Beyond the crisis in Zimbabwe: Sorting out the land question

Abstract

The depth of political and economic despair in Zimbabwe is beyond dispute. This paper situates the unfortunate picture in its historical context – drawing particular attention to the role of land in setting the country on its tragic trajectory, and showing how land remains the most fundamental problem precluding the restoration of political coherence and economic recovery. It argues that political and economic stability will be elusive until there is definitive closure to Zimbabwe's unpleasant past and at the same time clarity about property rights. It offers in addition some necessary first steps for the day when a new government is finally able to address and rectify the current chaos.

Keywords:

• land rights
• structural adjustment
• immiserisation
• political legitimacy
• terra nullius

1. The urgent challenge

The political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe requires no elaboration. As the political turmoil plays out over the next several years, the pressing challenges of economic reconstruction will be identified. A general development strategy – imported from other ‘post-crisis’ countries – will be unveiled. The standard development projects will be quickly deployed. Donors will line up to do good work and development assistance – millions of dollars or euros and much technical assistance – will materialise. The usual remedies will be on offer – microfinance schemes, infrastructure loans, the latest in seeds, fertiliser, agricultural extension services, irrigation infrastructure and marketing and input cooperatives. The international donor community knows exactly what is needed. And their confidence in that regard will be predicated on their conviction that what is needed in Zimbabwe is precisely the same bundle of goods and services regularly made available elsewhere. Development assistance is now regarded as a somewhat standard suite of programmes and projects. The donors ‘fight poverty’ and most of what they do is presumed to accomplish that goal. The Millennium Development Goals will provide the ‘mental model’ – the ‘framework’ as the donors put it – for what needs to be done. And it will very likely fail.

Our purpose here is to argue that it would be a mistake to presume that Zimbabwe is ready to receive the standard development prescriptions. The basis for our pessimism is the ‘land question’. Unless the international donor community is absolutely clear about the freighted history of land in Zimbabwe, any and all attempts to bring about economic recovery will founder and have few agreeable effects.

2. The land question

The national asset portfolio of Zimbabwe is dominated by land, and it should therefore not surprise us that land lies at the centre of political activity (Rukuni & Jensen, 2003). Of perhaps greater importance is that land is the physical manifestation of a long history of white colonial rule in Zimbabwe. This history is the mainspring of the current struggles in Zimbabwe. That struggle can be thought of in terms of ‘Whose land is it, anyway?’

Although the conflict over land reached its peak in 2000, the current and future threats to economic and social coherence must be understood as dating back to British colonisation in 1890. When Zimbabwe gained independence in April 1980, the Lancaster House Constitution secured the land rights of white farmers for a period of 10 years. Beyond that initial decade the matter was left vague. Despite this initial assurance to the white farmers, the poor and dispossessed have used the strategy of land occupations to press their demands for resettlement. These occupations are said to have been driven by a desire to redress historical injustices (Alexander, 2003), a view corroborated by Rukuni & Jensen (2003), who argue that the Zimbabwean war of liberation was fought, to a large extent, over the land question.

Soon after independence, a few rural people began to occupy land that had been abandoned by white farmers during the war for independence. In addition, occupations occurred on land that had been purchased by the government, and on land that was being actively farmed by whites. There is some sense that such occupations were not spontaneous but were sanctioned by the local elite of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Alexander, 2003). Such grass-roots nationalism in the early 1980s is said to have sprung from a desire for return of the land to non-Europeans now that the country had attained independence. In the early 1980s the state responded by formalising land occupations through an accelerated resettlement programme. However, in cases where land occupations threatened to disrupt commercial farming activities the government stepped in to evict the occupiers.

Even then, the official position was quite selective. In the case of Commissioner of Police v Rensford and the Messenger of Court, Gweru (SC 30/1984), the official government position offered sympathy to the occupiers (Tshuma, 1997). In this hearing, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of Rensford, a white farmer who had sought the assistance of the state in enforcing an eviction order against people who were ‘illegally’ occupying his farm. The government considered this a judicial subversion under the cloak of legality and subsequently ignored the judgement. Soon after this the government enacted the Emergency Powers (Resolution of Disputes over Occupation of Rural Land) Regulations (SI 243 A/1984), which gave it the right to buy privately owned land that had been ‘illegally’ occupied for more than 5 years. The government then compulsorily acquired Rensford's land and paid compensation for taking it, and thus the occupants became tenants of the state. This case foreshadowed events of the year 2000.

