Governance of Lake Chilwa common pool resources: evolution and conflicts

Abstract

This paper reviews the evolution of the governance of Lake Chilwa fisheries since the colonial era. The socio-political and economic transformation of Malawi has shifted the roles of the traditional authorities who had jurisdiction over these resources based on their tribal settlement patterns and identity. The user community, including district assemblies, are experiencing difficulty implementing the management reforms in the decentralised fisheries. The traditional leaders are taking advantage of the recently adopted governance reforms by using the co-management arrangement with the Department of Fisheries to extract money from the seine fishermen in the form of tributes. This ‘elite capture’ of the resources is causing conflicts between the traditional leaders and user committees over authority to manage resource use. With limited support from the district assemblies and traditional leaders, the devolved fisheries functions will be difficult to implement.

Keywords:

• Governance
• common pool resources
• traditional leaders
• fisheries
• lake recession
• Lake Chilwa
• Malawi

1. INTRODUCTION

The evolution of common pool resource governance in Lake Chilwa is the result of socio-political transformation that has shifted the roles of the traditional authorities who had jurisdiction over lake resources based on their tribal settlement patterns, and economic transformation dating back to the 1940s that has changed the fishing from subsistence to commercial. The lake experiences high seasonal and periodic water level changes, with serious recession in some years−such as 1968 and 1995 −that inevitably makes it difficult for the local fishing community to sustain their livelihoods.

Governance refers to ‘how power and decision-making is shared among different components of society’ (Béné & Neiland, 2005:7). In this paper these components include individuals as well as community groups and organisations, and governance arrangements include legal, social, economic and political issues applied to the management of fisheries resources. An enabling political environment has to be created to allow the actors to exercise their power and authority over the management of fisheries resources through decentralised systems (Njaya, 2007).

Associated with governance reforms is the concept of decentralisation, which refers to any act in which a central government systematically transfers part of its powers, authority, and responsibilities to local government structures or lower level institutions such as districts and community-level committees or user groups (Ribot, 2002; Pomeroy & Viswanathan, 2003; Béné & Neiland, 2005). Democratic decentralisation reforms offer an opportunity for legally supported forms of popular participation in the management of fisheries. Ribot (2002) and Pomeroy (2003) suggest that decentralised fisheries management should be inclusive. In Malawi's decentralisation, the Beach Village Committees (BVCs) – composed of all the people engaged in fisheries-related activities on a beach−fall under the lowest decentralised structures, the Village Development Committees. In this context, the resource user groups, traditional institutions, district assemblies, non-governmental organisations and the government need to work together in the management of fisheries.

This paper reviews the evolution of fisheries governance on Lake Chilwa and explores the impacts of socio-political and cultural dynamics on the governance reforms. It uses three main sources of information: secondary sources, mainly studies of Lake Chilwa household strategies (Mvula, 2002; Jul-Larsen et al., 2003; Kambewa, 2006); a comprehensive study of socio-ecological issues around Lake Chilwa (e.g. Kalk et al., 1979); and the author's previous co-management studies and PhD research.

2. LAKE CHILWA AND ITS FLOODPLAIN

This section highlights the variability of the Lake Chilwa fishery. The ecosystem changes seasonally: in the rainy season, the northern marshes are flooded and in the south the water becomes deeper; in the dry season, particularly from June to December, the northern marshes dry out and the southern water becomes shallower, attracting many fishermen (Kalk et al., 1979; Njaya, 2002). The demographic changes in response to the seasonal fishing grounds and technological change trigger conflicts, as is explained below.

Lake Chilwa is located in the centre of the low-lying Chilwa-Phalombe plain in the southern part of Malawi at 35°45′ E and 15°15′ S, and is shared between Malawi and Mozambique (Ratcliffe, 1971; Government of Malawi, 1999) (see Figure 1). It is the second largest lake in Malawi and the 12th largest natural lake in Africa. It is an enclosed and shallow basin with depths not exceeding 6 metres. A reed belt, which is widest in the north (about 15 km) and northeast side (1−2 km), and a seasonally flooded plain surround the lake (Landes & Otte, 1983). The lake's size varies according to the amount of rainfall and water flowing into the basin. In years with high water levels, the open water area increases to 1054 km², the Typha (bulrush) swamp area to 640 km², the marshy area to 163 km² and the flood plain grassland around the lake to 220 km². In low water level conditions in the dry season, the open water is reduced to 678 km², while the Typha swamp increases to 699 km², the marshy area to 300 km² and the flood plain grassland to 430 km², giving totals of 2077 km² and 2107 km², respectively (Government of Malawi, 1999). The dry season provides excellent alluvial soil conditions for a second annual crop of rice or maize.

