emphasises that ‘[w]e, as Himba, are not against development, but we do not like development to be forced on us’ (Epupa Action Committee, 1997). The establishment of the Kaoko-Epupa Development Foundation has helped create the mechanism by which resources can flow to the community (and perhaps its leaders) by legitimising them as part of Namibia's development landscape.

4. THE POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE: A VIEW FROM EPUPA

This analysis of the Epupa debate has identified five discursive ‘nodes’ and addressed the ways they represent development, the proposed project and the affected community. Aspects of local agency in this development encounter have been explored by focusing on Himba people's attempts to assert opposition to the project. This section now returns to the post-structuralist critique of development in order to highlight a number of its interrelated shortcomings, all of which become obvious when analysing the Epupa case.

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the post-structuralists assume development discourse is monolithic and univocal, generated via a hegemonic Western apparatus and imposed on the ‘Third World’. They assume that ‘the discourse’ may be internalised by officials at the national level, and even filter down to those in the village, but always in an undifferentiated form. However, these critics of development fail to acknowledge that development discourse is contested and manipulated on many levels. In the Namibian case we find that at least five distinctive nodes of representation apply unique discourses in a battle over the ‘socioepistemological space’ (Escobar, 1995a: 225). Contrary to the post-structuralist assumption, the debate in Namibia is a multi-vocal one. We find no monolithic discourse flowing in a single direction, but rather many voices speaking within and between the many layers of the debate. The Namibian case, therefore, asks us to look beyond a discourse of development, and instead search deeper into the discourses of development as generated by multiple actor sets.

The above relates directly to the second problematic, that of agency. The post-structuralist critics attribute the perpetuation of social and economic conditions in the ‘Third World’ to discourse itself. Words, language and epistemology become reified. Material explanations are replaced with representational ones (Takaki, cited in Mohan, 1997). However, discourse is not an agent in and of itself, but the product of those who use it. For this reason, the post-structuralist critique reduces development to discourse only, rather than to the interplay between conscious actors. Margaret Everett contends that such a view depicts development as a subject-less process. ‘We are left wondering where this discourse comes from and how it might be shaped by the struggles of real people’ (1997: 139).

By locating agency in discourse alone, the post-structuralist critique assumes that these ‘real people’ are merely passive and impotent objects of development. These critics ‘portray “subject peoples” as incapable (or nearly so) of autonomous intellectual thought’ and they ‘tend to ignore the important role of local and national elite groups in importing and redefining “western” development strategies’ (Everett, 1997: 137). Escobar (1995a), for example, depicted Colombian actors as being completely hemmed in by the World Bank, while Ferguson (1990) implied that people in Lesotho are unwilling and unable to challenge the ‘anti-politics machine’. As Everett (1997: 147) pointed out, post-structuralist critics ‘portray agents as largely unaware of the social processes in which they are caught’.

Our examination of the Epupa case, however, revealed something quite different. The analysis showed that despite being marginalised from the Epupa debate Himba people do have some agency in the development process. In fact, we see a set of actors who actively resist the scheme by appropriating and manipulating development discourse and the representations of Himba society. In Europe, two Himba leaders leveraged the timeless, isolated image of their community in order to gain support and resources in their fight against the Epupa dam project. Once again, the Namibian case reiterates the need to seek agency beyond discourse alone and, most particularly, at the local level among the so-called targets of development.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The issues raised by Namibia's proposed Epupa hydropower scheme are complex and diverse. There is no simple way to contextualise the Epupa debate, though an analysis of various nodes of representation in it does help unpack certain dynamics that have shaped the process. This article has examined the discourses of the various groupings by paying special attention to the ways they represent ‘development’, the project and the Himba people who constitute the affected community; and it has explored aspects of agency by focusing on Himba people's attempts to assert opposition to the project.

In addition, the Epupa case has afforded us the opportunity to critically assess the currently dominant post-structuralist critique of development. Development discourse is powerful and determining, but not nearly as uniform, totalising, or unidirectional as the post-structuralists claim. These critics fail to acknowledge that various agents employ discourses in multiple directions. In Epupa, we have seen development discourse that is ‘neither so monolithic nor so hegemonic’ (Everett, 1997: 137). These ‘targets of development’ – as represented by the state or the village, individuals or groups, members of the urban elite or rural peasantry – are in fact subjects who appropriate, resist and redefine development for their own ends.