Until 1985, illegal land occupants had access to high-ranking politicians, but soon the government introduced squatter-control committees at the district and provincial levels. These committees managed to keep land occupations at low intensity until the number of occupied farms rose from 200 in 1995 to 800 in 1997 (Moyo, 1998). These occupations occurred on commercial and state farms, in state forests and national parks, and in communal and resettlement areas (Marongwe, 2002). During this period, therefore, it would seem that ‘land hunger’ rather than retribution against white farmers was an important motivation. However, from 2000 the land occupations increasingly focused on white commercial farms. During this period the government ceased to impede such occupations. There are good reasons to believe that the government's silence – and later even encouragement – was calculated to take the public's mind off of the worsening economic situation.

By the early 1990s, Zimbabwe's economy was on a downward trajectory (Moyo & Yeros, 2005). Compared with annual rates of economic growth of slightly over 4 per cent in the 1980s, the annual rate of growth between 1991 and 1997 went from 2.7 per cent in 1991 to 0.7 per cent in 1997. During this period Zimbabwe experienced two major droughts. The first, in 1992, was described as the worst in more than a century. The 1995 drought was more localised. Compounding the effects of these droughts was a series of years in which unfavourable global commodity prices brought serious economic stress to agriculture.

It was during this time that Zimbabwe underwent a major economic structural adjustment programme imposed by the World Bank (2007) and the IMF. As a result, per-capita incomes fell dramatically, social conditions worsened, and the number of people living in extreme poverty increased. The upsurge in ‘land hunger’ must be seen in the light of this profound retrenchment of the industrial workforce, and an associated decline in urban–rural remittances.

August 1997 was an important turning point. Thousands of veterans who had been demobilised in the early 1980s started demanding compensation for their role in the war of liberation. At a time of increasing immiserisation, and in the light of new revelations about widespread political corruption, the war veterans decided to press their claims for recognition of their service to the cause of independence. To quell unrest, the government paid each of the registered war veterans a pension of Z$50 000 (US$4761.90) plus Z$2000 (US$190.47) per month (Bond & Manyanya, 2002). The long-run political benefits of such payments would seem significant.

In February 2000 a draft of a new Constitution was defeated in a referendum. The draft contained government-backed clauses reinforcing the right of compulsory acquisition of land, and qualifying existing compensation criteria for land acquired by the government. The new conditions would have required the government to compensate commercial farmers for improvements on the land but there would be no compensation for the land itself. The Commercial Farmers Union, along with others, campaigned against the draft Constitution. Not long after this, 12 war veterans occupied farms in Masvingo, claiming that ‘white farmers had connived to defeat the draft Constitution in the referendum’ (Moyo, 2001:318). The wave of farm occupations now began to gather momentum. When leaders of the War Veterans Association, and the ruling party, realised that white farmers were actively campaigning for the major opposition group, the Movement for Democratic Change, and were encouraging their farm workers to do the same, farm occupations then became violent and increasingly intertwined with the political campaign for the June 2000 parliamentary elections (Moyo, 2001).

The period after 2000 witnessed the increasing reluctance of the Mugabe government to enforce the law, leading to inevitable deterioration in tenure security. The creation of a youth militia unleashed serious violence as the government adopted a chaotic and partisan Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme (FTLRP). The FTLRP was supposedly completed in 2002 but farm occupations continued amidst intensified contestation over land claims.

It is important to note that this was not the first time that civilians had suffered from state-sponsored violence. During Gukurahundi (the 1980s civil war in Matabeleland) there was massive loss of life and property – over 20 000 people killed by five Brigade (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, 2007). Although the Matabeleland massacres were reminiscent of pre-colonial hostile relations between the Shona and Ndebele, they were more a result of the new Zimbabwe nation-state's struggle to assume power and moral authority (Moyo, 2004). Thus, as early as the 1980s the state exhibited its intolerance through this exercise of quasi-nationalism; in the period following the 2000 referendum it displayed similar intolerance by sponsoring violence on commercial farms in order to shore up its threatened political legitimacy. It would seem that whenever the state suffered from a ‘crisis of legitimacy’, arising from doubts about its capacity to govern, or from a series of economic crises, land emerged as an expedient by which these doubts could be dispelled.

After exhausting all legal channels within Zimbabwe for securing their tenure, white farmers took the matter to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Tribunal. In a case brought by 78 white farmers in November 2008, the Tribunal held Zimbabwe's land reform programme illegal since it violated the SADC Treaty requiring respect for civil rights and the rule of law. The Zimbabwe government described the ruling as an exercise in futility since the protocol had not been ‘domesticated’ by Zimbabwe's parliament. The SADC has not been able to enforce its ruling.