Figure 1: Lake Chilwa and its extensive associated marshes and floodplain

The lake level changes take two forms: seasonal, as outlined above, and periodic when the lake dries up completely in some years (a minor recession approximately every 6 years and a major one about every 25 years; Lancaster, 1979; Agnew & Chipeta, 1979). The major recessions since 1879 are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Documented and observed water level changes in Lake Chilwa from 1859 to 1995

Year	High	Low	Very low (dry)
1859	Livingstone (observation)
1860	O'Neill (1884)
1870	Buchanan (1893)
1879			Buchanan (1893)
1880		O'Neill (1884)
1888	Drummond (1902)
1900			Chipeta (1972), Duff (1906)
1913–1915		Chipeta (1972)
1920–1922		Garson and Campbell-Smith (1958)
Late 1930s	Burgess (personal communication)
1943		Chipeta (1972)
1949		Chipeta (1972)
1960–1961		Kalk (1979)
1967–1968			Kalk (1979)
1973		Kalk (1979)
1976	Kalk (1979)
1995			Njaya (1996)
Sources: Kalk et al. (1979) and Njaya (1996).

The Lake Chilwa catchment area is one of the most densely populated areas in Malawi. It has a population of over 1 million people, with an estimated density of 162 people per km², which is higher than the national level estimated at 105 per km² (Government of Malawi, 1999). Migration of fishermen and farmers into the Chilwa basin also contributes to the high population densities. The fishermen from other water bodies, especially Lake Malombe in Mangochi District, migrate seasonally to Lake Chilwa with their open water seine nets (nkacha). The number of fishermen has increased in recent years: in 2003 there were 3503, while in 2005 this figure had more than doubled to 7644. The number of seine nets, the dominant commercial gear used on the lake, also increased by about 200 per cent from 276 to 830 seines over the same period. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, seines catch more fish (Barbus paludinosus) than long lines, gillnet and fish traps; and, secondly, using seines involves employing a larger crew (usually more than six people) than the other gear types. The local people and chiefs appreciate the employment-generation role that seine nets play. There have been no plank boats with engines operating in the lake since the recovery of the fishery following the 1995 recession (Government of Malawi, 2005).

Fish traps made from local materials (mainly bamboos) are common because they are cheap to make. Gillnets and long lines target large fish species such as Oreochromis shiranus (makumba) and Clarius gariepinus (mlamba), while seines and fish traps largely exploit the small fish species, B. paludinosus (matemba).

3. EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE OF LAKE CHILWA FISHERIES

This section reviews the historical background of the ethnic settlement patterns and political and socio-economic transformations that relate to the evolution of management strategies on Lake Chilwa. Since the colonial era, the Lake Chilwa management systems have changed from traditional to centralised fisheries management and then to co-management (Figure 2). The changes were due mainly to the influence of colonialism around the mid-1800s and later to economic shifts from a subsistence to a commercial economy. The following subsections outline the evolutionary process of the three management systems on Lake Chilwa. Of particular interest is the fact that there has never been a time since the colonial era when any one of the management systems has existed on its own or in its pure form. There has always been a mix of one or two management systems. For example, where chiefs have control over the landing beaches, the government or the local district authorities have demanded permits for use of the fisheries resources. The basis for issuing such permits is that the fisheries resources are state-owned and hence the state should have an interest in the resource management for the benefit of the nation.

Figure 2: Evolution of fisheries governance on Lake Chilwa

3.1 Traditional fisheries management system before 1900 (pre-colonial era)

It is still unclear whether the management of natural resources by traditional authorities in the past had any specific regime. These authorities comprise various local institutions and are mainly non-elected chiefs with authority based on their ethnic groups. Donda (1997) asserts that during the pre-colonial era the demand for fish was low, probably because the population was smaller then. Dissi and Njaya (1995) note that the chiefs were in control of assigning landing beaches to fishermen on Lake Chiuta. The implication is that there was an indirect regulation of fishing effort. During the colonial period the chiefs had a mandate to control access to fisheries. They appointed beach chairpersons who controlled the use of the fishing beaches and could draw up a timetable for seining operations. This was also partly to collect hut tax. The chiefs had authority to collect taxes, as Chirwa states:

With the introduction of Indirect Rule and the establishment of Native Authority treasuries in 1933, chiefs in the lakeshore districts were empowered to collect fees on canoes made in their areas. The Forest Ordinance (Forest Rules GN. 12/32) forbade the cutting of trees for canoes without payment of a royalty to the chief in whose area the tree was cut. Quotas were imposed on trees to be cut for canoes. (1996:364)

There have also been some incentives in the form of the tribute that fishermen offer to chiefs, locally known as mawe or cha-kwa-mfumu. This may take the form of money or fish catch portions. In agricultural terms, Vaughan (1982) defines this as a tribute the local leaders (Nyanja and Yao) extracted from their subjects. The change of authority from the traditional leaders to other systems, especially co-management, has brought about conflicts in some cases between the BVCs and the local leaders (Njaya, 2002). The traditionally grounded system of paying chiefs tribute has been contested by the BVCs under co-management arrangements. It has been viewed as a recipe for corruption where some chiefs allow the illegal fishermen to operate in their areas with the aim of extracting mawe from them on a regular basis (Njaya et al., 2006).

The local fishermen had rules, agreements and norms that they enforced at household or village level, as shown in Table 2. Arguments by scholars such as Van Zwieten and Njaya (2003) about the usefulness of these local regulations have, however, not been about the biological rationale for such rules. Nevertheless, the local communities argue that it is necessary to have such rules in place in order to regulate the behaviour and operations of the fishermen on beaches. As one chief stated, ‘although the biological or socioeconomic rationale for such rules remain unclear, what is important is the social-cultural community pressure that influences compliance with the rules’.

Table 2: Norms, regulations and agreements in the traditional management system indicating the socio-economic rationale for each regulation

Rule/norm	Socio-economic rationale
Seining according to schedule drawn up by traditional leaders	To ensure equity of access to the fishing grounds
Large meshes (nets made of fibrous plant material) and widely spaced traps	Large-size fish were culturally accepted for consumption and for higher price
Source: Adapted from Van Zwieten and Njaya (2003).

3.2 Centralised management system (1946–1995)

The colonial government established the Department of Fisheries (DoF) in 1946 with a mandate to protect and conserve the national fish heritage of Malawi through appropriate control mechanisms (Donda, 2001). Its major activities include conducting research programmes and developing policy based on technical information for the development of the fishing industry in the country.

The colonial government assumed responsibility for ensuring efficiency in resource exploitation and formulated regulations in this regard, as shown in Table 3. While the government introduced licensing of beach seines and gillnets on Lake Chilwa in the 1960s (Ratcliffe, 1971), the exploitation of the fish resources remained largely unregulated. The licensing system became a source of revenue for the government rather than a management tool. Furthermore, the capacity of the DoF for enforcing fisheries regulations has always been constrained due to budgetary limitations.

Table 3: Regulations in the centralised system (pre-1995 recession) indicating the socio-economic rationale for each regulation

Rule	Socio-economic rationale
Minimum size of tilapia set at 100 mm	To fetch a higher price
Headline length for matemba seines should not exceed 300 metres	Regulating effort
Minimum mesh size for gill nets set at 2.75 inches (69 mm)	Larger fish fetch higher market prices
Licensing of seines and gill nets	Maximise profits for licensed fishermen
	Revenue for the government
Trawlers to pay commercial licence fees	Generate revenue for the government
Source: Adapted from Van Zwieten and Njaya (2003).

3.3 Co-management arrangement (post-1995 lake recession)

The Lake Chilwa co-management partnership between the traditional authorities and the DoF was a response to a crisis as a result of the lake recession following three consecutive years of drought (1992–1994). As was the case in 1968 when a similar recession occurred, a strategy was necessary to facilitate recovery of the collapsed fishery. The first strategy involved conducting artificial restocking by breeding O. shiranus chilwae in ponds at Domasi Aquaculture Centre (belonging to the DoF) and then releasing the fish into the lake. However, this was too expensive for the government to implement. Furthermore, it was difficult in practice to breed matemba (B. paludinosus) in ponds for restocking the lake. Hence, natural restocking after the 1995 recession was the most suitable and practical strategy.