With their tendency to focus most of their analytical attention on the development apparatus itself, the post-structuralist critics too often take their point of departure from the top; that is, from the perspective of foreign development planners, institutions and governments. Accounts offered by scholars such as Escobar (1995a) and Ferguson (1990) shield us from the dynamics that occur on the ground, from the struggles and conflicts that shape the development process. In this one-sided view of power, the influence of the local elite, community organisations and the so-called targets of development remains hidden. The post-structuralist critique of development requires dialectical balance and this is achievable only once we shift our analysis away from those at the top of the development apparatus. We need to incorporate alternative perspectives and acknowledge the agency of others in the development encounter, particularly those at the bottom of the development process.

This article thus charts a path forward. It reveals the post-structuralist critique of development as simplistic in its analysis of the development problematic. The scholarly study of development has more to offer than discourse analysis alone. We cannot engage development only at the level of rhetoric, as a social construct of the global order; we must extend the post-structuralist critique by also engaging development at the level of practice, as the lived experience of people in real and divergent communities. In this case of Namibian development, it means we need greater insight into the perspective of those who will be most affected if the Epupa dam is actually built. Despite the extensive feasibility study, public meetings and associated events, our understanding of the development process as experienced by those living in the affected communities is still extremely limited. Though additional research at the local level will not empower the Himba people, it will provide a more balanced and clearer picture of this Namibian development encounter.

The author would like to thank Leo Howe, Keith Hart, Alan Macfarlane, Fatima Müller-Friedman and two anonymous reviewers for their encouragement and/or critical readings of earlier drafts; and the English Speaking Union of San Francisco, Darwin College, Sir Bartle Frere's Memorial Fund, and the Rivers Video Project for generous financial assistance that made the research possible.

Notes

¹Assistant Professor of Socio-cultural Anthropology, Department of Social Science, Roosevelt Academy, Utrecht University. Based on research carried out in Windhoek, Namibia, in 1999, this paper is a revised version of a dissertation submitted to the University of Cambridge in partial fulfilment of the MPhil degree in Social Anthropology (Friedman, 1999). The author would like to thank Leo Howe, Keith Hart, Alan Macfarlane, Fatima Müller-Friedman and two anonymous reviewers for their encouragement and/or critical readings of earlier drafts; and the English Speaking Union of San Francisco, Darwin College, Sir Bartle Frere's Memorial Fund, and the Rivers Video Project for generous financial assistance that made the research possible.

²The proposed scheme will also affect Himba people and others who live on the Angolan side of the Kunene River. This article, however, analyses the Epupa project from a Namibian perspective only.

³By ‘discourse’, the post-structuralists mean not only the interchanges associated with speech and conversation but also, more importantly, that which is represented through language: ‘A discourse (e.g. of development) identifies appropriate and legitimate ways of practising development as well as speaking and thinking about it. A discursive perspective, however, also embraces a totalizing conception of how society constitutes its members (or “subjects”), and of the role of language in that process’ (Grillo, 1997: 12).

⁴In 2001, the debate died down substantially, though the Namibian government expressed its intention to pursue the project at a future date. Disagreements between the Angolan and Namibian governments over site selection and project prioritisation, as well as the Namibian government's focus on other high profile development projects, pushed the Epupa project to the side. More recently, however, reports suggest that the project is regaining momentum within government circles (Menges, 2004).

⁵For an evaluation of Swedish development assistance to Namibia during the period 1990–3, see Odén et al. (1994).

⁶Interviews were held with the Swedish embassy's First Secretary/Economist (1 July 1999) and Counsellor (2 July 1999).

⁷When this manuscript was first written, the author was constrained by his own lack of fieldwork in Kaokoland. This section, therefore, relies on the work of those who have had both a direct and indirect impact on the Epupa debate.

⁸The interviewees here remain anonymous because Namibia is a small country and this is a controversial issue.

⁹Here the author refers to ‘resistance’ as the conscious intention to oppose or counteract. The anthropological concept of resistance as used by such writers as Scott (1985) and Comaroff (1985), however, often denies the need for such awareness among its resisting subjects.