There is no doubt that the SADC has sufficient leverage to influence the course of events in Zimbabwe. However, its ambivalence in the face of the crisis can be explained by the dominance in its membership of political leaders who share a history of liberation struggles against white rule. It seems that these leaders regard the events in Zimbabwe as no more than the denouement of decolonisation. But the SADC's ambivalent attitude to Zimbabwe's descent into political violence and economic collapse has of course had the practical effect of compromising its political legitimacy on the African continent.

So far our discussion of recent history has focused on land and the political manoeuvrings attendant to land. It would be a mistake to overlook the profound economic implications of this history. In the following discussion we show several graphs for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and for Zimbabwe.1 First, there is general recognition that the Zimbabwe economy has suffered a lack of investor confidence starting well before independence – but especially over the past 15 years. Figure 1 shows the percentage change in gross capital formation for the sub-continent and for Zimbabwe. The trend in Zimbabwe does not bode well for future economic growth.

Figure 1: Percentage change in gross capital formation

The effect of this uncertain investment climate is apparent in Figure 2, which shows the annual percentage growth in manufacturing value added. We see that manufacturing has suffered greatly since the beginning of the 1990s when the structural adjustment programme was launched.

Figure 2: Annual percentage growth in manufacturing value added

We now turn to the agricultural sector. Figure 3 shows the percentage annual growth in agriculture value added. The wild swings since 1970 must be seen from two perspectives. It is to be expected that the experience of a single country would display more volatility than the combined averages of 48 countries. But from the perspective of agricultural value added in a country long buffeted by a number of forces, the picture in Figure 3 is ominous. The impact of drought years is also clearly evident.

Figure 3: Annual percentage growth in agriculture value added

The specific issue of per-capita food production can be seen in Figure 4, which shows the indifferent record of the entire sub-continent. Notice that all 48 countries have lost ground in this battle going as far back as 1965. But the impact on Zimbabwe is both more extreme, and more tragic.

Figure 4: Index of per capita food production (1999–2001 = 1.0)

Another perspective on this grim picture can be seen in Figure 5, which shows the cereal yield (in kilograms per hectare) since 1965.

Figure 5: Cereal yield per hectare (kg)

It is well known that human fertility rates drop in the face of unpromising political and economic outlooks. When the Soviet Union collapsed, birth rates declined dramatically. We see in Figure 6 that Zimbabwe has experienced a similar ‘birth dearth’. The steady decline in the rate (per cent) of population growth since 1984 is illustrative of the despair. While falling rates of population growth are usually welcomed on the sub-continent, the Zimbabwe trajectory cannot possibly be considered good news. Worse still, of a population of 12 million, about 3.5 million have emigrated, and this, along with the HIV/AIDS pandemic, has robbed the country of vital skills.

Figure 6: Rates of population growth

Finally, consider what may be the cruellest phenomenon in a poor country, the consumer price index (Figure 7). It is here, in the plummeting purchasing power of what little cash might be on hand, that we see the full implications of the political chaos in Zimbabwe. The accompanying hyperinflation has resulted in the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar and the extinction of private savings.

Figure 7: Consumer Price Index (2000 = 100)

By whatever measure, life for the Zimbabwe people has become one of unremitting hardship. With the collapse of the economy and the social services, the rate of unemployment stands at 94 per cent and over 7 million out of a total population of 12 million depend on food aid. The country has been witnessing an increasing need for humanitarian assistance. It is apparent that Zimbabwe cannot be revitalised without a comprehensive resuscitation of agriculture, and this will require technical help, extension programmes and the inflow of capital. However, the success of agriculture is inextricably linked to the land question. We now turn to the historic roots of that problem.

3. Land and ‘rights’ to land: A historical perspective

The southern African country now known as Zimbabwe was, from 1901 to 1964, called Southern Rhodesia by the white settlers. Between 1964 and 1979 it was called Rhodesia. For a brief while in 1979 it was known as Zimbabwe Rhodesia, and at independence in 1980 it was renamed Zimbabwe.