The traditional leaders and the DoF agreed that for a natural restocking programme to be successful it was necessary to conserve all fish stocks in Mpoto lagoon and reservoirs along the feeder rivers, including the Domasi, Likangala, Thondwe, Phalombe and Sombani in Malawi, and the Mnembo and Chimazi in Mozambique. The aim was to have the conserved fish stocks repopulate the lake after it had refilled. A similar fish recovery programme took place in 1968.

Therefore, a co-management regime with the involvement of the river-based communities in this recovery management strategy was important, as this would make it easier to enforce regulations forbidding the catching of fish in the designated reservoir areas. The local leaders and the DoF organised meetings in villages located along the major feeder rivers to work out an effective partnership for enforcement of the rules, which they formulated together and publicised on radio and newspapers. The rules banned the use of poisonous plants (katupe) for fishing in rivers flowing into Lake Chilwa, banned seining operations in all feeder rivers and the Mpoto lagoon, and banned the use of seines from 1996 to 1997.

When the lake refilled in 1996, the DoF seized the opportunity to introduce and expand the co-management framework to all lake-based fishing communities. A meeting was organised in 1996 with the lake-based traditional chiefs. The meeting reviewed the regulations, as shown in Table 4, and introduced a closed season and a requirement for transfer letters for migrants. They agreed to review some of the regulations while maintaining the licensing and mesh size restriction regulations formulated under the centralised management.

Table 4: Regulations in the co-management arrangement indicating the socio-economic rationale for each regulation

Rule/norm	Socio-economic rationale
Lake Chilwa and Mpoto lagoon should be closed from 1 December to 1 April	To promote fishing and farming practices for cash incomes and food security
Riverine fishing is closed from May to September	To protect breeding matemba so that fishermen catch the mature ones and hence earn high income
Nkacha is a prohibited gear	To avoid competition with the existing beach-operated seines
All gillnets and seines should be licensed	Revenue for government
Fishing should be done during the day time only	For easy monitoring of landed fish
Every fisherman should be registered with a BVC and pay a fishing licence	Control movement of fishermen and limit gear theft
	Revenue for the government and community
No fish traders should market their fish within the waters	To ensure that fish landed are checked by BVCs
Source: Adapted from van Zwieten and Njaya (2003).

The shift of co-management from river-based fishing communities to the lake-based one may be a source of conflict in future. One village head along the Likangala River stated:

The fisheries people from government [the DoF] have abandoned us just because we have accomplished what they wanted, that is, to conserve fish stocks in rivers and then work with others after the recovery of the depleted stocks. We will see whether they will not need us in future, as the lake will dry up again. The fisheries people should not come to us when such time comes again.

Towards the end of 1996, the DoF sensitised the fishermen to the need to form BVCs in a co-management arrangement. These were representative committees for the user groups. The fishermen, mostly those operating fish traps, gillnets and long lines, became members of 48 BVCs formed on the lake through elections. In the following year (1997), six traditional authorities and four Group Village Heads around the lake formed the Lake Chilwa Fisheries Management Association. Instead of co-management operating at village level through BVCs, the arrangement was hijacked by the Association, which was criticised for having no elected fishermen to represent the interests of the fishing community (Lowore & Lowore, 1999; Njaya, 2002).

The traditional authorities were mainly interested in confiscating illegal nets and charging fines ranging from MK20 000 to MK30 000.1 In some places, the custom of the tribute to traditional authorities and Group Village Heads has been encouraging illegal operations during closed seasons by nkacha seine fishermen. Opportunist local leaders benefit from co-management through the penalty fees and tributes they get when they allow fishermen to operate illegally, for example during the closed season. Co-management has therefore been captured by the elite, the local leaders, for their own benefit. During the key informant interviews, one respondent stated that:

The influence of traditional authorities in the co-management is not for resource management but rather for their personal benefit. They formulated the closed season regulation to have an opportunity of confiscating our seines and charge us over MK20 000 for their personal use. This is unacceptable as we work to get money for our families. In fact there is no need for the closed season to be permanent. It was justifiable for the first two to three years after recession but not now when the lake has fully recovered. (Committee Chair for Ntila BVC)

Additionally, the exclusion of seine fishermen from the BVCs meant that there was limited participation of other user groups in the co-management. The traditional leaders influenced the formulation of management regulations that were not in the fishermen's interest. For example, fishermen considered a closed season of 6 months duration (as was suggested by the Association) a threat to their livelihoods and not necessary for resource conservation.