3.1 The early years

The discovery of gold in 1886 on the Witwatersrand at Johannesburg, South Africa, triggered direct British occupation of what would become, in a few years, Southern Rhodesia. This discovery of gold by Afrikaners was seen by the British as a serious threat to their colonial supremacy in southern Africa. Cecil John Rhodes, English financier and mining magnate, quickly understood that continued British dominance in the region could only be guaranteed by the discovery and exploitation of a ‘second Rand’ north of the Limpopo River. In 1888, Rhodes obtained the Rudd Concession from King Lobengula. This grant from the King gave Rhodes exclusive control over all of the mineral wealth contained in Lobengula's territory, along with the power to do what he (Rhodes) deemed necessary to exploit the minerals (Rayner, 1962). In 1891 Lobengula, who had repudiated the Rudd Concession, attempted to play the Boers against the British by granting Edouard Lippert, a Boer, a parallel concession – the Lippert Concession. But Lippert was later to be bought out by Rhodes. Both the Rudd and the Lippert Concession are considered controversial and fraudulent (Palley, 1966; Palmer, 1977). As with many treaties of this sort, it is doubtful whether they would stand the scrutiny of what we now call the ‘canons of construction’. In general terms, treaties between indigenous leaders and foreign powers must always be understood against the background of granting the benefit of the doubt to indigenous peoples. After all, such treaties are written in the language of the colonial conqueror and so it is to be expected that the balance of power in such negotiations favours the colonial party (Orange, 1987; Wilmsen, 1989; Brownlie, 1992).

Sharing Rhodes's alarm, the British government quickly granted him a charter empowering his British South Africa Company (BSAC) to, inter alia, make treaties, promulgate laws, preserve the peace, maintain a police force, acquire new concessions and generally provide, at the Company's expense, the infrastructure of a new Colony. In 1890, Rhodes and his BSAC recruited a force, the Pioneer Column, from all over South Africa, with each of the 196 pioneers being promised a free farm of 3175 acres and 15 reef claims of 400 by 150 feet. The primary interest of the pioneers was the gold and therefore many pioneers sold their land claims to speculators for about £100 each while still on the march to Salisbury, now Harare (Palmer, 1977). Upon arrival in Salisbury, the pioneers were disbanded and were now free to peg (stake) their promised 15 gold claims and to ‘ride off’ their 3175 acre farms. Blake observes that:

Few of them paused to reflect on the legal aspect of these exciting promises. The status of the farms was particularly questionable, for the Company was not in a position to give valid title to land. (1978:93)

Land grabbing and speculation typified the pioneer era in Southern Rhodesia. By 1892 Rhodes had decided to stop free land grants, inducing the BSAC and pioneers to sell land to those individuals intent on settling as farmers in Mashonaland.

After realising that the gold fields in Mashonaland were only a shadow of the South African Rand, Rhodes's attention turned not only to land speculation in Mashonaland but also to the mineral wealth of Matabeleland, which he hoped would be greater than Mashonaland's – and where the fertile and well-stocked highveld was an added advantage. When, in 1893, an excuse was found for the BSAC to attack Matabeleland, the Ndebele state was destroyed. The land speculation that was typical of Mashonaland was replicated in Matabeleland, but on a larger scale. For the Ndebele, ‘within a few months of the European occupation … practically the whole of their most valued region ceased to be their patrimony and passed into the private estates of individuals and the commercial property of companies’ (Palmer, 1977:38).

By the end of 1895 it had become clear that the anticipated gold discoveries in Matabeleland were a mirage. At this time, one-sixth of the country's 96 million acres had been expropriated by Europeans. The land dispossession provoked the Ndebele and Shona Uprisings of 1896–97. Again the BSAC prevailed, since it assumed that it was the ‘owner’ of the land in Southern Rhodesia. On the basis of this assumption, the Company granted land titles to members of the Pioneer Column and other European immigrants. After the defeat of the Ndebele in 1893, the Company regarded itself as master of Rhodesia by right of conquest. This assumption was later found to be mistaken.

Matters came to a head in 1918 over the question of ownership of unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia. The claimants – in a case brought before the Privy Council in Britain – were the BSAC, representatives of European settlers, and Africans. Judgement in the case was given in favour of the Crown. That is, the Privy Council upheld the titles of those to whom the Company had granted land. The Council further affirmed that the natives had lost their land rights through conquest.

In 1923, the white settler community voted for the status of ‘self-governing colony’ rather than union with South Africa. That same year the BSAC surrendered its power to the settler government, under which land dispossession of indigenous people continued. Palmer (1977) gives an account of the land evictions and dispossession of indigenous people in 1948 to make way for post-1945 white war veterans. In 1965 the Rhodesian Front led by Ian Smith declared unilateral independence from Britain. The Shona and the Ndebele did not consider this as independence because black people had no franchise. Neighbouring Malawi and Zambia had obtained their independence from Britain in 1963 and 1964, respectively, and these examples spurred blacks in Rhodesia to press for majority rule. The war for independence reached its peak after Mozambique became independent in 1975. In parts of the country where the war was being fought, the freedom fighters held night rallies at which rural peasants were repeatedly reminded that ‘we are fighting so you can get your land back’ (Cliffe, 1981:30). The war for independence came to an end following the signing of the Lancaster House Peace Agreement in 1979. The 1980 elections brought full independence to Zimbabwe.

3.2 Property rights after independence

When Zimbabwe finally forced Britain to grant independence in 1980, the interesting question became: what remains of the alleged property ‘rights’ of white commercial farmers? Notice the ironic twist here. Since the British Crown failed to acknowledge native land rights during the hegemony of white rule from the mid-nineteenth century up until Zimbabwean independence in 1980, what basis in law can be found to prevent the independent government of Zimbabwe failing to acknowledge land titles held by whites – titles granted by the British Crown? It would seem that white farmers, who imagine themselves ‘owners’ under the new Zimbabwean dispensation, are in a legally tenuous situation. Riddell (1978), Ranger (1985), Moyo (2001) and Marongwe (2002) provide detailed accounts of claims over the white farmers' land by dispossessed clans. Yudelman (1964), commenting on the fate of pioneers in various regions of the world, offers some interesting insights.

Unlike the western frontiersmen of the US, the Southern Rhodesian frontiersmen encountered a numerically superior indigenous population that was seeking land for itself. As a distinct minority at independence, white farmers faced a most uncertain future. One of the pioneers, Frederick Courteney Selous, may not have realised the irony of his message when he wrote to his mother to say: ‘So you see the campaign is virtually over and the fair-headed descendants of the northern pirates are in possession of the great King's Kraal, and the calf of the black cow has fled into the wilderness’ (Blake, 1978:111).

The fundamental question becomes: to what extent does contested possession become ownership? One of the central issues here is the myth of empty land:

The doctrine … is identified … as that of territorium nullius, empty land, which asserts that lands occupied by foraging peoples at the time of settlement by Europeans became the sole property of the ‘original [European] discoverers’ because such native peoples were deemed to be even more primitive than others encountered in European expansion. (Wilmsen, 1989:1–2)

The issue of terra nullius is as old as European contact with peoples engaged in an economy unrecognisable to colonisers in virtually all its aspects. But of course the term terra nullius means ‘unowned’, not ‘empty’. The land-use patterns observed by Europeans tended to conflate the two ideas. Since indigenous peoples did not have the usual artefacts that colonisers took to imply ‘ownership’ (fences, stone houses, adjacent cultivated fields) it was too easy to assume that the locals did not need or want the land and it was therefore vacant or ‘empty’. Regarding land as empty was a convenient excuse to lay claim to as much of it as possible.

The British in southern Africa differed little in this regard from Europeans who ventured to North and South America, Australia and New Zealand. The idea of terra nullius was simply a convenient justification for all the colonisers to get on with the task at hand. Interestingly though, when the British arrived in Egypt, in Sudan (to a somewhat lesser extent) and in South Asia they encountered agricultural practices and settlement patterns that were recognisable to European minds. With terra nullius no longer available as a pretext, colonialism took on a somewhat different character.

Palmer reports that ‘When the Europeans came to Rhodesia in the 1890s, they were immediately struck by the vast amount of seemingly empty land’ (1977:38). And, as always, the appearance of this kind of human settlement and these rural livelihood strategies deceived European arrivistes because of their embedded cultural norms where land, land occupation and land ownership were concerned. For example, local hostilities and an abundance of wild animals meant that settlements were small and compact and large expanses of land were seemingly vacant. Land that was being rested in systems of shifting cultivation could be mistaken for land that was not being used. And other parcels had cultural significance that might have suggested they were unused. We see this most prominently in the African idea of ‘space as place’. Colonisers tend to see a parcel of land as an asset to be mobilised for the production of crops, or as a building site, or as ‘green space’ for the production of amenities. Africans, as with indigenous people everywhere, tend to see a parcel of land as something internal – as part of their past and as essential to their future. It is an asset of a different form and meaning. Thus, assertions such as: ‘Land was plentiful, and there was little pressure on Africans to earn a livelihood from other sources’ (Yudelman, 1964:42) cannot be taken seriously.