After the recovery of the fishery in 1998, there was an influx of immigrant nkacha seine net fishermen from Lake Malombe, Mangochi. The local fishermen responded by forming a pressure group to regulate these migrants' fishing practices. The mobilisation of the seine fishermen into pressure groups has shifted the co-management partnership from the traditional authorities and the DoF at the Association level to the seine fishermen and the DoF at the BVC level. A co-management with resource users is now emerging since the first form of co-management (1997−2005) with lake-based local leaders became weak, unlike the one that emerged with river-based local leaders who formulated rules for banning fishing in rivers and the Mpoto lagoon. This shift clearly shows that co-management is dynamic (Njaya, 2007), and implies that in any co-management regime partnerships of key actors can change over time depending on the prevailing circumstances, some of which could be due to conflicts, as is discussed below.

4. COMMON CONFLICTS

The Food and Agriculture Organisation (2000) defines natural resource conflicts as disagreements and disputes that emerge as a result of access to and control of appropriation. Tubtim (2006:147) points out that, in natural resource management, actors do not agree on everything. Conflicts, sometimes violent, can occur between resource users in common property regimes (Warner, 2000; Pomeroy & Rivera-Guieb, 2005), usually because people want to use or manage commons such as fisheries in various ways, depending on their objectives. Singh (2002:5) notes that ‘Conflicts and disturbances arise when there are varied interests of people in a particular resource’. Therefore conflicts over common pool resources are inevitable.

In a fishery, interests diverge because of differences in user groups' ethnic origins, gender and fishing class (Malasha, 2003). On Lake Chilwa, specific gear types are associated with specific ethnic groups. The Yao from Lake Malombe are associated with the introduction of nkacha seines on Lakes Chilwa, Chiuta, Malombe and Malawi. Scoop and cast nets on Lake Chilwa are linked to the Sena people from the Lower Shire valley. In most cases, conflicts arise when the fishing gear that is introduced proves to be more efficient in exploiting the resource.

There is also power contestation between the BVCs and traditional authorities, as noted by Hara et al. (2002) in the case of Lake Malombe. The contestation is usually due to control over money obtained from penalty fees and permits given to immigrant fishermen. The BVCs believe they are obliged to allow in-migrant fishermen to use their beaches after inspecting their nets to check that they are the recommended size and type. The traditional leaders, on the other hand, believe that the power and authority to control the use of their beaches still rests with them. As one chief in northern Lake Chilwa stated:

Beaches belong to us, traditional leaders, as evidenced by the beach names being synonymous with names of traditional leaders. Therefore I do not believe a BVC should have more powers to regulate the number of fishermen using my beaches. I can deal with them in one way or another, mainly by not supporting their co-management programme but encouraging illegal fishing operations.

Conflicts between the different classes of fishermen, small-scale and commercially oriented, have been prevalent on Lake Chilwa, most commonly between gillnet fishermen and nkacha seine operators. The gillnet fishermen complain that the nkacha seine fishermen destroy the gear they have set in open waters. Apparently the seine operators are mostly in-migrants who introduced the nkacha seine on the lake. When the DoF introduced co-management, it was the traditional small-scale fishermen (mostly operating cheap gear such as gillnets and fish traps) who became BVC members, to the exclusion of the commercial fishermen operating seines. Regulations formulated by the BVCs therefore seemed to target and penalise only the seine net operators. For example, the closed seasons on Lakes Malawi, Malombe and Chilwa target the seining operations. This has been seen as a tool for excluding the nkacha seine operators from Lake Chilwa, hence the conflict−as evidenced by the remark by one seine fisherman on southern Lake Chilwa: ‘All these regulations are targeting us, as you will never hear anything about confiscation of under-meshed gillnets’.

Social−cultural issues, including theft of gear and catch and demand for tribute, are other sources of conflicts. Thefts of gear and catches are common among fishermen on Lake Chilwa and other water bodies. The gillnet fishermen complain that the seine operators steal fish from gillnets set overnight. These cases, as one gillnet fisherman stated, are rampant because gillnets can catch large makumba, unlike the seines that target only small matemba.