This historical account reminds us that once it was realised that the land between the Limpopo and the Zambezi was only a shadow of the South African Rand, white settlers turned to land speculation with the reassuring knowledge that their land claims (‘rights’) were protected by the Crown. But those alleged rights, gained through conquest, have been contested by dispossessed indigenous people and more recently by the state. Moyo (2004) believes that the land conflict is fuelled by ideological and policy discourses that have not resolved the question of whether – and to what extent – the ‘rights’ in question are valid in a constitutional sense, to say nothing of their social and political legitimacy.

While the land question remains unresolved, Zimbabwe faces the formidable challenge of simultaneously satisfying two opposed needs: on the one hand to resolve historical injustices in the distribution of land and thereby bring economic recovery to the agricultural sector, and on the other to respect the constitutional rights of all Zimbabweans and bring relief to farmers who have suffered financial losses. The country requires a way forward that will strike a workable balance between the two mutually exclusive outcomes. Lacking that, it faces the destruction of its future by the rhetoric of redress for its past.

4. The way forward: Revitalising the agrarian economy

Despite the collapse of commercial farming over the past decade, Zimbabwe has the potential to once again enjoy political and economic stability and regain its former position as one of Africa's leading exporters of agricultural products. This can be done through the implementation of strategies that give priority to revitalising the agrarian economy – the essential engine of economic recovery. Doing so will require a comprehensive economic recovery programme spanning a decade of careful attention. The core components of such a programme will be stabilising the macro-economy, restoring basic public services and generating employment. The programme will include timely normalisation of relations with the international community, as well as rapid support comprised of aid, debt relief and private finance.

4.1 Enforcing the rule of law and building trust

The first step is obvious: restoration of the rule of law and building of trust. Without renewed commitment to the Constitution, and an independent parliament and judiciary, the current economic situation will remain problematic. The land invasions that became common after 1999 have been promoted by the selective application of the rule of law along racial, class and political lines. Constitutional amendments have undermined the perception of a society based on the rule of law, and are understood to represent a defeat for impartiality. The absence of an independent Judicial Services Commission has further jeopardised the legal environment.

It is no surprise that economic activities are undermined by capricious and arbitrary legal procedures. During its immediate past, Zimbabwe has seen inconsistency and incoherence in application of the law, and a corresponding erosion of confidence in the government's ability to govern effectively. As a result, fast-track land reform beneficiaries have had few reasons to invest in farm infrastructure and equipment. At the same time, the government has taken the initiative to remove some occupiers from certain farms, often where such properties are destined to become the possession of high-ranking politicians, bureaucrats or the business elite.

An important element for recovery of the agricultural sector is the need to reassure foreign and domestic investors that their investments are safe from potential expropriation. The speed at which the agricultural sector can recover ultimately depends on the government's ability to inspire trust among citizens, banks and investors. Legal and administrative systems must foster trust at all levels of society.

4.2 Land audit, adjudication and restitution

The next step required is for an independent government body to conduct a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit, to provide information to help the land adjudication and restitution process. The chaotic way land reform was implemented after 1998 gave some people claims to multiple parcels of land. There are conflicting and competing claims over land parcels, and some individuals have sold or abandoned the land parcels that they occupied. A land audit is necessary for each pre-1998 commercial farm. Among other things it would establish:

• the names of all land claimants, including, as relevant, the former owner of the commercial farm, farm workers and resident and non-resident land reform beneficiaries;

• the size and location of their landholdings;

• the size, nature and value of physical assets owned or claimed; and

• the level of utilisation of the landholdings.

The audit should identify all land and physical asset claims, including multiple and overlapping claims.

Land adjudication will be required to resolve conflicting land claims, systematically regularise landholdings, and reconcile overlapping land claims. There are competing claims to land by commercial farmers, farm workers, new settlers and the state. Land adjudication is the process through which existing rights in a particular parcel of land are finally and authoritatively ascertained. Land records must be regularised, and there is a need for a functioning system of land administration. This work could be undertaken by an independent Land Commission, established by law and specially tasked to hear land claims, validate land rights and provide redress to commercial farmers whose farms have been taken over by the government since 1998. The Land Commission should consist of individuals experienced and knowledgeable in land reform issues, and its work will be enhanced to the extent that there are clear terms of reference, and staff and financing are adequate to the task. Claimants must have the right of appeal to the regular courts. A land compensation fund or other means of compensating commercial farmers for their land should be considered. Various options for paying compensation should be considered, such as public bonds or annuities. Given the contested history of white ‘ownership’ of land, it must be acknowledged that the concept of ‘compensation’ may be politically problematic. But practically speaking we know of no other means to move forward.

4.3 Promotion of dialogue, reconciliation and rebuilding the capacity of government agencies

The years of crisis have produced a society seriously polarised along racial, political and ethnic lines. Obviously this situation has corroded political stability, economic growth and social integration. As suggested above, a plan for putting Zimbabwe on the path to economic recovery must be accompanied by a programme to build trust in the political system. Such a programme must promote dialogue and reconciliation not only between the major political parties but among all citizens. Importantly, the programme will need to incorporate a policy of reconciliation and national healing so as to build goodwill and confidence among Zimbabweans of various racial, political and ethnic affiliations.

A programme that promotes dialogue and reconciliation will need to be supported by reform of the police, the army, the judiciary and the intelligence and prison services, since ‘Politicization and corruption of the police, military, intelligence services, and judiciary have undermined what were once professional and highly regarded institutions’ (Moss & Patrick, 2006:27). Any programme for economic recovery must include investigation of officials for past abuses, training officials in civilian policing and criminal justice, and disbanding the militia. The youth militia will need to be demobilised and reintegrated into society, and psychological support services will be needed to help them obtain training, education and jobs.

4.4 Developing an agricultural sector strategy

An agricultural sector strategy will need to be formulated with strong participation of the government, international community and various farming sectors. It would aim to increase agricultural productivity and employment by addressing the following four main areas.

4.4.1 Resuscitating production in former large-scale commercial farming areas

As part of a land audit and adjudication process, racial integration would be promoted in these areas as a means to provide a more secure base for social and political stability. White farmers who still wish to pursue commercial farming would – through land restitution – be able to do so. However, as we know from South Africa, restitution of historic land claims is long and difficult. The land audit and adjudication process would allow those who had claimed several white farms to retain one, but they would have to surrender the remainder into a ‘restitution pool’. It is from this pool that white farmers could once again take up farming. Recall that there is a maximum farm size, so enforcement of this cap would liberate substantial land for resettlement. Finally, there are large tracts of abandoned and underutilised farms, some of which are owned by the government, that could be placed in the restitution pool.

While it will not be desirable – or politically feasible – to restore the pre-1998 agrarian structure, there are policy solutions that would strike a balance between the compelling needs of the landless and the interests of commercial farmers who were forced off their land. A policy that supports the building of a multicultural farming community would provide opportunities for mutual support between returning commercial farmers and new settlers. It is essential to recall that white commercial farmers have vast knowledge, and the requisite entrepreneurial skills, to benefit new settlers. Opportunities exist for the realisation of mutual benefits through equity share schemes, land rental arrangements and other initiatives. Policies that promote land rental markets could bring currently underutilised farm land back into production.

Measures that can be taken to optimise land use and release land onto the market include the introduction of a land tax that takes into account land-use potential, the encouragement of land subdivision where necessary, and the disposal of government-owned land with the first option to purchase the land being given to current occupants. A well-designed land taxation system based on land-use potential would induce farmers to use land optimally, thus increasing productivity. Apart from being a production incentive, a land tax can reduce land hoarding and speculation, and it can help to mobilise the land market.

The development of a viable land market could also be promoted through new legislation that would facilitate and secure various leasing and sharecropping contracts. The basis for such arrangements already exists, as grazing land in resettlement areas is often leased to commercial farmers by absentee new settlers. Farmers and their workers often enter into sharecropping arrangements so as to spread risk, share resources and assume joint responsibility for minimising theft.

4.4.2 Promoting the smallholder agricultural sector

Beneficiaries of the land reform programme, and communal farmers, will probably lack knowledge and experience in farm management. These new farmers will require training and education to equip them with the necessary skills to become successful farmers. Boosting production in the smallholder sector will require a package that includes drought mitigation measures, research, special credit facilities and augmented market channels for inputs and products. While tomato production has been successful on many resettlement schemes, most farmers have been unable to find a viable market for their tomatoes. There is a need to finance the development of irrigation and other infrastructure, to augment the agro-industry sector, and to upgrade services in communal and resettlement smallholder farming areas.

Experience from the 1980s demonstrates that the smallholder farming sector can perform at impressive levels of success if there is timely access to input supplies, high-quality extension services, training and educational programmes, credit and viable marketing channels.