The immigration of fishermen from other areas has galvanised the local communities into collective action. The flashpoints include competition over space or resources (fish and land), competition over prices (they claim that migrants depress the prices of fish) and social problems (e.g. sexual conflict, since migrants come with their spouses). Similar issues caused conflicts on Lake Chiuta when over 300 seine fishermen from Lake Malombe invaded the small lake in the 1990s (Donda, 2001; Njaya, 2002). The large catches by seines led to lower prices, which negatively affected earnings for gillnet and fish trap fishermen. Additionally, there was competition over fishing grounds, since both gill nets and seines operate in open waters.

Finally, the relationship between the BVCs and the Village Development Committees at the community level remains unclear. Hara (2008:82) asserts that ‘the BVCs and other sectoral management committees are not part of the institutional set-up for decentralisation’. The implication of such unclear relationship is limited support for co-management from the District Assemblies and power contestation between the government, the BVCs and the Village Development Committees.

5. LESSONS LEARNT AND CONCLUSION

The following lessons can be drawn from the above review. First, the governance of the Lake Chilwa fisheries resources has undergone several changes, mainly influenced by socio-political and economic dynamics. In the pre-colonial era, management was not an issue because fish was plentiful and people fished mainly for consumption. With the commercialisation of the economy and changes in the political landscape, limiting access became an issue because people wanted to catch as much fish as possible for profit. The high productivity of the fishery attracted fishermen from other water bodies, mainly Lake Malombe. The increase in the fishermen and the commercialisation of the economy triggered governance reforms with a move either from traditional forms to centralised fisheries management or from centralised to co-management arrangements.

The introduction of management measures in the centralised management systems, including licensing, gear and mesh restrictions and closed seasons, continue to dominate the management agenda in the co-management arrangements. Contrary to scientific recommendations (Sarch & Allison, 2000; Jul-Larsen et al., 2003), local fishermen strongly believe and support measures that limit and control levels and types of fishing effort that should be applied on Lake Chilwa. Therefore, despite the Lake Chilwa fishery's high regenerative capacity, collective action should be promoted, especially during recession periods, and the regulations, such as minimum mesh sizes for gillnets and closed seasons for seine nets, should be applied. The reduced employment opportunities as a result of the economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, which saw workers retrenched by estates and companies and the end of mine contracts in South Africa, caused high pressure on fishing. Malasha (2003) makes a similar observation: that when people were retrenched by the copper mines on the Copper Belt, Zambia, they took up fishing as their main source of livelihood. Issues of conventional maximum sustainable yield become irrelevant in these circumstances.

The move towards decentralised fisheries management by devolving functions from the central government to lower level structures including District Assemblies and BVCs, as commonly observed in many African countries, faces many challenges (Njaya 2007; Hara, 2008). For example, in Lake Chilwa the traditional authorities advance their interests at the expense of the fishermen. They aim to extract economic benefits from the fishery through practices such as demanding regular fish catch tributes from fishermen or collecting fines from those who break the Association's rules. There is thus an ‘elite capture’ by traditional leaders of the co-management arrangement. While fisheries resources continue to play a significant role in the local economies of the districts surrounding Lake Chilwa, the role of District Assemblies has up to now been non-existent. This means the co-management arrangement is confined to local levels without any support from the higher authorities at district level.

Fishing in Lake Chilwa and the surrounding floodplain is a major source of livelihoods for the inhabitants of the area and people from surrounding areas who come either to fish or trade. The fluctuating nature of the resource as a result of the lake drying from time to time means that at times these livelihoods are at stake. It is therefore important that this resource be managed with the participation of the local fishermen, who have their own ways of protecting the fishery by using non-destructive fishing gear and not fishing during certain periods of the year. There is therefore a need to develop policies and management strategies that take into account the local knowledge and governance system based on the prevailing socio-political and economic circumstances and resource-level changes during seasonal and periodic recessions of the lake water. The authorities, the DoF and the District Assembly, should also address power contestation among the key co-management partners – the fishermen and the traditional leaders. In essence, governance reforms should build on an adaptive management strategy with the full and genuine cooperation and participation of all stakeholders.

This special issue was produced with the support of the European Union's Sixth Framework programme through the Cross-Sectoral Commons Governance in Southern Africa Project No. 043982. This work does not reflect the Commission's views and in no way anticipates its future policy in this area.

Notes

¹In 1997, MK20 000 was worth about US$1180; by 2002 it was equivalent to about US$250.