4.4.3 Increasing tenure security

There will need to be new policies to strengthen security of tenure in all rural areas. In the commercial farming areas, 99-year land leases, with an option to purchase after 10 years, seem promising. This approach will give farmers the option of title to land upon completion of certain levels of land improvement. In the communal areas, new land policies must provide for legal recognition (by the state) of customary land rights. Depending on demand, communal land should be surveyed and registered in the name of individuals, families or groups. Security and predictability in the land tenure system are essential ingredients of economic recovery. With increased security in lease or freehold areas, and in communal areas, the incentives to invest and to adopt appropriate environmental measures will be strengthened.

4.4.4 Improving incentive structures and supporting services

Incentives for production and investment in commercial farming must be strengthened. As a first step, government involvement in factor and product markets must be eliminated. At present, the government controls the distribution of seed and fertiliser to smallholder farmers, thereby thwarting the wishes of smallholders who would rather buy inputs on the market. Moreover, production could recover if the government relaxed its control over input distribution. On the output side, the government requires farmers to sell their grain through the Grain Marketing Board. An observer notes that:

Sharecropping arrangements are entered into between farmers and their workers, particularly for food crops, in order to circumvent marketing regulations that require the delivery of maize and wheat grown on commercial farms to the Grain Marketing Board within 14 days of harvest. (Hasluck, 2003:67)

Prices offered by the government are far below what produce can fetch on the open market – often by a factor of three to four.

Innovative supply-side policies will need to concentrate on deregulating product and factor markets and supplying services. The new programme will need to provide for infrastructure that ensures reliable access to transport and communication at affordable prices.

Farms of all types and sizes will require substantial capital investment. Both white and black commercial farmers who had their farm assets looted – and who have been resettled – will require ready access to capital if they are to return underutilised land to production. The need for extension services, infrastructure and social services is paramount.

4.4.5 The agrarian trust fund

An agrarian recovery programme will require substantial international funding. The international donor community needs to invest in Zimbabwe's economic recovery in order to avert further civil conflict. The goal here is a viable state – representative governance based on the rule of law, market-mediated economic activity and a confident civil society. In such a state, essential security, well-being and justice are available to all citizens. Given the centrality of human resources development to the creation of a viable state, donors should consider supporting programmes to encourage the return of skilled Zimbabweans who are now resident in foreign countries. The Zimbabwe Government could complement such efforts by restoring dual citizenship and granting voting rights to Zimbabweans in the diaspora so that they retain attachment to their homeland.

Through its investments in the agricultural sector, the international donor community would be contributing to the creation of productive incentives, a reduction in local and international threats, the promotion of rule-based regimes, national self-reliance and civic harmony in southern Africa. An agrarian trust fund would allow the immediate launch of the necessary first steps. Those steps would include an assessment of Zimbabwe's priority needs – including evaluation of the infrastructure deficit and other areas that can be privately financed. A national coordinating body can be established to manage financial inflows.

5. Summary

The situation in Zimbabwe is troublesome because, at least since 1980, the land question has hovered over – and distorted – all political and economic considerations. Claims and counterclaims about alleged ‘property rights’ have further hijacked the quest for clarity. And all sides in past and current disputes have, in an unfortunate sense, benefited from this muddle. The history traced here reinforces the point that political and economic coherence will be elusive until there is definitive closure to that unpleasant past. The essential transformative step is for a consensual governance process to emerge from the turmoil of the Mugabe period. That process must immediately confront the question of ‘Whose land is it, anyway?’ The answer, as in all constitutional democracies, is that property rights are not ‘discovered’ by a careful reading of some sacred texts (Becker, 1977; Bromley, 1989, 1991, 1992, 2004, 2006; Christman, 1994). Rather, property rights are created by the political community in which various assets and income streams are accorded extraordinary protection. The political community must decide which assets in that community shall be given the extraordinary reification we call ‘property rights’.

Once that has been accomplished, the restoration of investor confidence in Zimbabwe's commercial farming sector will not be far behind. The core components of that revitalisation include a return of the rule of law, a degree of financial predictability, and assurance concerning the nature of law and consistency in its application. A comprehensive financial package would help restore much needed macro-economic stability. These measures would begin to bring about social and political stability, reduce the corrosive effect of great uncertainty, and once again turn Zimbabwe into an attractive destination for new investment.

But there is more to economic revitalisation than foreign and domestic investment – a full array of feasible and transparent economic incentives must be introduced to mobilise human energy in the interest of entrepreneurial activity and the building of a civil society. However, quick and decisive settlement of ‘the land question’ is the sine qua non of political and economic change in Zimbabwe.

Notes

¹The data for Zimbabwe are included in the data for sub-Saharan Africa. The difficulty in separating Zimbabwe out from this larger group of countries seemed excessive given our immediate purpose.